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The politics behind the story: Sixty years on from the 1957 Australia-Japan Commerce Agreement

Edited by Michael Heazle and Dan Halvorson

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Workshop Edited Papers

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2017 Australia–Japan Dialogue

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About the Authors

Dan Halvorson is a Senior Lecturer in the School of Government and International Relations at Griffith University. He is a member of the Griffith Asia Institute and Centre for Governance and Public Policy. Dan's research interests focus on the history of Australia's foreign and defence policies, Cold War history in Asia, decolonisation and nation-building, and on great power intervention in the periphery. He has published recently in the *Journal of Cold War Studies* and *International History Review*.

Ryosuke Hanada is a Research Fellow at the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA) where he mostly researches Japan's relations with key maritime states in the Indo-Pacific region, in particular Australia and India. He is also a PhD candidate at the Australian National University. He obtained his MA from the University of Warwick and BA in Law from Waseda University. His publication includes 'Emerging Great Power Competition: US and China in Regional Economic Cooperation of the Asia Pacific', Waseda University Organisation for Japan–US, Studies: Student Paper No.201201.

Michael Heazle is an Adjunct Associate Professor with the Griffith Asia Institute. He convenes the annual 1.5 Track Australia–Japan Dialogue for GAI, which he co-founded in 2011. From 1992 to 2000, he was a regular contributor to the *Far Eastern Economic Review*, and wrote for a number of other domestic and international media. Dr Heazle has researched and published in the areas of energy, human, and environmental security; policy making and the treatment of specialist advice; China–Japan relations; and Northeast Asia security. His works include a collection of books and edited volumes with several university presses and publishers (University of Washington Press, Cambridge University Press, Earthscan/Routledge, Edward Elgar) and numerous articles in various peer reviewed journals including *Marine Policy*, *Environmental Science and Policy, Intelligence and National Security, The Pacific Review*, and the *Australian Journal of International Affairs*. His latest book is *Regional Primacy in East Asia: China's Rise and Australia–Japan–US Trilateral Relations* (co-edited with Andrew O'Neil; Edward Elgar).

Rikki Kersten is a Professor and Dean, School of Arts, Murdoch University, Western Australia. She specialises in Japanese history, politics, security policy and foreign policy. She has a special interest in Australia–Japan relations, and in the US–Japan alliance. Educated at Adelaide and Oxford universities, Professor Kersten has held research attachments to various tertiary institutions in Japan, including the University of Tokyo and Keio University. Previously, Professor Kersten spent five years in the Australian Foreign Service, and served in the Political Section of the Australian Embassy in Tokyo.

Professor Kersten has taught modern Japanese history at Sydney and Leiden Universities and served as Director of the Research Institute for Asia and the Pacific at the University of Sydney. Before joining Murdoch, she was Dean of the College of Asia and the Pacific, Dean of the Faculty of Asian Studies, and a Professor of Modern Japanese Political History at the Australian National University in Canberra.

Sheryn Lee is a Lecturer in Security Studies at the Department of Security Studies and Criminology, Macquarie University. She completed her PhD at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre (SDSC), the Australian National University in 2017. Her dissertation examined arms racing theory and the modernization of naval and associated air capabilities in the Asia Pacific (2001–16). She was previously a non-resident WSD-Handa Fellow at Pacific Forum, Center for Strategic and International Studies; and holds an AM in Political Science from the University of Pennsylvania, where she was a Benjamin Franklin Fellow and Mumford Fellow.

Sheryn was also a TB Millar scholar at the SDSC; and Robert O'Neill scholar at the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS)-Asia in Singapore. She is also a regular contributor to *East Asia Forum*.

Takayuki Nagano is a Professor of International Relations and History at the Department of Foreign Studies, Dokkyo University, Japan. His areas of interest include post-war international relations of the Asia Pacific region, with particular emphasis on Western powers' (the US,

UK and Australia) alliance diplomacy. He is currently focusing on Japan–Australia relations during 1970s and 80s with special attention to Australia's attitudes towards Japan's emerging role in the Asia-Pacific region. He is also working on Anglo-Australian relations between the 1950s and 60s with special reference to the birth of Federation of Malaysia and Indonesian Confrontation (Konfrontasi).

Dr Nagano obtained his Ph.D. in International Relations from Sophia University, Tokyo with his thesis titled 'British Post-war Policy Towards South East Asia: Its Evolution and Development'. He also studied at the Department of Government at University of Essex, the Department of International Politics at University of Wales, Aberystwyth, and the Department of International History at the London School of Economics and Political Science.

He is a co-editor of *Introduction to Australian Studies*, published by University of Tokyo Press. He is a regular contributor to *Asian Security*, published annually by the Research Institute for Peace and Security, Tokyo. He also contributed an article on post-war Australian diplomacy to *Cyclopaedia of Oceania* published by Heibonsya. His most recent article is titled 'Australia's Diplomacy towards Japan in the 1970s' in *Japan's Post-war Policy Revisited: Politics and Diplomacy in the 1970s* (edited by Prof. Fumio Fukunaga, published by Yuhikaku).

Tomohiko Satake is a senior research fellow at the National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS) located in Tokyo. He specialises in Japan–US–Australia security cooperation. Between 2013 and 2014, he worked for the International Policy Division of the Defense Policy Bureau of the Japan Ministry of Defense as a deputy director for international security.

He earned B.A. and M.A. from Keio University, and PhD in international relations from the Australian National University. His publication includes: 'Japan–Australia security cooperation: emerging challenges and opportunities', CSIS Strategic Working Paper, April 2017; 'The New Guidelines for Japan–US Defence Cooperation and an Expanding Japanese Security Role', Asian Politics & Policy, 8: 27–38, 2016; 'The

Japan–Australia contribution to a liberal and inclusive regional order: beyond the 'China gap'', Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 70, Issue 1, 2016; and 'The Origin of Trilateralism? The US–Japan–Australia Security Relations during the 1990s', The International Relations of the Asia Pacific, Vol. 11, No. 1, 2011.

Hideshi Tokuchi is a Senior Fellow, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS), Japan. He joined the Defence Agency (the predecessor of the Ministry of Defence) of Japan in 1979 and served as the nation's first Vice-Minister of Defence for International Affairs from July 2014 until he left the Government in October 2015. In the Ministry of Defence, he also served as the Director-General of four bureaus: Operations; Personnel and Education; Finance and Equipment; and Defence Policy. He taught Japan's national security policy as a visiting professor at National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS) from 2002 to 2015. He is a Senior Fellow of the institute, a Senior Research Adviser to the Institute for International Policy Studies (IIPS), and a Visiting Professor of National Defence Academy now. His paper in English includes 'The Defence Force of Japan Awakens to Address the Contemporary Security Environment', in Ron Huisken, ed., *CSCAP Regional Security Outlook 2017* (Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific, 2017), pp. 13–15.

Thomas Wilkins is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Government and International Relations at the University of Sydney. He specialises in Asia Pacific regional security issues including: alliances/alignment, Australia–Japan relations, and middle powers. He received his Doctorate from the University of Birmingham in the UK (with one year spent at Johns Hopkins University as exchange student), and conducted Post-Doctoral work at the University of San Francisco and East-West Centre, Honolulu, for two years. He has since been a Japan Foundation and Japanese Society for the Promotion of Sciences fellowship recipient at the University of Tokyo, totalling two years, and is a Visiting Associate Professor at the University of Hong Kong. He has published in journals such as *Review of International Studies, International Relations of the Asia Pacific, Pacific Review, Australian Journal of International Affairs, Asia Policy*, and *Asian Security*.

Contents

Introduction

Michael Heazle and Dan Halvorson

The annual Australia–Japan Dialogues are focused on the bilateral relationship between the two states, and the mutual relationships that both countries share within the Asia-Pacific region and in the world. The Dialogues, which are jointly hosted by the Griffith Asia Institute and Japan Institute of Institute of International Affairs, bring together political scientists, international relations and diplomatic history scholars, and policy experts and practitioners. The Dialogues provide a valuable opportunity for interdisciplinary collaboration and institutional cooperation in Australia–Japan related research. The 2017 Australia–Japan Dialogue, held in Brisbane in November 2017, brought together 19 experts to examine the historical, political and strategic foundations of the contemporary bilateral relationship.

The catalyst for the 2017 Dialogue theme was the sixtieth anniversary of the 1957 Commerce Agreement between Japan and Australia, which is generally recognised as the first major step in the development of substantive bilateral relations between the former wartime adversaries after the signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1951. Thus, the anniversary provided a timely opportunity to reflect on the contemporary Australia–Japan relationship and where it may be heading; and further, to examine change and continuity by revisiting the circumstances and strategic environment from which the relationship was re-established and forged more than 60 years ago. The economic complementarities between Australia and Japan during this period, and the subsequent trade benefits of the Commerce Agreement, have been well covered in the literature. However, the political and security drivers of the close economic and trade relationship established during this period of the Cold War have tended to be overlooked in existing narratives. The theme of the 2017 Dialogue sought to balance the economic narrative that tends to

dominate understandings of the relationships' post-war evolution, by instead placing its focus on the politics of the relationship, then and now, with a view to identifying parallels between the two countries in their regional environments from the early 1950s onwards.

In light of this rationale, two key questions guided the Dialogue's eight presentations and plenary discussions:

1. What have been the main political and strategic drivers of the Australia–Japan relationship, and how have they evolved since 1957.
2. Are these drivers still, and likely to remain, important in shaping the contemporary relationship and its future?

The Dialogue's Australian and Japanese participants concluded that four factors remained pivotal in shaping and continuing to drive the development of the bilateral relationship throughout the post-1951 San Francisco period. These were:

1. A common and enduring commitment to liberal-democratic values and principles of governance;
2. A common and enduring concern over the presence or emergence of revisionist challenges to the US-led status quo in the Asia-Pacific region;
3. A shared priority in ensuring the prosperity and stability of East Asia, and the establishment of an inclusive regional identity built on liberal principles in which Australia and Japan are members;
4. A shared understanding of the importance of a continued US commitment to regional stability and prosperity—and thus an ongoing commitment on the part of both states to ensuring Washington's engagement with and commitment to East Asia, both militarily and economically, continues.

The Dialogue also concluded that there remain important differences in the types and level of policy concern generated by the above factors for the Japanese and Australian governments. This has been the case

throughout the history of the post-war relationship. One of the major points of interest emerging from the 2017 Dialogue papers and discussion was that Canberra and Tokyo have, over time, effectively traded places on their respective concerns and threat perceptions regarding the People's Republic of China (PRC). For example, in the early decades of the Cold War, Canberra was far more concerned about the perceived threat from communist China than was Tokyo, which viewed the Soviet Union as the primary threat to Japanese security. However, this position on the PRC has been reversed in the early decades of the twenty-first century. Australia's recent prosperity has been heavily reliant on the resource demand generated by the rapid growth of China's economy, and thus Australia has tended to view China more as an opportunity than a threat, until perhaps very recently. On the other hand, Tokyo is increasingly worried about a more nationalistic, assertive and authoritarian China. In the early twenty-first century, China's economic growth has displaced Japan's position and status as the world's second largest economy, China's increasingly strident nationalism is often defined against its historic treatment at the hands of the Japanese, and Chinese maritime expansion in the East and South China seas is perceived as a potential threat to the security of sea lanes to Japan, and more broadly, as a challenge to the 'rules-based' liberal international order.

Background

The 1957 Commerce Agreement marked the first major step towards normalising the post-war Australia–Japan bilateral relationship beyond the basic establishment of diplomatic recognition. While the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty re-established diplomatic relations between the two countries, the bilateral relationship remained largely without political or economic substance until 1957. Indeed, the significance of the Commerce Agreement went far beyond only re-establishing trade relations. Its impetus was very much the product of common concerns in Canberra and Tokyo over the emerging and quickly changing international environment faced by both countries in the early 1950s period of the Cold War—albeit at the elite if not the popular level—

and that the strengths and advantages of one could help overcome the challenges faced by the other.

For Japan's governments, the immediate challenge was to re-build the country's economy and infrastructure that was destroyed by the war, and negotiate an uncertain post-war environment within the pacifist limits of its Constitution, while also seeking to establish the 'new' Japan as a trusted international partner. For Australia's leaders, the need to hedge against over-reliance on Britain and the Commonwealth for Australia's security and prosperity was clear. In addition to Australia's growing Cold War anxieties and strong hopes for a permanent security guarantee from the United States (US), the Menzies government (1949–1966) was well aware of Europe's moves toward economic integration, and what the proposed European Economic Community (EEC) would mean for the preferential trading position Australia had enjoyed within the British Empire and later Commonwealth. It is no coincidence that the Menzies and Nishi government's (1957–1960) negotiation and conclusion of the Commerce Agreement occurred simultaneous to the build-up in Europe towards the creation of the EEC.

The long-term national interest parallels were not difficult to see for either government, and the 1957 re-establishment of bilateral trade relations marked the beginnings of initiatives by successive governments that promoted both economic and political engagement over the following six decades. The 1957 Commerce Agreement heralded not only the development of Australia's natural resources industry through rapidly growing trade with Japan, it also marked the start of a paradigm shift in how Australians thought about Asia. The Agreement also marked the beginning of Japan's international recognition as a major trade partner and contributor to regional engagement, development and foreign aid in Asia and the Pacific. Rapidly growing trade and investment relations during the 1960s and 1970s helped lead to increased Japanese investment and cultural exchange with Australia following the signing of the Basic Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in 1976.

It is clear from an examination of the major developments in the post-1976 phase of the relationship that significant efforts have been made both by Canberra and Tokyo to develop and deepen the bilateral political relationship. These include cooperation on a range of initiatives over the last four decades including the creation of the 1989 Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum and subsequent annual leaders' meetings, nuclear non-proliferation, the ASEAN Regional Forum, the East Asia Summit, and also deepening cooperation across a range of traditional and transnational security issues both bilaterally, and with the United States, beginning in the 1990s.

Contemporary relations between Australia and Japan are anchored in these past developments, which have fostered uninterrupted growth in the bilateral relationship. This growth is not only because of the many and substantial economic benefits that have been involved, but also because of common political values, shared regional aspirations, and an unwavering commitment to the US-led Asia-Pacific security framework. These political foundations of the bilateral relationship have made it resilient in the face of major changes to the global and regional environment since 1957, and have provided the impetus for its further growth despite the challenges these changes have posed.

Japan's apparent economic decline from the 1990s has raised doubts over Tokyo's future international influence and role. These doubts resonated among many Australians as they instead looked to a rapidly growing China as the new provider of trade-generated prosperity. But although confidence in Japan's economy has declined, Australian governments have nevertheless continued to look to expand and deepen the relationship. This has endured despite Japan's struggling economy and China's growing demand for Australian resources. The bilateral partnership became even closer in 2007 with the signing of the Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation (JDSC), and has become even closer still over the last decade following a raft of additional agreements and joint commitments.

Themes and Perspectives

The 2017 Dialogue provided a retrospective analysis of the development of the bilateral relationship since the 1957 Commerce Agreement, although moves toward bringing the two countries closer are found earlier in 1954 in the multilateral setting of the Colombo Plan. The aim of this retrospective analysis was not to revisit the well-known trade and economic benefits that have accrued to both partners as a result of the landmark Commerce Agreement, but rather to assess the still largely neglected political and strategic drivers of the relationship and to look for evidence of continuity and change to explain the relationship's resilience over time. This approach allowed for a nuanced appreciation of the imperatives—beyond the economic—that have underpinned the Australia–Japan relationship, its continuity and deepening, in addition to providing some insights into the direction of the relationship into the future.

Each of the Dialogue's four sessions featured the presentation of two written papers followed by plenary discussion. The revised papers are included in this volume. Each pair of discussion papers addressed the evolution of the political and strategic relationship during a discrete historical period from the perspective of each country. The first session addressed the post-war *Return of Japan and Australia's Asia Awakening: The Post-San Francisco Treaty Environment (1952–1975).* The 1957 Commerce Agreement marked the first formal bilateral step towards normalising the post-war Australia–Japan relationship beyond only diplomatic recognition. The relationship is widely considered to have remained without political or economic substance until 1957. But an often overlooked development in political relations between Tokyo and Canberra at this time was the role of Colombo Plan negotiations in forging the first political ties between the two nations after the San Francisco Peace Treaty came into effect in 1952. As archival material from the Menzies government reveals, common foreign policy priorities, underpinned by shared security fears and aspirations beyond only trade interests, loomed large for both governments from the early 1950s onwards.

Halvorson's chapter examines the structural and historical factors underlying the growing convergence of interests between Australia and Japan during the early Cold War decades from 1950 to 1972. In doing so, it focuses on two important but lesser-known historical episodes: Australia's sponsorship of Japan into the Colombo Plan as a donor country in 1954; and Canberra and Tokyo's membership of the Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC) (1966–75). Halvorson argues that the interests of Australia and Japan converged during this period in that they were both status quo powers during the Cold War, relying on security guarantees from Washington, and supporting the containment of communism in Asia. Both were also interested in the stability and development of the post-colonial states of South East Asia to protect against communist subversion and for the expansion of trade opportunities. The chapter reveals that the main point of tension between the two countries during this period was an increasing divergence on policy toward communist China that widened in the late-1960s. During the 1960s, Japan cautiously sought to engage and accommodate Peking, while Australia maintained its hardline stance against any diplomatic recognition of the PRC. Halvorson concludes that despite this divergence, both Japan and Australia sought in the later 1960s to develop within ASPAC a sense of an Asia-Pacific regional identity within the Cold War structural dynamics of the time.

Nagano's chapter examines how in the 1960s Tokyo sought to locate its political relationship with Australia within emerging Japanese ideas of an Asia-Pacific regional policy framework—in the form of the Western Pacific Summit Proposal of Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda (1960–1964) and the concept of an Asia-Pacific Zone, advanced by Foreign Minister Takeo Miki (1966–1968). Nagano suggests that while the 1957 Commerce Agreement with Australia was very important for Japan, it was only with the revision of the Agreement in August 1963 that Tokyo came to view Canberra as a genuine partner in the Asia Pacific. This was because the 1963 revision removed the protectionist General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Article 35 from the Commerce Agreement, thus increasing the mutual complementarity of trade relations and thereby helping to ease Japan's

post-war balance-of-payments difficulties. Both Japanese proposals on regional policy sought to develop a cooperative political relationship with Australia in addressing security and development problems in South East Asia.

With the 1963 Western Pacific Summit Proposal, Tokyo saw itself as playing a mediating role in Indonesia's *Konfrontasi* ('Confrontation') of newly-formed Malaysia, where Washington's concern to insulate President Sukarno from Chinese communist influence was in tension with British decolonisation policy in South East Asia. After Confrontation had subsided in 1966, Miki's Asia-Pacific Zone sought to more inclusively build on the foundations of ASPAC to include Indonesia in a development plan to redress the north-south economic divide in East Asia. Even though neither proposal came to fruition, they represent early steps by Japan in engaging with Australia politically as a valued partner in contributing to the stability and development of South East Asia.

During the 1950s and 1960s, the major policy ambitions for governments in both nations were containing communism, keeping the US committed to the region, and stabilising and growing what was a still nascent regional order both politically and economically—in part to steer newly independent South East Asian nations away from communism, but also to help ensure the establishment and maintenance of a US led, pro-Western order. Anti-Japanese sentiment in Australia, however, remained very high, posing a major obstacle to the policies of the Menzies government to restore trade and political relations with Japan in order to keep both Japan aligned with Western interests, and to secure Australian trade interests in the region. Fears of an electoral backlash, as a consequence, initially prevented Australian government support for Japan joining the Colombo Plan, which was for Tokyo an important step in Japan's reintegration with the region. Canberra's attitude, however, soon began to shift as the benefits of a more prosperous Japan firmly anchored to Western interests became more compelling while pressure from the US and other Western states to accept Japan also began to grow. In 1954 Japan joined the Colombo plan with Australian support, thereby

establishing both the initial political linkages—and an enduring strategic rationale—for the Commerce Agreement's successful negotiation only three years later.

The significance of the 1957 Agreement itself, moreover, went far beyond re-establishing trade relations between the two former adversaries, making Australia the first country to grant Japan Most Favoured Nation (MFN) trade status after the Pacific War. Indeed, the impetus for the agreement and its provisions was very much the product of common strategic concerns in both Canberra and Tokyo over the emerging and quickly changing international environment both countries faced in the 1950s. A shared desire for political rapprochement between Canberra and Tokyo prior to 1957, driven in large part by Cold War insecurities and shared feelings of isolation, thus became the catalyst for the Commerce Agreement and its successful negotiation during 1956–57, which heralded much more than only rapidly growing bilateral trade relations and the development of Australia's natural resources industry. The late 1950s and 1960s also marked the start of a paradigm shift in how Australians more broadly would think about Japan in particular and Asia more broadly, and also the beginning of Japan's international recognition as a major contributor to regional engagement and development.

The second session of the Dialogue, entitled *Legitimacy without Power and Power without Legitimacy: Complementarity in Australia–Japan Political Relations*, addressed the period 1976–1990. This session analysed the bi-lateral relationship following Japan's rise as the world's second largest economy and Western rapprochement with China in 1972, thereby solving the China tension during much of this period. The analysis highlighted some important developments in the Australia–Japan relationship that often have been overlooked. The usual 1970s and 1980s narrative is a story of growing trade relations and optimism, culminating in the successful creation of the APEC Forum in 1989. Australian and Japanese governments, however, were becoming increasingly insecure during much of this period about future US commitment and influence in the region following the Nixon administration's adoption of the Guam Doctrine in 1969, the 1975

and 1979 oil shocks, and the US withdrawal from Vietnam in 1973. These unexpected US policy developments and outcomes translated also into additional concern over the stability of the region's liberal order to which both nations had very much tied their long term economic and political interests.

Kersten's chapter argues that it was during this period, which is bookended for the bilateral relationship by the conclusion of the 1976 Basic Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation and establishment of APEC in 1989, that both Australia and Japan sought with greater intensity to broaden and deepen their economic relationship toward the political. Despite the apparent success of bilateral initiatives during this period, Kersten suggests that it was insecurities rather than optimism that drove Tokyo and Canberra toward a closer political relationship. The angst caused in Canberra and Tokyo by the possibility of even a partial US withdrawal from Asia in the 1970s after its defeat in Vietnam again highlighted both the depth of Australia and Japan's shared strategic interests and their common concern over a still fluid regional security environment in South East Asia.

Australia's struggling domestic economy during the late 1970s and 1980s further compounded an already prevalent sense of vulnerability. And with a still rapidly growing Japanese economy—second only to that of the US, and tipped by some in the 1980s to soon become the world's largest—policy makers in Canberra worried that the bilateral relationship may soon diminish in importance for Tokyo, ironically creating an important reversal in perceptions compared with the 1950s when Japan looked to Australia as a key regional partner. In Canberra, Australia's growing economic dependence on Japan coupled with an acute sense of relative weakness spurred policymakers and analysts to build for the first time a policy planning framework that went beyond primarily managing relations with Australia's 'great and powerful friends'. In this sense, Kersten concludes that Australia's developing relationship with Japan created a new template for Australian foreign policymaking as a middle power that has endured through to the present.

Hanada's chapter explores the motivations for Tokyo's political cooperation with Canberra during the 1970s and 1980s by focusing on changing international and regional structures—as well as Japan's domestic politics. Hanada argues that the key driving forces for advancing Japan–Australia cooperation were their shared concerns over a declining US presence in the region, and a sense of necessity in promoting the economic development of South East Asian states in order to stabilise the region in the wake of the communist victory in Vietnam and continuing turmoil in Indochina. The receding US presence and lingering concerns over the continuity of Washington's commitment to the region prompted Tokyo to take on a level of responsibility in Asia commensurate with its status as the worlds' second largest economy and an advanced industrial democracy. For Japan, Australia was one of the best partners in this project due to its common political values, shared regional aspirations, and common desire in seeking an unwavering US commitment to the Asia-Pacific region.

Hanada argues that while the emergence in Japan of leaders such as Takeo Fukuda, Masayoshi Ohira and Yasuhiro Nakasone prompted Japan's active engagement in the broader Asia Pacific as a responsible political power complementing the US leadership role, the historical, material and ideological constraints on Japan's contribution to security issues tended to limit Tokyo's options in South East Asia to economic diplomacy. While Japan's economic diplomacy toward South East Asia and its initiatives for creating regional economic cooperation chiefly targeted economic development in the region, there were political and strategic consideration behind the policymaking in Japan. The leadership in Japan mattered as well. Fukuda, who had a clear-cut idea of the importance of an open economic order for the sake of preserving regional security, enabled the efforts of Japanese diplomats to enhance their engagement in the fledgling Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), which was established in 1967, and contribute to cooperative relations between the ASEAN states and Indochina.

Somewhat paradoxically, it was the very success of bilateral trade and political relations between Japan and Australia that led to feelings of

insecurity within the relationship on either side during this period. In Australia, the scale of dependence on Japan for Australia's prosperity provoked a flurry of high level anxiety as policymakers realised that the changing nature of trade and the restructuring of industry in the region might derail the neat complementarity of bilateral trade that had existed with Japan. This led Australian governments and business to seek to broaden the spectrum of interdependence away from a predominant focus on the export of resources and raw materials. By the 1990s, again in part driven by US abandonment fears, isolation worries had again shifted back to Japan following the dramatic bursting of Japan's real estate and investment bubble in the early 1990s, the ending of the Cold War, revived fears of a declining US regional presence, and Australia's increasing trade dependency a rapidly developing China.

The Dialogue's third session focused on the period from 1991 to 2017 under the theme of *Old Fears in a New Era? Australia–Japan Security Relations and the US.* Addressing this theme, Satake's chapter traces security cooperation between Japan and Australia over the three decades since the end of the Cold War. Satake argues that the ending of the Cold War in East Asia did not translate immediately into a more stable and peaceful environment, and that both Japan and Australia realised that simply maintaining bilateral alliances with Washington was not an adequate guarantee of their security. Thus, both Canberra and Tokyo sought during the 1990s and into the twenty-first century, to diversify and enhance their bilateral and multilateral partnerships in the region, while continuing to embrace their respective US alliances. It was within this strategic environment that the bilateral political relationship between Japan and Australia became closer in the specific fields of defence and security, where a number of cooperative operations were undertaken. This became institutionalised in 2007 with the signing of the Japan–Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation (JDSC) by the Abe and Howard governments. Satake's chapter shows how the security relationship has further intensified in the 2010s with increasing and unprecedented military to military cooperation. This has continued to strengthen up until the present time, based on both countries

commitment to maintaining the liberal 'rules-based' order in the Asia Pacific, even with the disruption to the relationship in 2016 over the Turnbull government's failure to go ahead with the proposed submarine deal, where Japan would supply the next generation of Australian submarines.

Underpinning the need for Japan and Australia to diversify their security partnerships, the 1990s and early 2000s saw two important reversals of perception on what were now familiar themes within the bilateral relationship. First, Tokyo's deepening preoccupation with Japan's relevance in the region during its so-called lost decade of the 1990s accentuated fears that Japan's importance to Australia was being eclipsed by China's growing economic clout. Second, the balance of threat differences that had existed between Australia and Japan over China during the 1950s and 1960s began to resurface in the early 2000s, and have since become an increasingly stark point of difference between the two partners. But unlike previous differences over China during the early Cold War decades, in the contemporary bilateral relationship the China threat looms largest for Japan with Australia remaining far more ambivalent about China's intentions.

Reflecting this, Lee's chapter notes that Australia–Japan bilateral relations are an often-cited example of successful security cooperation between two US allies, with much hope for increasing the scope of trilateral initiatives with the US. Indeed, when compared with other regionalism initiatives—such as US–Japan–ROK and US–Japan–India relations—the security dialogue and strategic partnership agreements between Canberra and Tokyo is considered to be relatively advanced. As the earlier chapters in this volume show, Australia–Japan relations have a strong foundation built on post-WWII reconciliation and the strong economic relationship that developed after 1957, yet Lee argues that they lack the capability to provide practical solutions to a changing balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region. In respect to this, Lee's chapter argues that a key problem is the restraint placed on the bilateral relationship by Australia—in that political and public debate remains divided over the conditions Australia would need to commit to its ANZUS obligations in the region.

Moreover, Australia is sensitive towards any forms of security cooperation with Japan that may endanger its trade relationship with China.

This difference, while not preventing security relations between the two nations from rapidly developing over the last decade, as Satake's chapter demonstrates, has nevertheless made the management of expectations within the bilateral relationship perhaps more important than ever. The acute disappointment felt in Tokyo over the Turnbull government's 2016 decision to reject Japan's bid to build Australia's new generation of submarines clearly demonstrated the need for governments on both sides to be more frank about the limits on security cooperation, and how such limits can be overcome, or at least managed within the relationship. The 'strategic interests' Japan emphasised in its submarine bid, for example, were not shared by the Australian side to anywhere near the same degree expected by some Japanese policymakers. The Japanese bid's failure, while not attributable only to Australia and Japan's differing views on China, thus highlights some of the subtle, yet important, differences that exist between the two countries in terms of their priorities and thus also the need for bilateral expectations to be more carefully managed by both sides.

The Dialogue's fourth session, *Present Trends and Future Directions: Trade, Investment, Culture, Security and Beyond*, sought to assess changes and continuity in the fundamentals of the bilateral relationship that have developed over the last 60 years, and to offer some suggestions on its future trajectory in terms of shared interests, aspirations, fears and anxieties. Both chapters addressing this theme of the Dialogue examined the development and likely future trajectory of the strategic partnership between Australian and Japan that was inaugurated by the 2007 JDSC. Wilkins' chapter argues that Japan's current 'special relationship' with Australia is predicated upon a carefully nurtured strategic partnership founded on the JDSC and subsequently augmented. Wilkins considers this to be especially significant since it established the template that Tokyo has sought to apply to a series of bilateral relationships with other such partners.

Several notable features of the strong security alignment with Australia are identifiable, according to Wilkins. First, it has been the easiest security partnership to facilitate and has attracted bipartisan support in Japan, as it has in Australia, thus making it the most successful of Japan's new security alignments to date. Second, it has served as a 'proving ground' for a range of new Japanese foreign policy objectives, such as arms exports, overseas military operations, intelligence sharing, as well as a 'demonstration effect' for historical reconciliation. Wilkins' chapter concludes that while the partnership may have reached its 'natural limits', with little indication it will be formalised into a defence-treaty alliance, future bilateral security integration will correspond to developments in the regional strategic environment as the results of the Sino-American contest for supremacy in the Asia Pacific are played out.

Tokuchi's chapter first surveys the reasons for the close strategic partnership between Japan and Australia: both countries are close allies of the United States and integral to Washington's global network of alliances; both countries are mature democracies and committed to the US-led liberal international order; both are maritime nations in the vast Asia-Pacific region; and both countries' public sentiment toward one another is very friendly. In discussing present and future challenges and opportunities for the strategic partnership, Tokuchi argues that the Australia–Japan bilateral relationship, and the trilateral relationship of both with the United States must be more robust to address the multifaceted security environment in the Indo-Pacific area—which includes traditional security concerns such as an assertive, rising China and an unpredictable North Korea, along with a raft of transnational and non-traditional security risks from terrorism, refugee flows and natural disasters to cybersecurity.

The plenary discussion concluded that the fundamental strategic and political commonalities that made the 1957 Commerce Agreement possible remain similar in 2017. The US-centred hub and spokes regional security system continues, as it has for almost 70 years, to be the cornerstone of foreign policy thinking in both Canberra and Tokyo. It has remained, despite the uncertainties created at times under

various US administrations, an indispensable instrument for maintaining regional stability under the post-war liberal order. More recently, the US alliance network in East Asia has also become the foundation of spoke to spoke security cooperation, thereby demonstrating the traditional hub and spokes system's potential to evolve and become a framework for broader security cooperation. Japan and Australia are integral parts of this system.

However, it was noted that the status of the Australia–Japan security partnership, may have reached its 'natural limits' as a 'special' security partnership in the current climate; and there is little evidence to suggest it will, or needs to be, formalised as a bilateral defence alliance in the absence of a major regional crisis—thus any further deepening of Australia–Japan security commitments will depend on developments in the regional strategic environment. How the ongoing Sino-American contest for influence and leadership in the Asia-Pacific plays out in the next few years, for example, will be a major factor in determining the extent and nature of Australia–Japan security cooperation in the short to medium term. That said, some further deepening of bilateral security engagement vis-a-vis closer trilateral cooperation with the US is likely given the priority both nations give to encouraging US engagement in the region. A quadrilateral arrangement including India has now also again been raised. The likely level of engagement and commitment among the four parties, especially from Australia and India, however, remains very unclear.

Conclusion

The 2017 Dialogue and plenary discussions concluded that Australia–Japan relations have developed from a strong foundation built on post-WWII reconciliation, common political values and ambitions, trade complementarities, and in particular a shared sense of the extent to which continuing US engagement in the region underwrites the region's prosperity and security. Yet the bilateral relationship, in spite of its maturity, stability, and 'special' character, still lacks the ability to respond more decisively to the region's changing balance of power, or act collectively with others to protect the very core interests that

have made the Australia–Japan relationship so long-lasting and resilient.

China, as in the 1950s and 1960s, again features as a point of divergence in Australia and Japan's contemporary regional outlooks, but now with Australia placing restraints on its security cooperation with Japan due in part to a strong reluctance to damage its trade relations with Beijing, and also because of entrapment fears. Indeed, in addition to domestic opposition in some quarters to any risk of Australia becoming entangled in a China–Japan conflict through closer security ties with Japan, policy and public debate in Australia also remains divided over the conditions under which Australia would need to, or should, commit to its ANZUS obligations with the US.

Dialogue participants agreed that the Australia–Japan relationship, despite the strong and enduring convergence of political values it is based upon, requires a much more compelling ideological narrative, one able to facilitate a level of bilateral security cooperation that is more clearly and consistently focused on maintaining the many interests both countries share. In addition to the constitutional limits on collective defence faced by Japanese governments, the relationship's prospects for more effective security cooperation in support of the existing international order continue to be complicated by a persistent divergence in balance of threat perception over China, caused in part by differing geographical locations and in part by divergent domestic political and economic concerns.

The Evolution of an Asia-Pacific Identity: Australia–Japan Political Relations during the Cold War, 1950–1972

Dan Halvorson

Introduction

This paper examines the evolution of the political relationship between Australia and Japan during the Cold War from 1950 to 1972. Most studies examine the 1957 Australia–Japan Agreement on Commerce, and the political conditions that made this possible, as marking the beginnings of the post-war bilateral relationship. In this paper, my focus will rather be on two lesser-known, but important historical episodes: the motivations for Australia's sponsorship of Japan into the Colombo Plan as a donor country in 1954; and an analysis of Canberra and Tokyo's membership of the Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC) (1966–75) in the 1960s. An examination of each sheds light not only on the political convergences between the two, but also the ways in which Australia sought to influence Japanese policy in line with Western interests. Both countries were historically isolated from Asia due to their geographical location, greater levels of development and sense of cultural difference. For Tokyo, this was exacerbated in the early part of the Cold War era by its recent militarism, defeat and occupation, and for Australia by the White Australia Policy and residual support for European imperialism. Overlaying these historical factors

were the Cold War dynamics that shaped the era, intertwined with the instability generated by decolonisation.

By the late-1960s, Australia and Japan had developed a close political relationship based on a number of factors deriving from the Cold War strategic environment in Asia. Australia and Japan were status quo powers, privileging security and stability above all other interests and values. This was guaranteed by their respective alliances with the United States (US), and Washington's containment of communism – the fundamental strategic orientation of both countries' foreign and defence policies. Canberra and Tokyo were also convinced that socio-economic development in the poorer countries of South East Asia was crucial, not only for stability and security against communist subversion, but also for their own economic prosperity. In this respect Australia placed more emphasis on the security and territorial integrity of newly independent South East Asian states, and was willing to take on a direct military role; whereas Japan, precluded by its wartime past from the question of any such involvement, was dedicated to stability by providing aid and technical assistance, and developing trade and investment opportunities with the region. The main political divergence between the two during this era, widening in the late-1960s, were attitudes toward communist China. By this time, Japan did not perceive Peking to be as great a threat to stability in East Asia as Australia maintained, and Japanese representatives was cautious to avoid association with anti-communist rhetoric in ASPAC forums and public communiques. Tokyo's more accommodating attitude to China is a prominent theme in the Australian archival documents on ASPAC, although the reasons behind it are not clearly articulated from the Australian side. Despite this tension, both countries cautiously sought to foster a regional consciousness, in the form of an Asia-Pacific identity, to overcome their isolation from the region.

From Post-War to Cold War: Australia and the Regional Environment

In the December 1949 Australian Federal election, the Liberal-Country Party Coalition under Robert Menzies defeated the wartime Australian Labor Party (ALP) government of Prime Minister Ben Chifley (1945–49). For Australian strategic thinking, this marked the transition from the unsettled post-war situation in Asia to a more rigid Cold War framework. The main themes of the Chifley government's foreign policy were consistently expounded by External Affairs Minister, H.V. ('Doc') Evatt in the second half of the 1940s. These were an obsessive and enduring fear of Japan and its pattern of wartime aggression in South East Asia and the Pacific, dedication to the United Nations (UN) as a world organisation and rigid adherence to its principles, and an evolutionary view of decolonisation within the framework of the European empires.

Two perspectives deriving from the shock of the war permeated the Chifley government's thinking. The first was a backward-looking pre-occupation in preventing the last war with Japan, or any similar pattern of invasion threat from Asia.[1] Resulting from this, the second was a dogmatic unwillingness, particularly on the part of Evatt, to see the world from a standpoint other than that of Australia's. These perspectives informed the Chifley government's ambivalence toward the Asian region in the late-1940s and its failure to recognise the emerging Cold War dynamics from 1947. Evatt's continued obsession about a resurgence of Japanese militarism and his dedication to securing the harshest peace treaty possible, was in accordance with Australian public opinion,[2] but inconsistent with the views developing at the time in Washington.[3] The US was firmly established in Japan and Tokyo's former League of Nations' mandated territories in the Pacific, and in 1947 considered that the 'importance of regional defence' in the wartime Southwest Pacific sector, which was Australia's pre-occupation, had substantially 'diminished'.[4] In 1948, British and US officials described Australia's continued fear of Japan as 'pathological'.[5] Evatt remained fixated on Japan as late in his term of office as November 1949,[6] even after the fundamentally altered regional

circumstances with the communist victory in the Chinese civil war, with his speeches remaining dominated by a focus on the Second World War and the value of the collective security mechanism of the UN.

For the Menzies Coalition government elected on 19 December 1949, it was the Cold War in East Asia that drove regional policy rather than the ALP government's enduring fear of Japan. Canberra's response in the early 1950s to the 'challenge' of a 'rising and menacing tide of Communism in the East' drew Australia politically closer to Asia. The new Coalition External Affairs Minister, Percy Spender's (1949–51) rhetoric on taking office was different in tone and content from that of Evatt. It was projected outwards into the region, in contrast to Evatt's customary attitude of defensiveness vis-à-vis a resurgent Japan.[7] With Japan, Menzies government policy was that an early peace settlement was desirable, and that it was in Australia's 'interest to develop and maintain relations with Japan such as normally exist between two countries at peace'.[8]

In a brief for the new Coalition government in January 1950, the Department of External Affairs (DEA) made an assessment of the strategic situation in Asia. The point was first made that the situation had 'been confused since 1945', and was 'only now approaching clarification with the failure of the United Nations experiment … and the entry of China into the Communist bloc'. The discernible features of Australia's strategic environment were the transition from a multipolar to bipolar world in which China had entered the 'communist camp', and where the Soviet Union was 'determined upon the submission' of the USA; reduced British influence in the area and 'a looser Commonwealth with an internal redistribution of power'. South East Asia had moved from being a largely colonial preserve to 'a region of weak independent Asian states', which were characterised politically by a demanding and self-conscious nationalism. The brief concluded that Australia could 'no longer assure its security and prosperity solely within the framework of the British Commonwealth'. [9] The Cold War in East Asia intensified when North Korean forces invaded the Republic of

Korea (ROK) in June 1950 marking the beginning of the three-year Korean War.[10]

These dynamics of decolonisation intertwined with the Cold War led to two main policy orientations in Asia for the Australian government. The first was to further Australia's interests in the Asia Pacific through the residual material, institutional and political resources of the British Commonwealth.[11] This was given policy expression through two initiatives in 1950, the Australia–New Zealand–Malaya (1950) defence planning agreement, known as ANZAM, and the Colombo Plan.[12] The Colombo Plan was a Commonwealth development initiative originally offered to former British colonies in South Asia, and to the remaining dependencies of Malaya and Borneo in South East Asia. It was subsequently extended to all South and South East Asian states throughout the 1950s. Less well known is that the original Commonwealth donor countries moved quickly to seek the participation of other developed states, including the US, and later, Japan. In 1954, Australia sponsored Japan's entry into the Colombo Plan, the motivations for which are analysed below.[13]

The second orientation was for Canberra to seek closer security ties with the United States, which were formalised in 1951 with the Australia–New Zealand–United States (ANZUS) Security Treaty. As is well-known, the conclusion of the ANZUS Treaty allowed for a 'soft' peace treaty with Japan to be politically acceptable in Australia and New Zealand.[14] Australia's close association with Washington during this period of the Cold War leading up to Vietnam is well-covered in the literature. Less emphasised is that the circumstances of the Cold War also provided the conditions for a mutual sense of solidarity with the non-communist states of East Asia, with which Australia mostly enjoyed close relationships.[15] Of these, Japan was the most important. These relationships transcended narrow security interests; being grounded also in non-communist identity and a nascent Asia-Pacific consciousness. These relationships were institutionalised through the South Korean-instigated Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC), the only East Asian organisation in which Australia and New Zealand have ever been included as core members without extra-regional Western

powers. The third part of the paper examines Australian motivations for being part of the organisation, and Australian–Japanese interactions within it.

Australian Sponsorship of Japan's Admission to Colombo Plan, 1954

The Colombo Plan was drafted at a meeting of Commonwealth foreign ministers held at Colombo from 9–14 January 1950, the first such meeting to include the newly independent Asian states of India, Pakistan and Ceylon.[16] The Plan was an umbrella scheme to assess development needs identified by the recipients, and to provide technical assistance, education and training. Aid funding and delivery were then arranged bilaterally between donors (initially Britain, Canada, Australia and New Zealand) and recipients.[17] Spender was instrumental in providing the political impetus for formulating and implementing the Plan, which was launched in July 1951.[18] Australia's motives for taking a leading role involved normative commitments and longer-range strategic interests. Raising living standards in South and South East Asia was viewed as an obligation by the Australia government,[19] with Canberra's political objectives for the Plan defined as attaining 'Commonwealth solidarity and Asian-Western friendship'.[20] Socio-economic development in the region would in turn lessen the attractiveness of communism and protect against subversion.[21] By demonstrating Australia's commitment to South East Asia in this way, Spender also sought to attract greater US involvement. This came to fruition when Washington entered the Plan as a donor country in 1951.[22] Japanese participation was first raised by Britain in advance of the March 1952 meeting of the Colombo Plan Consultative Committee in Karachi, Pakistan.[23]

The debate within the Australian government, and between Canberra and the other Colombo Plan members, over possible Japanese participation, took place within a clearly defined Cold War policy framework that emerged after the Treaty of Peace with Japan entered into force in April 1952. Australia's political objectives in East Asia were defined as ensuring 'that China does not become inseparably linked'

with the Soviet Union, and that in the longer-run, 'it is detached from the Soviet orbit'; that 'Japan remains peaceful and aligned with the Western world', progressively becoming a 'reliable member of the Western group'; and 'that the countries of South East Asia retain their independence', in time developing into 'fully independent states aligned with the Western world'.[24]

What is striking about this policy framework is Canberra's pro-active policy toward Japan only seven years after the end of the war, and in opposition to domestic public opinion:

> *The conclusion of a Peace Treaty with Japan will mark a new stage in Australian–Japanese relations. There will undoubtedly be a tendency on the part of the Australian public to limit contacts with Japan and some resistance to any positive programme of cultivated close relations with Japan. Yet if Japan is to be aligned with the Western world, it is essential that the attitude of Australia should not be one not of grudging concessions, or reluctant dealings with a former enemy, but of positive co-operation.*[25]

Diplomatic relations with Japan were to be 'established promptly' with 'no barrier' to reciprocal arrangements. Normal trade relations were to be resumed, including visits by Japanese nationals to Australia in connection with this. Japanese shipping would be allowed to return to Australian ports and there would be no barriers to the export of materials needed for Japan's re-construction.[26]

Despite this enabling policy framework, Australian officials remained ambivalent about Japanese membership of the Colombo Plan for a number of reasons until August 1954, when External Affairs Minister Richard Casey (1951–60) took personal carriage of the issue, and came down on the side of supporting Japanese membership. It was recognised by Australia from the outset that the Japanese had 'the technical knowledge and experience needed by the underdeveloped Asian countries', in addition to 'the industrial capacity to provide the technical equipment and capital goods needed throughout South and

South East Asia'. But with Japan's fragile balance-of-payments position in the early 1950s, it was deemed unlikely that Tokyo 'would be able to make substantial financial contributions', at least initially. There was also a recognition in Canberra from 1952 that Japan would see 'political and commercial' advantages to being part of the Plan, and therefore it was likely that Tokyo would make increasing efforts to join.[27]

The Australian government perceived that there remained international political barriers to Japanese membership, although I would suggest that these are not particularly convincing, and that the main reason for Australia's initial opposition was the Menzies government's sensitivity to domestic public opinion in the lead up to the tightly contested federal election held in May 1954.[28] The DEA stated that current Australian policy was 'to oppose or at least delay Japanese participation' because there was a case for French participation before that of Japan; and that 'there might be justifiable protests from the Philippines and Indonesia at any move to encourage Japanese aid to other Asian countries' while their wartime reparations claims remained unsettled.[29] By the end of 1953, all donor states but Australia, and most recipients, with the exception of Indonesia, favoured Japan's membership.

The inconsistency of the Australian government's position on this with its stated policy on Japan was noted by the DEA. In a 'General Appraisal of the Colombo Plan' in August 1952, it was recognised that 'leaving aside' continued public hostility in Australia, Japan was 'nearer to the category of an ally than that of an enemy' in the context of the 'communist threat', and considering the conclusion of the Treaty of Peace, the ANZUS Treaty and the US–Japan Security Treaty. The point was made that 'to exclude Japan from co-operative political relations with the area closest to her would … operate directly against Australian policy to encourage Japan to become a useful and trusted member of the non-communist world'.[30]

Japan made informal and formal representations to India, Canada and the United States about gaining membership throughout 1953 and

1954. Japan's motivations for this were, according to Kobayashi, 'its interests in good neighbourliness and economic co-operation with South East Asia, as well as to gain status in international organisations and co-operation with western democracies'.[31] During this time, support for Japan from Washington and London also became firmer. By July 1954, the Australian government was becoming concerned about its isolation among the Plan's donor countries in continuing to oppose Japanese membership, and thus modified its position to one of acquiescence should a majority of member-states support Japan's entry, and none of the Asian recipients opposed it.[32] Washington increased the pressure on Australia in August 1954 ahead of the Consultative Committee meeting in Ottawa in October.[33]

Japan did nothing in particular to 'smooth the Australian attitude' on membership,[34] and it is unclear whether Canberra's change of heart was directly attributable to prompting from Washington. But the Australian position shifted decisively on 16 August 1954, when Casey sought to reconcile Tokyo's proposed Colombo Plan membership with Australia's Cold War strategic objectives. Casey wrote to Arthur Tange, then Secretary of the DEA, that assuming Cabinet agrees, 'I think that this subject of their joining the Colombo Plan … might be the first thing that we might do to implement this new attitude towards Japan'.[35] Further,

> *If we want to get any political capital out of our being willing to allow Japan into the Colombo Plan – then I think we should even consider whether we might even go as far as making the proposal – or at least making a warm response to such a proposal made by someone else … I suggest that Japan's wish to get into the Colombo Plan may be a rather heaven-sent opportunity on which we might base our 'new deal' towards Japan.*[36]

By 18 August 1954, Australia's sponsorship of Japan's membership had gained the approval of Menzies and the Cabinet.[37] The new position was laid out in a DEA cable to all posts on 28 August. Australia was now in full support for Japan's membership on the basis of the 'technical knowledge and experience in training facilities and industrial capacity' that Tokyo can

provide to recipient states, and the 'advantage of Japanese interests being directed towards South East Asia as an alternative … [to] China and more generally of [a] need to encourage Japanese orientation towards [the] Western democracies'.[38] Japan was admitted to the Colombo Plan as a full member on 5 October 1954 without opposition. The Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, Katsuo Okazaki (1952–54), in a statement to the Committee commented that 'it is understandable that her neighbours cannot readily forget recent history but we must realise that the past is the past and it is the future to which we must look".[39]

According to Kobayashi, the 'dramatic shift in Australia's position was recognised by the Japanese government as the first initiative that Australia took to improve the bilateral relationship since the resumption of diplomatic relations in April 1952'.[40]

This early episode in post-war Australia–Japan political relations shows how the logic of Cold War dynamics in Asia could override the anti-Japanese feeling prevalent in Australian society in the 1950s. Due mainly to the constraints of public opinion perceived by the Menzies government until mid-1954, the positive policy toward Japan that was articulated in 1952 after the Peace Treaty came into force remained largely rhetorical until pressure from the United Kingdom (UK) and especially the US was brought to bear on Australia to change its opposition to Japan's membership of the Colombo Plan. For Australia, supporting Japanese membership was an important step in reintegrating the country back into the international community in a co-operative way, solidifying Tokyo's alignment with the West in the Cold War, and orienting Japan's development and trade interests towards South East Asia rather than China.

Australia and Japan in the Asian and Pacific Council (1966–75)

Australian and Japanese interests became more publicly aligned and less ambivalent with the 1957 Commerce Agreement, and reciprocal Prime Ministerial visits in the same year.[41] Japan was increasingly viewed in the late-1950s and early-1960s by Canberra 'as a counter-weight to the Communists', 'as giving technical and managerial

leadership to under-developed countries', and 'as an increasingly important trading partner'.[42] In 1959, Japan's long-term interests were judged to be 'compatible' with Australia's. The Australian government believed that Tokyo's fundamental interest in its 'economic survival' would lead it into 'future directions not unacceptable to Western policy'. According to the DEA, in the absence of supporting cultural values or ideological orientation, the 'key to Japan lies therefore in its economy', and despite some conflicting trade interests in South East Asia, Australia should accept 'this situation and continue our present policy of placing no obstruction in the way of Japan's trade expansion'. It was also observed that 'while Japan clearly would like to re-establish its pre-war position as a trading partner of China's', there was little prospect of this 'more serious than some resuscitation of trade'.[43]

In one of the clearest statements of the common interests between Japan and Australia during this period, Coalition External Affairs Minister, Sir Garfield Barwick (1961–64), said to Parliament on 16 August 1962,

> *Japan, a great trading nation in the Pacific … has many interests in common with Australia … Japan's association with the free world, her support for the United Nations in its efforts to ensure international peace, her geographical position close to Asia and her need to trade in order to sustain and develop even further her internal prosperity are some of the most important … I believe that they provide the basis of a community of interests of great importance to Australia.*[44]

While these commonalities with Australia would endure, Japan's interest in developing more cordial political relations with Peking and the prospect of an expanded trade relationship with China did become a point of tension in the bilateral relationship in the late-1960s, evident in Japan's sensitivity to overt discussion of security issues in ASPAC forums, and in its active efforts to expand membership of the organisation to a wider range of Asian states.[45]

One of the firmest indications of Australia's close political relationships with the non-communist Asian states during the Cold War was South Korea's invitation to Canberra in June 1966 to membership of ASPAC. In the study of Australia's regional relations, ASPAC is either totally omitted or quickly dismissed as an instrument of Cold War policy. It remains one of the most misunderstood organisations in the history of Australia's foreign policy.[46] Australia and Japan, among others, repeatedly pointed out that ASPAC was not a security organisation. Unfortunately for ASPAC's legacy, it operated at the time when Western opinion turned irrevocably against the Vietnam War after the Tet Offensive in January 1968. It became, and remains tainted, by the anti-communist coloration of its membership, which consisted of South Korea, Japan Taiwan, the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, South Vietnam, Australia and New Zealand, with Laos as an observer. There can be no denying that only 'Cold War logic' could have provided 'a thread to pull this disparate group of countries together' at this time.[47] The view that it was an anti-communist grouping became entrenched, when in a 1967 article in *Foreign Affairs*, and in the 1968 US Presidential campaign, Richard Nixon called on the organisation to take on a security role to reduce Washington's Cold War responsibilities.[48] Despite Nixon's campaign rhetoric, Washington was not involved in the establishment of ASPAC, nor did it seek to directly influence its operations.[49]

The dismissal of ASPAC on this basis is inadequate, however, when the documentary record demonstrates that in the mid to late-1960s, the organisation was considered by Australia as the premier vehicle for Asian regionalism. ASPAC was a fully East Asian initiative that did not involve any extra-regional great powers, and remains the only Asian organisation in which Australia and New Zealand have ever been included as core members. This alone was considered of great importance by the Australian government.[50] In Canberra's stated purposes for its membership, strengthening the relationship with Japan is specifically mentioned, suggesting the importance of this for Australia. According to the Australian government, 'the long term stability and economic progress of the countries of the region will require greater self-reliance on the part of Asian countries'. The

overarching aim of Australia's participation in this respect was to 'foster a sense of regional consciousness among the governments of Asia and a common approach to the problems of the region'.[51] ASPAC was considered 'the most promising' organisation 'through which a regional consciousness' could 'be developed'. More specifically, ASPAC helped to relieve the relative diplomatic isolation of South Korea, Taiwan and South Vietnam; but most importantly for this paper, the Australian government believed its 'association with Japan in ASPAC strengthens relations between the two countries and increases our influence with Japan in regard to its policies in Asia'.[52]

Japan's involvement in ASPAC was, however, considered lukewarm by Australia until 1968, when the purposes and operation of the organisation became clearer and more acceptable to Tokyo. Australian representatives were quite frustrated by the reserved Japanese attitude at early ASPAC meetings. For example, the Australian Ambassador at Bangkok reported to the DEA in July 1967 that the 'Japanese delegation have taken ASPAC meetings very quietly. They have been obviously under instructions not to take the lead, and have several times failed to speak when a contribution from them would have been helpful to us'.[53] The behaviour of Japanese officials in ASPAC meetings was deemed inconsistent with the much more positive tone of Ministerial talks between the two countries. For example, in March 1967, the two Foreign Ministers Paul Hasluck (1964–69) and Takeo Miki (1966-68) 'recognised the rapid growth of a sense of solidarity and of a forward-looking spirit in the Asia-Pacific region. The Ministers spoke of the importance of dealing with common problems in an Asia-Pacific scale and recognised the close relationship between economic progress and political stability'.[54]

Japan's early misgivings about ASPAC revolved around two main issues. In response to proposals by developing member states for specific projects and technical assistance, Japan was concerned that ASPAC did not duplicate the activities of other development organisations such as the UN Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE), the Colombo Plan or Asian Development Bank. On the political side, Japan and Malaysia were both concerned that ASPAC meetings and

procedures did not produce binding communiques reflecting an anti-communist stance, or that the anti-communist members would regard silence on certain issues as acquiescence with their viewpoints. By the 1968 ASPAC Ministerial Meeting held in Canberra, Japanese concerns had been dispelled, and its participation had improved from Australia's point of view.[55] Concrete ASPAC projects were kept modest and all members agreed to the issuing of communiques without binding opinions or commitments.[56] Discussions became more open and Japanese representatives were willing to canvass political matters. At the Canberra Ministerial meeting on 30 July 1968, Foreign Minister Miki explained Japan's position:

> *Many of us live close to a Communist power, and from that point of view alone the question of security must be of great concern to us. When I speak of security I am using the word in the very broad sense. The concept of security includes the military aspect … But I do not think this is the forum for us to discuss the military aspects of security, although I do not deny that the military aspects are important. However, I must emphasise that we must try to achieve political, social and economic security if we are to obtain overall security'.*[57]

The DEA reported after the meeting that whereas 'a year ago the Japanese were trying to avoid political discussions in ASPAC they now accept it and Miki himself participated in the discussion on political matters'. The Japanese, remained however, 'the most reluctant of all ASPAC members to take public positions particularly on questions relating to Communist China, North Korea and North Vietnam'.[58] This was a significant point of difference between Japan and the Coalition governments of Holt (1966–67), Gorton (1968–71) and McMahon (1971–72) that succeeded Menzies, which were heavily involved in the Vietnam War, and retained a hard line against any moves toward diplomatic recognition of the People's Republic of China (PRC).

In 1969, the DEA assessed that, while Australia and Japan shared strong economic interests and a shared commitment to development in South East Asia, the divergence over China policy was growing:

> *The Japanese feel an affinity for China and there are considerable pressures on the government to seek a rapprochement with Peking. Although the Japanese Government remains firm in its unwillingness to recognise Peking, pressures on it to do so could increase if current Canadian and Italian moves to recognise China led a considerable number of other countries to follow their example. Japan would not wish to be one of the last countries to recognise China.*

However, these differences over China did not affect the co-operative bilateral relationship, common interests and shared Asia-Pacific identity that had developed between Australia and Japan by the late-1960s. For example, in talks between Australia's Minister for External Affairs, Gordon Freeth (1969) and Japanese Foreign Minister Kiichi Aichi (1968–71) in June 1969, Aichi commented,

> *that relations between Japan and Australia were very good, not only in the political field but also in the economic field. Both countries had a basic policy of close cooperation with the United States. Both were Pacific nations, and had a common role to play in the Pacific region. Although they had different characteristics each country could, in its different way but with common purposes, make a contribution to stability and peace in the region. Japan and Australia worked together in ASPAC and in other organisations such as the United Nations, ECAFE and the Asian Development Bank. It was Japan's intention to promote further this co-operative relationship.*[59]

The period under consideration here comes to an end with the announcement on 15 July 1971 of Nixon's visit to Peking in 1972. This was met with shock and much consternation in Canberra and Tokyo at the lack of consultation or forewarning from the US administration. One of the most significant consequences of US rapprochement with the PRC at the time was the breakdown of ASPAC. Of the ASPAC members, Japan and Malaysia were the most concerned to engage and

accommodate Beijing. This meant that formal association with Taiwan was increasingly untenable.[60] Japan recognised the PRC and normalised its relations on 29 September 1972. Canberra assessed that there was no prospect of Taiwan leaving ASPAC voluntarily, but that the organisation's 'credibility as a representative forum would be seriously damaged by the withdrawal of either Malaysia or Japan'.[61] Malaysia ceased to participate from 1971.[62] The Japanese approach was to de-emphasise its membership and letting ASPAC gradually wind down, which mirrored Canberra's position.[63] The organisation was quietly dissolved in 1975.

While ASPAC could not survive the changing strategic dynamics of the late-1960s and early 1970s, we can conclude that it did serve a number of valuable purposes for the Australia–Japan relationship, despite differing levels of enthusiasm in participation, and an increasing divergence on China policy. First, ASPAC, with its annual Ministerial Meetings and more frequent Standing Committee consultations, provided a regular, institutionalised forum for Australia–Japan relations. Second, without the presence of Washington, it allowed for greater development of an independent relationship between Canberra and Tokyo than would otherwise have been possible.[64] Third, along with other Japanese initiatives in this era toward greater co-operation around the Pacific basin,[65] ASPAC represented an early attempt at developing an 'Asia-Pacific' regional consciousness. This was a shared identity that both Canberra and Tokyo sought to foster because of their relative outsider status in East Asian affairs and their strong extra-regional alignment with the United States. This nascent Asia-Pacific regional consciousness came to greater fruition with the creation of APEC in 1989 as the Cold War came to an end.

Concluding Observations

The paper has explored Australia's sponsorship of Japan into the Colombo Plan in 1954 and both countries' membership of ASPAC in the second half of the 1960s, to elucidate the structural and historical factors underlying the growing identity of interests between the two during the early Cold War decades. The interests of Australia and Japan

converged in that they were both quintessentially status quo powers during the Cold War, relying on security guarantees from Washington, and supporting the containment of communism in Asia as its northern and southern 'anchors'. Both were also interested in the stability and development of the post-colonial states of South East Asia to contain communism, and for the expansion of trade. Initiatives by both countries in the sub-regions of Asia, such as development assistance with the Colombo Plan and other bodies, went some way toward reducing their historical isolation by integrating themselves constructively into regional arrangements. To buttress this, both cautiously sought in the later 1960s to develop within ASPAC a sense of an Asia-Pacific regional identity within the Cold War structural dynamics of the time.

Looking at present strategic circumstances in East Asia, we can perhaps observe some commonalities with earlier patterns: uncertainty over US commitment to the region, a more assertive and nationalistic China, overt Sino-Japanese strategic rivalry, competing maritime claims in East Asia, and so on. On this note, I will conclude with a passage from the Australian government's assessment of the PRC-Japan Normalisation Agreement from 9 October 1972, which seems quite prescient in its longer-term prediction: 'the lack of any particular identity of views on political or diplomatic questions is likely to militate against any closer political relationship, and it is probable that China and Japan will find themselves vying, over the longer term, for political and economic influence in the Asia/Pacific region'.[66]

Japan's Policy Towards Asia and Japan–Australia Relations in the 1960s

Takayuki Nagano

Introduction

Post-war Japan–Australia relations have developed on the basis of bilateral commerce and trade, and a foundation was laid by the signing of the Japan–Australia Commerce Agreement in 1957. Although in the 1970s both countries experienced 'trade wars' over primary products, their relationship became more solid than ever through their joint efforts to overcome the crisis. In the late 1980s, Japan and Australia upgraded their relations to a partnership that aimed to contribute to stability and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region, and the two countries played an important role in the creation of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Forum in 1989.

In the late 1980s regional policy coordination and collaboration in promoting economic integration and trade liberalization in the region between the two countries blossomed, but it was in the 1960s that the two nations committed themselves to placing their relations in the regional context. Japan in particular had gradually looked to Australia as her regional partner in promoting peace and economic development in the Asia-Pacific region. Several attempts were made in the 1960s to secure Australia's commitment to this foreign policy endeavour, and although they did not come up with anything substantial, they led to

the partnership between Japan and Australia in the 1980s, as represented by the above-mentioned APEC.
In this paper, we examine how Japan in the 1960s recognised its relations with Australia in its Asia-Pacific regional policy framework, by focusing on the 'Western Pacific Summit Proposal' by Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda and the concept of 'Asia-Pacific Zone' by Foreign Minister Takeo Miki.

Beginning of a New Era for Japan–Australia Relations

In 1957, when the Japan–Australia Commerce Agreement was signed, mutual visits between the Prime Ministers of Japan and Australia were realised, which led to rising expectations that bilateral relations would develop further in the near future. In April 1957, Prime Minister Robert Menzies made an official visit to Japan and made a proposal for the final settlement of the pearl fishing dispute, a long-standing issue between Australia and Japan. He also made a proposal concerning the repatriation of Japanese war criminals[67]. In return, Shinsuke Kishi became the first Prime Minister of Japan to visit Australia, in December, and expressed his 'apology' ('heartfelt sorrow') for the events of World War II, which was widely and favourably received in Australia.[68]

The Japan–Australia Commerce Agreement was revised in August 1963, which was the beginning of the 'mutual complementarity' of Australia–Japan trade relations. Japan–Australia trade expanded dramatically after the signing of the commerce agreement in 1957, but Japan was always in deficit. In 1955 Japan gained the membership of GATT, but she had to deal with the discriminatory ('humiliating') status resulting from GATT Article 35[69]. The Ikeda Administration regarded the invocation of the Article 35 by European countries and Australia as a major obstacle to expansion of Japan's foreign exports. Australia and major Western countries retained the right to raise tariffs against any Japanese goods that endangered domestic industries under the article. In the 1960s, Japan, with its economic outlook still uncertain, was suffering from balance-of-payments difficulties, and one of its major foreign economic policy priorities was to end the

invocation of GATT Article 35 by European countries and Australia. When the negotiations between Japan and Australia started in November 1962, the Australian government was very reluctant, because it feared strong public rebuke and because of uncertainty over Britain's membership in the EEC. However, in August 1963, both governments concluded the revision of the agreement, and Australia finally agreed to invoke the use of GATT Article 35. It was their shared long-term interests that brought the negotiation to the successful end.[70] From that point onwards, Japan, which was entering the era of rapid development of heavy chemical industries and high economic growth, started to consider Australia as an important trading partner.

Japan's Policy Towards Asia and Australia

Ikeda's 'Western Pacific Summit Proposal'[71]

Western alliances were severely divided over Indonesia's '*Confrontation*.'[72] While Britain and Australia, striving for peaceful decolonization of the British Empire in South East Asia, took a tough stance towards Sukarno's Indonesia, the United States took a conciliatory attitude towards Indonesia, fearing that putting too much pressure on Indonesia would force Sukarno into the communist camp. Under such circumstances, the Ikeda administration tried to play a role as an intermediary in resolving conflicts by utilizing its friendly relations with Indonesia.[73]

For Prime Minister Ikeda, peace and stability in South East Asia became an ever more essential prerequisite for Japan's overseas trade and economy. It was also important from the viewpoint of the Cold War strategy in Asia to prevent isolating Indonesia, a major South East Asian power, and engage Indonesia in the free world. Furthermore, for Ikeda, with Western allies divided over the conflict, Japan was given a great opportunity to play an independent role in conflict resolution, which could enhance Japan's status as a major world power. Ikeda had his own idea of international order: stable international order could be realised and maintained by the solidarity and collaboration of 'three pillars of the free world,' the United States, Europe, and Japan. With

regard to Asia, Ikeda believed that there was a wide gulf between the US and Europe on the one hand and Asia on the other, and Japan could play a leading and intermediary role in bridging the gap between them. In that regard, mediating Indonesia's '*Confrontation*' was a great opportunity to show Japan's role in the free world and its major contribution to the liberal international order.[74]

However, it can be said that Japan's ability to play an intermediary role was quite limited from the beginning. Japan was the only 'Western' nation that maintained friendly relations with Indonesia through development assistance, which gave the UK and Australia, who were at odds with Indonesia, the impression that Japan was essentially pro-Indonesia. These countries were suspicious of Japan's mediating role. (Japan agreed to provide emergency relief aid of 12 million US dollars to rescue Indonesia from its foreign currency crisis, in response to Sukarno's request in October 1983, right after the formation of the Malaysian Federation).[75]

The 'Western Pacific Summit Proposal' was one of Ikeda's attempts to end the conflict at the early stage of the '*Confrontation*.' According to Ikeda's proposal, the five heads of Australia, New Zealand, Japan, the Philippines, and Indonesia hold regular meetings to discuss broad issues concerning peace and stability in the Asia Pacific. The political objectives contained in this proposal were to incorporate Indonesia into the international community. That was why Malaysian participation, to which Indonesia would strongly object, was excluded from the outset.[76]

In realizing this proposal, Ikeda considered Australia as the most important partner. With each becoming an important trading partner to the other and both looking to Asia as strategically important, Ikeda thought that the solid basis for partnership and cooperation was being created, and both countries shared long-term interests with regard to peace and stability in Asia.[77] As Indonesia's economic development and national integration had regional significance, Ikeda believed that Japan and Australia should support Indonesia and strive for Indonesia's

engagement with the international community; this was the main focus of his 'Western Pacific Summit Proposal.'

With his summit proposal, Prime Minister Ikeda visited Australia in September 1963 and held talks with Prime Minister Menzies. He argued that while the United States was heavily militarily involved in the region, Australia and Japan should commit themselves to Asia from a different and multilateral basis and put more focus on the specific countries rather than approaching the region as a whole. In addition, Japan and Australia's future trade with Asia was dependent on how Asian countries achieved economic development and improved people's livelihoods. According to Ikeda, Indonesia was the country they had to pay particular attention to. Japan and Australia should avoid Indonesia, with abundant natural resources and a population of 100 million, coming to terms with the communist camp. They had to encourage Indonesia to concentrate on 'steady efforts' towards economic development rather than foreign adventures. Ikeda said the Japanese government was willing to cooperate with the countries concerned and provide whatever assistance she could for Indonesia's nation building.[78]

To Ikeda's regret, Menzies' reaction to his proposal was not positive. Menzies repeatedly criticised Indonesia's misconduct and argued that all necessary measures had to be taken to stop Sukarno's threatening behaviour. He said that the international community should not compromise with him and make its attitude clear to Sukarno that it would not stand for his intimidation[79]. Ikeda found little room to appeal to Menzies for Indonesian economic development under Japan–Australia collaboration. In the end, Ikeda had to postpone proceeding with his 'Western Pacific summit proposal.'[80]

Prior to his visit to Australia, Ikeda made his summit proposal to President Diosdado P. Macapagal while in the Philippines, but the reaction of the Philippine president was also extremely cautious. Furthermore, the US Department of State also took a negative attitude as Ikeda's proposal might disturb the 'Maphilindo concept' proposed by the Philippines.[81]

While Ikeda was putting forward his proposal to the leaders of the Asia-Pacific region, the Federation of Malaysia was established on September 16, 1963. Indonesia reacted strongly against this and declared its '*Crush Malaysia*' policy, stepping up the military aspect of *Confrontation*. Under these circumstances, the idea of engaging Indonesia while excluding Malaysian participation in the summit meetings could not have been well received by many countries. Moreover, there was a strong concern within the Japanese government that Japan might be risking its international standing by taking sides with Indonesia and leaning towards open military action against Malaysia.[82]

Ikeda's 'Western Pacific Summit Proposal' led to Foreign Minister Takeo Miki's 'Asia-Pacific Zone' initiative, as will be described later. Recognizing that expanding Japan–Australia trade would provide a solid basis for the partnership, Japan sought to contribute to the stability and development of South East Asia with Australia as a partner. Japan believed that economic development in the region, especially of Indonesia, would in the end moderate its diplomatic stance and achieve stability within the region.

Miki's 'Asia-Pacific Zone Initiative'

Ikeda's 'Western Pacific Summit Proposal' came to nothing due to the intensification of '*Confrontation*' by Sukarno's Indonesia. However, Sukarno's leadership was badly shaken with the '9-30 incident' in 1965, and the '*Confrontation*' policy came to an official end in 1966. Japan once again moved towards building a partnership with Australia. In July 1966, the Consul General of the Japanese Embassy in Canberra, for example, met with MR Booker, First Assistant Secretary of the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade after the ASPAC (Asian and Pacific Council) Asia Foreign Ministers' Meeting in Seoul and tried to sound him out on the possible visit to Australia of Hideo Kitahara who was in charge of Asia-Pacific Affairs at the Foreign Ministry of Japan.

According to the diplomatic record, in meeting with the Japanese Consul General, Booker admitted that Japan and Australia had become heavily focused on issues relating to trade and commerce, and consultation and cooperation on political issues was not sufficiently explored.[83] He said he would welcome Kitahara's visit. Even after that, the Japanese government repeatedly emphasised the importance of regular contact and dialogue, and in October 1966 the Australian government ultimately agreed not only to accept the visit of Kitahara, but also to hold the first regular Japan–Australia talks in Canberra in January 1967.

Takeo Miki, who was appointed Foreign Minister in December 1966 under the Sato administration, actively advanced his 'Asia-Pacific Zone initiative' based upon the Japan–Australia partnership. Miki was blessed with several opportunities to visit Australia before taking office as foreign minister, and it seems that he developed a strong interest in the relationship with Australia. Miki visited Australia at the end of 1955 and had a chance to talk with Australian Foreign Minister Richard Casey. In his talk, he emphasised the importance of development assistance to improve the standard of living of South East Asian people, thereby preventing the spread of communism.[84] Miki also accompanied Prime Minister Kishi on his visit to Australia in 1957.

Miki introduced the public to the framework of his own 'Asia-Pacific Zone initiative' in May 1967. This initiative was Miki's answer to the question of how to solve the 'North–South problem' in Asia, and he stressed promotion of regionalism in the Asia-Pacific region. The outline of his speech entitled 'Asia-Pacific Diplomacy and Japanese Economic Cooperation' can be summarised into the following four points:

1. The importance of fostering a sense of solidarity among the Asia-Pacific countries,
2. Japan's status as a driving force in development cooperation for Asian countries (Japan as a bridge between Asia and the Pacific),
3. The importance of the development and expansion of trade

among the developed countries in the Pacific,
4. The importance of development assistance in resolving the 'North–South problems' in the Asia-Pacific region.

Miki's initiative was based on an idea of development aid for 'have-not countries in Asia' through economic integration of 'haves in the Pacific.' According to him, promotion of free trade among the developed countries in the Pacific, the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan, was important because it would enhance the financial ability of those developed countries to contribute to the economic development of Asian countries.

Miki's strong pursuit of a solution to the 'North–South problem' was one part of his diplomatic philosophy as a politician.[85] At the end of 1955, Miki visited South East Asian countries as a special envoy of Prime Minister Ichiro Hatoyama, and he realised the significance of solving the problem of widespread poverty in South East Asia. He recognised that 'a large amount of economic aid as well as military aid' would be necessary for 'effective resistance to Communism' in the countries in South East Asia in his talk with officials from Australian Department of External Affairs[86]. When Miki made his first speech as foreign minister in the National Diet, Japan, the only developed (industrialised) country in Asia, had a 'moral responsibility' to address the 'North–South problem' in Asia. As mentioned earlier, Miki advocated his 'Asia-Pacific Zone Initiative' as a bridge between rich and advanced countries in the Pacific and poor and underdeveloped countries in Asia.

It was Australia that held the key to Miki's 'Asia-Pacific Zone initiative.' There were four reasons behind Miki's initiative.

Firstly, Australia itself was strengthening its orientation towards Asia. As Ikeda sought partnership with Australia in the 'Western Pacific Summit Proposal,' Australia, which had taken an Asia-oriented stance after the UK's decision to accede to the EEC, was thought to be the most promising partner in Asia. For Miki, Japan and Australia both held 'double' identities, being 'Western' countries embracing liberal

democracy but also being a part of Asia and having sympathy with Asian values.

Secondly, for Miki, the US was not an ideal regional partner in his initiative. Miki saw that US involvement in Asia was extremely tilted towards military power, and the US placed containment of China at the centre of its policy towards Asia. The ambiguous attitudes of the Japanese government regarding the role of ASPAC were also the reflection of Miki's idea. It is also well known that Miki and Sato were frequently in discord over the matters relating to Japan's relations with the US and with China.

Thirdly, it was practically impossible for Japan to fund all the necessary development assistance to South East Asian countries, and Australia, which shared strategic interests in regional peace and stability, could become a partner in this regard.

Finally, as was the case with the APEC initiative in the 1980s, the Japanese government circle thought that any regional initiative solely sponsored by Japan could raise strong concern among Asian countries that considered this a post-war version of the 'Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere' initiative.[87] It was believed that having Australia co-sponsor Miki's initiative would help to assuage those concerns.

However, a big question remains as to whether Miki's ideas had been shared and understood by Prime Minister Eisaku Sato. Although Prime Minister Sato supported Asian regionalism, such as through an active engagement in the Ministerial Conference for the Economic Development of South East Asia, and providing funds to Asian Development Bank (ADB) comparable to the US, behind those positions was Sato's strong commitment to US Cold War strategy in Asia. In order to strengthen Japan–US relations, Sato believed that Japan's development assistance for South East Asia should be based on and in accordance with US Cold War strategy, and Japan's role in Asia should be to contribute financially to US policy. The divergence of recognition as to international affairs between Sato and Miki could be ascribed to the biggest factor, which eventually buried Miki's plan.

Miki regarded ASPAC as a possible framework to proceed with his idea of an 'Asia-Pacific Zone initiative.'[88] ASPAC was formed in 1966 by initiative of President Park Chung-hee of South Korea. ASPAC was the first regional organisation covering the whole Asia-Pacific region. However, most of the member states were US allies, and their foreign policy orientations were anti-communist and anti-China. That was why Indonesia did not join this organisation.[89] Although Miki had once argued that ASPAC should not deal with matters relating to politics and security, he hoped that ASPAC would become the place for foreign ministers in the Asia-Pacific region to discuss broad issues including foreign policy, politics, and culture from a regional and global perspective. He assumed that regular meetings of foreign ministers would deepen mutual understanding between member states and enhance the sense of solidarity among them.

His idea for ASPAC was presented to Australian Foreign Minister Paul Hasluck in Tokyo at the end of March 1967, and at the informal meeting between officials of the Japanese and Australian foreign ministries held in April of the same year.[90]

It is quite understandable that Australians did not exhibit a strong interest in Miki's 'Asia-Pacific Zone initiative.' What Miki proposed was just an overall direction to advance Asia-Pacific policy, and he did not have any concrete and detailed roadmap[91]. Therefore, Australia was unable to assess what Miki intended to do. The Japan–Australia Foreign Ministers' Meeting held in Tokyo at the end of March 1967 became a forum at which Miki officially presented his idea to Australia, but even at that moment Miki's plan had not taken concrete shape yet. All that Miki could convey to Hasluck was that he did not consider a new political organisation and mechanism necessary for the moment and regional cooperation excluding particular nations should be avoided. With the time of ASPAC's foundation less than a year ago, Hasluck preferred to wait and see how ASPAC developed[92]. He also believed it important for the immediate future to deepen mutual understanding, build momentum of cooperation, and raise a sense of solidarity, and hoped that all this finally developed into a regional organisation.

Hasluck was sceptical of Miki's intention, and in the end, he assumed that Miki's proposal was just a political gesture to domestic opinion. Without any prospects for Miki's proposal to materialise, Hasluck was unable to support him.[93]

Miki's 'Asia-Pacific Zone initiative' lost momentum after Australia gave it a cool reception. While his idea of Asia-Pacific cooperation did not disappear and was to be discussed in the two influential non-governmental groupings, the business association named Pacific Basin Economic Council (PBEC) and the academic conference named Pacific Trade and Development (PAFTAD), discussions at the government and official level became languid. At the same time, as Japan's international balance of payments went into the red, the government stance towards development assistance became negative. The economic situation in Japan forced the government to adopt monetary tightening policies for the time being, and it was extremely difficult to allocate sufficient budgetary funds to development assistance.

Conclusion

Since the middle of 1967, the two governments had had no chance to discuss Japan–Australia regional cooperation. At the Japan–Australia Summit held in October 1967, regional cooperation in Asia Pacific was not taken up between Sato and Australian Prime Minister Harold Holt. The major concern for the two leaders was to facilitate economic relations between the two countries, such as preventing double taxation.[94] Even at the second official-level talks held in November of 1967, neither Australia nor Japan presented any proposals to tackle Asia-Pacific regional issues. Furthermore, at the Japan–Australia Foreign Ministers' Meeting in July 1968, they focused on bilateral issues such as fishery problems and double taxation issues. It was when US President Richard Nixon announced the 'Guam Doctrine' in July 1969 and called for security self-reliance by US allies that the governments of Japan and Australia reinvigorated the move towards building an Asia-Pacific partnership.

Miki's 'Asia-Pacific Zone initiative' did not lead to actual cooperation between Australia and Japan. However, for these two countries that had normalised relations in the latter half of the 1950s, it should be emphasised that Miki's concept gave them the first opportunity to exchange views on regional issues in Asia-Pacific. In the joint communiqué issued after the foreign ministerial talks between Miki and Hasluck in 1967, the countries agreed that 'development assistance to the countries in Asia is the common duty of Japan and Australia.' Although both Ikeda's summit proposal and Miki's initiative did not ultimately materialise, Japan and Australia shared the strategic awareness of themselves being part of Asia, and based on this they moved forward to strengthen Japan–Australia relations. Embryonic phase of the bilateral partnership leading to the APEC proposal can be found in the 1960s Japan–Australia relations.

In the late 1960s Japan became the second largest economy in the world in terms of GNP, and began to have a self-image of a 'major economic power.' Meanwhile, 1970s' international relations were undergoing the decline of US power; such as US withdrawal from the Vietnam War, two 'Nixon Shocks,' and so on. Against this international background the demand for Japan's 'international contribution' comparable to 'major economic power' rose both inside and outside of Japan and at the same time, there was a rising concern over Japan's future policy in the world. Under such circumstances Japan began embracing the national image as a 'pacifist state.' 'Pacifist state' and 'Asia Pacific power' were inextricably linked in 1970s' Japan.

In 1971 John Douglas Anthony, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Trade and Industry visited Japan, and held talks with Prime Minister Sato, Foreign Minister Aichi etc. In a joint statement two governments agreed that they place its relations in the regional context declaring that the strengthening the relations was essential for the stability and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region. It was also agreed that the Japan–Australia Ministerial Committee should be established based on such recognition. The political cooperation between the two countries was given the opportunity to be further strengthened.

Managing Insecurity: Australia's Engagement of Japan 1976–1990

Rikki Kersten

Introduction

In the history of Australia–Japan relations, the period between 1976 and 1990 is bookended by portents of great things for this bilateral relationship. The conclusion of the Basic Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in 1976 appeared as a landmark agreement that heralded an intention to broaden the hitherto trade-focussed bilateral relationship between Australia and Japan. Similarly, the advent of APEC in 1989 on the back of close coordination between Australia and Japan tempts us to characterise this era as a prelude to regional leadership by this bilateral partnership. Internationally, the ending of the Cold War in Europe in 1991 likewise appears as a capstone for this era of bilateral optimism, though this historic watershed had not been anticipated. Instead, it was the certainties of Cold War enmity that drove the strategic perspectives of both Australia and Japan during this period. It is worth remembering that policymakers in Australia and Japan did not foresee either the 'lost decades' of Japan's economic performance that would begin in the 1990s, or the shift in power relativities that accompanied the advent of post-Cold War multipolarity. To the contrary, the 1960s had delivered unprecedented rates of growth for Japan, ushering in a pleasing complementarity in trade between Australia and Japan that elevated the importance of this bilateral relationship in the eyes of leaders in both nations. There was every reason to think that, with adjustments, this mutually beneficial interdependence would continue. Yet it was also during this period that

policymakers in Australia and Japan identified the need for this bilateral economic relationship to broaden beyond the economic sphere to embrace the political. It was insecurity, not complacency or optimism, that pushed them to do so.

In assessing the enduring drivers of Australia–Japan ties, it is important to understand how multiple insecurities during this period of bounty and celebration, spurred the subsequent broadening and deepening of the relationship in the 1990s. Whether it be bilateral trade disputes, a shared sense of risk as US allies or a compulsion to address a perceived imbalance within the bilateral ledger on Australia's part, political responses were deemed essential to manage these insecurities. How Australian thinking on foreign policy responded to these circumstances within the context of its bilateral relationship with Japan would lead to new policy framing around Australia's status and effectiveness as a middle power in the Asia-Pacific region. Here we will examine how Australian thinking about Japan and about itself as Japan's bilateral partner between 1976 and 1990 utilised insecurity as a key driver for cementing this bilateral relationship, thus ensuring it would remain dynamic and outward-looking for decades thereafter.

International and Bilateral Insecurities

Several knots of insecurity underpinned Australian foreign policy thinking in the late 1970s and 1980s. The confluence of Cold War great power rivalry and the possibility of US disengagement from the Asia-Pacific region concentrated the minds of policymakers under Prime Minister Fraser. While driven by Cold War parameters, Fraser's policy responses signalled a transition away from reflex reliance to relying on 'great and powerful friends'. It constituted a strategy reset that transformed both the world view informing policy, and perceptions of Australia as a foreign policy actor. Insecurity about the world fed into new regionally-focussed strategies that led Australia to see both itself and Japan in a new light. The mobilisation of an Australia–Japan partnership in regional settings and in minilateral endeavours on a global scale in the late 1980s emanated from these beginnings under Fraser. But as Australia articulated its policy

responses to this shifting Cold War threat environment, it revealed another layer of domestic insecurity underpinning its approaches to foreign policy. Japan was central to all of these developments.

Seen in retrospect, the bilateral relationship between Australia and Japan between 1976 and 1990 appears primarily to be a case study of how the Cold War constrained and shaped sub-US alliance relationships. More precisely, this period reveals how the loss of the Vietnam War by the US and its allies in 1975 – heralding the 'end game' phase of the Cold War in Asia – shifted national threat perceptions and over time enabled sub-alliance relationships to assume a more central place in national security thinking in both Australia and Japan. But if we adopt a contemporary perspective, the 'ending' of the Cold War was not in prospect in the minds of policymakers and political leaders at that time. Instead, continuing insecurity framed by Cold War thinking was the order of the day.

When Malcolm Fraser became Australia's Prime Minister in December 1975, his worldview was the embodiment of Cold War polarisation. In his signature foreign policy speech 'Australia and the World Situation' delivered in June 1976, Fraser outlined a perilous predicament whereby Australia's security depended on the maintenance of a balance of power between the two superpowers in the regions immediately proximate to Australia i.e. South East Asia, the Indian Ocean, and the Western Pacific. At the same time however, Fraser set out to pursue a course that did not entirely depend on how great powers behaved. Instead, in the pursuit of what he called 'active and enlightened realism', Fraser identified a sphere for Australian foreign policy initiative that consigned exclusive dependence on great powers – the 'great and powerful friend' mentality – to the past. In dealing with Cold War uncertainty, Fraser identified a role for Australia as a middle power 'in a world whose relations also depend…on the actions of other major powers – China, Japan and the European powers'.[95] Given the uncertainties surrounding China's prospects that prevailed at that time and the distancing impact of the Treaty of Rome and the European Economic Community initiative, Japan logically assumed prominence in Australian thinking. In Fraser's words, Japan and Australia

shared an interest in 'a stable, great power balance in which no potentially hostile power dominates a region of critical concern to either of us'.[96]

The spectre of US disengagement from the Asian region in the 1970s and 1980s was another element that highlighted the existence of core shared interests between Australia and Japan. In the wake of the 1973 Paris Agreements, the spectre of US withdrawal from Asia and the imperative to keep the US engaged in Asia became a major driver of security considerations in both Australia and Japan. This prospect of reduced US commitment to regional security was partnered with what has now become familiar to US allies and partners, namely the concomitant US expectation of more burden-sharing on the part of their allies. The Guam Doctrine of 1969 had already made this abundantly clear, before the ensuing Nixon Shocks of 1971 compounded the sense of jarring insecurity underpinning national, regional and global outlooks of US allies, particularly Japan. Just as has occurred in the 21st century, the possibility of US abandonment was a catalyst for closer sub-alliance relations between Australia and Japan, forcing the bilateral policy parameters to expand to include political and defence matters.

By the 1980s, Japan's economic superpower status, the perceived ubiquity of Japanese products, and conspicuous real estate acquisitions had provoked an anti-Japanese backlash in the US. As John Welfield noted, with the denouement of the Cold War the US tended to:

> *View Japan as the new 'evil empire', a formidable East Asian mercantilist state, alien in culture, undemocratic in its values, in no way committed to a liberal order of world trade, determined to reduce its former conqueror and benefactor to the status of a service economy*[97]

Australia and Japan experienced their own difficulties in the 1970s and 1980s over such matters as prices for Australian iron ore and sugar, and declining market access for Australian beef; and reliability and stability of supply of raw materials from Australia. But it is likely that,

as MacMahon Ball observed, in contrast to US attitudes towards Japan, Australia's expanded vision for Japan as a partner and regional leader must have been gratifying for a Japan that was increasingly burdened by global expectations of leadership commensurate with its economic clout.[98] These contextual factors surrounding the US as a global actor incentivised both Australia and Japan consciously to embrace a stronger political dimension to their relationship.[99]

Perversely, the very success of bilateral trade between Japan and Australia engendered its own set of insecurities on both sides. In Australia, the scale of dependence on Japan for Australia's prosperity provoked a flurry of high level anxiety as policymakers realised that the changing nature of trade and the restructuring of industry might derail the neat complementarity of bilateral trade with Japan. This led Australian governments and private sector entities to seek to broaden the spectrum of interdependence away from a predominant focus on resources and raw materials exports. The 1976 Crawford Okita report on *Australia, Japan and Western Pacific Economic Relations* was one prominent example of an attempt to overcome emerging insecurities by projecting bilateral Australia–Japan economic leadership into the Asia-Pacific.[100] In effect, the transformation of both countries' economies in the 1970s and 1980s exposed a fear in Australia that Japan may become less dependent on Australia. It is important to note however that while it was the substance of bilateral economic relations that sparked an intense focus in Australia on how to better manage its relations with Japan, the solution favoured by many involved closer political, cultural and strategic relations in addition to diversifying the content of trade and the encouragement of Japanese foreign direct investment.

In navigating the nexus between dependence and complementarity in their trade relationship with Japan, Australian officials and private sector analysts revealed another stratum of insecurity that was more introspective in nature. The 1978 Myer Committee Report is a telling example of how national insecurities arose in response to anxiety concerning over-dependence and declining complementarity in Australia's trading relations with Japan. These insecurities included the

power imbalance both *between* the two nations and *within* the bilateral relationship, and a deficit in strategic cultural attributes. On top of all that, Japan watchers in Australia worried that Japan mattered more to Australia than Australia did to Japan. In sum, Australia saw itself as labouring under a power and culture deficit at the very moment that it realised Australia needed to stake more on anchoring Japan in Australia's sphere of interest, namely in the Asia-Pacific region.

Even during the process of negotiating the NARA Treaty, Australian bureaucrats were concerned about Australia's relative weakness when compared to Japan. In his commentary on the treaty talks Gary Woodard notes that Australia and Japan 'were increasingly disparate in power but with many common interests', and that there was concern on the Australian side that as global trade and political circumstances changed Australia would 'decline in relevance' in Japan's eyes.[101] In worrying the problem of Australia's relative weakness in power terms, commentators remarked favourably on Japan's 'monolithic' qualities,[102] it's essential unity and 'communal purpose' in negotiating situations,[103] and immediately contrasted this with Australia's approach. For example, the Myer Report states that whereas Australia was divided with 'a fairly loose sense of cohesion' in trade policy terms, Japan formed a united front.[104] Derived from cultural attributes, the Report argued that these qualities made Japan 'better suited to coping with rapid change than is Australian society, with its lack of overall unity and its emphasis on loyalty to established relationships, attitudes and systems'.[105]

While replete with cultural stereotypes and interesting allusions to colonial ties with Britain (and alliance relations with the US), these observations underscored Australia's concerns that it was not properly equipped to manage its vitally important relationship with Japan. Moreover, as the Myer Committee Report implies, if Australia were less able to adjust and respond to changing global contexts then this could lead to a lack of coordination between Australia and Japan; and this may in turn weaken the complementarity and interdependence underscoring the bilateral relationship as a whole, to the detriment of Australia's national interest. What started as a cultural reflection ended

in a recipe for political, societal and policy self-denigration, and a completely new whole of government approach to Australia's Japan policy.

Australia's Responses to Insecurity

Fraser's ambitions regarding Japan relations were inherently political. Indeed, Fraser took the signing of the 1976 NARA Treaty as 'tangible evidence of a will on the part of Australia and Japan to lend greater political substance to our dealings'.[106] While it is possible to argue that the decision to politicise the Australia–Japan relationship was a 'Whitlamite legacy', [107] it is not the ownership of the idea but its inextricable inter-connection with regional conceptualisations of a broader-based bilateral relationship that marked a step change in Australia–Japan relations. Particularly in the 1980s, a new kind of complementarity arose between Australia and Japan: just at the juncture when international expectations of Japan to act as a global leader reached a crescendo, Australia decided to embrace economic and political leadership in the Asia Pacific as its rationale underpinning a new approach to its foreign policy. A pleasing and familiar inter-dependence accompanied this development, in that both sides regarded their role in the regionally-focussed partnership as one of acting as facilitator (and sometimes intermediary) for the other. Australia surmised that Japan needed to overcome a historical legacy of distrust in its region (especially in South East Asia), and Australia needed Japan in order indirectly to exert influence that exceeded its actual heft in terms of power. As the Myer Committee Report noted, 'Australia could have greater capacity to influence Japanese actions than Australia's international status would otherwise suggest'.[108] But it was Australia's responses to the range of insecurities outlined above that shaped the way Australia pursued this objective.

The objective of broadening the parameters of the bilateral relationship beyond that of bilateral trade was foreshadowed in the NARA Treaty,[109] but the Treaty itself was not the prime mover behind this development. Instead, spreading risk beyond the economic sphere was regarded by Australian policymakers as the best means of guiding the

evolution of the relationship in ways that accorded with Australia's interests. As Rix stated, the goal was 'the increase, through encouragement of 'broader' and more 'stable' ties, in Australia's influence over the direction of the relationship'.[110] It was in effect a hedge against the possibility that the changing nature of global trade would see Japanese and Australian interests diverge. Australia's decision to adopt the role of 'influencer' in its reinvigorated relationship with Japan was in turn a direct response to the insecurity attached to being the lesser power in the bilateral relationship. Seen from this perspective, Australia's evolving Japan policy was a proactive response to insecurity.

When Fraser referred to Japan in 1977 as 'a major power in regional, and indeed, world politics', he was already calibrating how Australia might influence Japan's foreign policy direction beyond the parameters of the bilateral relationship. In launching the Myer Committee Report, Mr Fraser celebrated the fact that 'Australia has a not inconsiderable capacity to influence Japan's approach to international issues of close relevance to Australia's interests'.[111] When extended to regional and global contexts, Australia's potential to exert influence on Japan's behalf (for instance, in the matter of Japan's membership of the United Nations Security Council) was seen by Australia as another possible positive outcome of this unequal, yet mutually beneficial expanded relationship.

A tangible outcome of this expanded vision for the Australia–Japan relationship was an early articulation in Australia of a willingness to include enhanced defence relations in the relationship-broadening agenda. The Myer Committee Report had already ventured in that direction, stating that defence relations may well constitute a pathway towards closer political ties.[112] While in the 1970s and for most of the 1980s Australia expressly and repeatedly stated its preference for Japan's power to be expressed in non-military spheres such as aid,[113] furthering the defence relationship was an objective put forward by the Myer Committee that would endure through to the present. It should be noted that when Opposition leader John Howard called for 'a wider range of defence cooperation between Australia and Japan'

during a visit to Tokyo in March 1988, he was shouted down by both sides of politics.[114] Nonetheless, by the late 1980s, Prime Minister Hawke would be openly advocating for Japan to adopt a higher profile in strategic terms, urging Japan to exert 'a louder and more authoritative influence in global and regional affairs – I mean political and strategic affairs, not just economic'.[115] With APEC a tangible proof of bilateral partnership expressed as regional diplomacy underscoring Australia's status as influencer, Hawke in 1990 could exhort Japan to embrace its global leadership role as the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq exposed Japan to unprecedented, hostile global scrutiny:

> *We want Japan to be more forthcoming, more confident, more creative, more outspoken than it has been in the past…for the good of our region and for the good of the world*[116]

A second example of insecurity inspiring proactive reframing of the Australia–Japan relationship occurred in response to the perceived 'cultural deficit' in Australian policymaking and negotiation vis a vis Japan. Once again, the negative aspersions cast onto Australia by Australians in the context of the Japan relationship was transformed into a formula for managing the relationship more effectively. In its Report, the Myer Committee advocated a holistic approach to relationship management via the creation of new bureaucratic, political and public-private sector entities to better and more effectively manage the Japan relationship.[117] It was unprecedented for any bilateral relationship of Australia's to warrant such institutional, multi-layered attention on a national scale. In recommending the creation of a Japan Secretariat, a Standing Committee on Japan with representation at only the highest level, and a Consultative Committee on Relations with Japan comprising public and private sector membership at a senior level, the Committee members were voicing their sense of vulnerability to 'monolithic' Japan even as they were attempting to mirror the substance of that 'monolithic' entity. In recommending the formation of a 'One Australia' negotiating entity, the Committee was effectively suggesting that Australia emulate the Japanese. Combined with advocacy for regular high-level ministerial consultations (the AJMC), the Australian intent to make political

consultation on regional and global issues a natural practice for both nations successfully overcame the insecurity associated with Japan's 'superior' consensual approach to governance and policy.

Attention to enhanced mutual understanding through cultural policy (for instance, the establishment of the Australia–Japan Foundation and the Working Holiday Scheme, plus language learning initiatives) addressed the flip side of this admiration for Japanese attributes. The Myer Report conveyed their nagging sense of insecurity that Australia and Japan, though highly inter-dependent, were nonetheless exposed to the risk that naturally attached to nations of alien races and cultures who pretended to close partnership. This at least was a perception that would not survive into the 1990s.

Conclusion: Recalibrating the Australia–Japan Relationship

In many ways, it was the very scale of economic interdependence and the resulting insecurity at the prospect of this changing that sowed the seeds of creativity and bilateral ambition in the minds of foreign policy makers between 1976 – 1990. Similarly, the possibility of partial withdrawal from Asia by the US prompted Australia and Japan to view each other for the first time as nations with shared strategic interests in a regional context. Domestically, Australia's high economic dependence on Japan combined with its sense of relative weakness in terms of influence forced its policymakers and analysts to engage in policy planning and relationship management concerning a nation other than a 'great and powerful friend' for the first time. In this sense, Australia's relationship with Japan created a new template for Australian foreign policymaking that articulated a *modus operandi* for Australia as a middle power that has endured through to the present.

Changing Bipolar World and Japan–Australia Relations in Asia Pacific: Expanding Japan's Foreign Policy Scope in 1970–80s

Ryosuke Hanada

Introduction

What have been the key political and strategic drivers of the Japan-Australia relationship? Japan's major diplomatic initiatives in the 1970s and 80s took the form of economic diplomacy, such as providing aid to developing states and forming regional economic cooperation structures in the Asia Pacific. However, this does not mean that Japan had no underlying political and strategic considerations behind the promotion of these economic measures. Rather, during the severe security situations of the Cold War period, it would be reasonable to assume that structural changes in global and regional politics as well as the Japanese domestic political situation were behind Tokyo's external economic policies.

This paper aims to rediscover the political and strategic motivations behind the development of the Japan–Australia cooperation in the 1970s and 80s by examining Japanese foreign policy and Japan–Australia relations. It addresses three questions, including 1) what

global and regional factors motivated the Japanese government to promote its relations with its Australian counterparts during the Cold War era; 2) how did the domestic political situation in Tokyo impact foreign policymaking in the Japanese government; and finally, 3) whether these factors still apply to the evolution of bilateral security cooperation between the two countries. It argues that the 1970s and 80s was the time when Japan found its responsibility to proactively contribute to the Asia Pacific region and to complement US leadership in the liberal camp by promoting the economic development of South East Asia. From the Japanese point of view, Australia, an advanced industrial democracy, an ally of the United States, and sharing geographical proximity to Asia and sympathy to the West, was seen as a desirable partner to preserve regional order centring on US supremacy. It was also beneficial to Tokyo to cooperate with Canberra in order to mitigate South East Asian concerns over the resurgence of imperial Japan in expanding economic diplomacy.

In order to shed light on the political and strategic aspects, this paper examines two cases – economic assistance in South East Asia, and Pacific Basin Cooperation initiatives. This paper demonstrates that changing regional security situations drove Japan to take on the responsibility of preserving the stability of South East Asia by proactively promoting economic diplomacy. It also touches upon how changing domestic political factors, especially leadership, in Japan affected the government's political and strategic foreign policy calculations. The emergence of leaders who struggled to explore Japan's foreign policy apart from the Yoshida Doctrine expanded their foreign policy scope to the Asia Pacific and enhanced the sense of responsibility to contribute to regional peace and stability. Yet, the material and ideological constraints on Japan's contribution to security issues limited Tokyo's options for economic diplomacy.

Japan–Australia relations from 1976–1990 in Global and Regional contexts

Looking at the major developments of Japan–Australia relations from 1976 to 1989, significant efforts were made by both sides to advance

the two nations' political relationship in dynamic international politics. Notwithstanding a wide variety of issues and agendas discussed between diplomats from the two sides, this paper mainly examines two cases, namely 1) economic cooperation in South East Asia under the Fukuda administration, and 2) the Pacific Basin Cooperation initiative originally proposed by Ohira. Behind these cases, as will be discussed later, there was political motivation from the Japanese side to complement the leadership role of the US in the Asia Pacific region vis-à-vis threats of communism and the Soviet Union. The significance of the Australian role in these cases varied.

Economic Diplomacy in South East Asia in 1970s

Around the time when Japan and Australia signed the NARA Treaty in 1976, Japan held severe concerns about the declining presence of the United States in both Northeast and South East Asia. Jimmy Carter, who promised the withdrawal of US troops from the Korean Peninsula in his campaign, was elected as the 39th US President in the late 1976. Though President Carter did not act on his campaign promise, the US presence receded dramatically in South East Asia as seen in the US withdrawal from South Vietnam in 1973, the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam's reunification in 1976 and the dissolution of the South East Asia Treaty Organization in 1977. While the People's Republic of China normalised its relations with the West, including Japan, Australia and the US, there was uncertainty over the potential destabilization of regional security in South East Asia. In fact, after Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia, the Sino-Vietnam War began in 1978.

In this regional security environment, Japan had promoted economic diplomacy backed by a growing economic presence in the Asia Pacific region, especially in South East Asia. In August 1977, then Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda attended the historical Japan–ASEAN summit meeting in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, which was the first summit meeting between ASEAN leaders and the leader of a non-ASEAN state. In his visit to Manila, the final destination of his trip, Fukuda made an announcement of the so-called 'Fukuda Doctrine' which articulates (1) Japan's rejection of its role as a military power; (2) Japan's commitment to consolidating a relationship of mutual confidence and

trust; and (3) Japan's desire to be regarded an equal partner of ASEAN[118]. It was the first proactive foreign policy of post-war Japan according to the Diplomatic Bluebook in 1978[119]. Takehiko Nishiyama analysed the Fukuda Doctrine as a 'symbol of the significant change of Japan's diplomatic attitude' and 'the departure of Japan's spontaneous and active diplomacy for creating the stabile regional order in South East Asia'[120]. Sumio Edamura, former Ambassador to Indonesia, also recalled that the Fukuda Doctrine was formulated based on their concern about the potential power vacuum in South East Asia as well as self-recognition of the need for Japan to implement greater international contributions with their significant economic and limited military power[121].

It may appear that there was no relationship between Japan's proactive economic diplomacy in South East Asia and its relations with Australia. However, it should be noted that South East Asia was one of the most frequently and intensively discussed topics between the Japanese and Australian governments during the mid-1970s. Additionally, it was Australia which requested that Japan increase its commitment to South East Asia while Japanese policymakers internally endeavoured to promote its active foreign policy even without those requests. For example, in the 4th Policy Planning Dialogue in 1975, Australian representatives requested that Japan play a more important role in South East Asia, and reiterated that the importance of South East Asia for Australia is almost the same as that of the Korean Peninsula for Japan[122]. In 1976 to 1977, the two countries embassies in South East Asia also conducted consultations on issues related to the economic and political situations of South East Asian states in the post-Vietnam war era.

One tangible accomplishment of their bilateral consultations was that of the expanded ASEAN-summit meeting in 1977, in which the presence of PM Fraser and PM Fukuda, together with NZ PM Muldoon, lent international legitimacy to ASEAN[123]. From early 1977, the Australian Embassy in Tokyo aimed at coordinating its policy toward the upcoming ASEAN summit in August 1977 with the Japanese government since both PM Malcom Fraser and PM Fukuda were

thought to be receiving invitations to the meeting. In July 1977, they exchanged their views on agenda items and the format of the meeting at working level. Although the actual ASEAN summit was chiefly dominated by economic issues, the Japanese and Australian sides considered issues like the Asia policy of the US, and the security situations in the Indian Ocean and the Korean Peninsula.

Thus, although it is true that Japan's economic diplomacy toward South East Asia was formulated independently from Japan–Australia relations, the two diplomatic agencies had accumulated multiple consultations on issues related to ASEAN in the mid-1970s. These consultations were driven by several shared perceptions stemming from the changing regional security environment, including 1) self-recognition as advanced industrial democracies in the Asia Pacific region, 2) the importance of cooperation for self-development of South East Asian states and 3) the indispensability of US presence in the region. The Japanese side struggled to find a way to graduate from diplomacy dominated by war reparations. The end of the Vietnam War and war-weariness in the US prompted Tokyo to be more cautious of stability in South East Asia. As an advanced democracy free from the legacy of the Second World War, Australia was the best partner for Japan to accomplish political stability in South East Asia through economic assistance by advanced industrial states.

There is little evidence to assess Fukuda's policy and attitude toward Australia. Nevertheless, Fukuda, who emphasised the importance of 'cooperation and alignment (*kyo-cho to rentai*)' in international affairs, was anxious about the emergence of protectionism and kept the linkage between the liberal economic order and peace in mind[124]. Inoue argues that Fukuda believed the foundation of peace was an open liberal economic order, so Japan should contribute to the preservation of such an order. In that sense, his Fukuda Doctrine which chiefly focuses on economic development should be seen as also having security implications. The presence of Fukuda as a prime minister during that time was another driving force to promote Japan's economic diplomacy and, subsequently, cooperation with Australia.

Asia Pacific Regional Economic Cooperation in 1980s

Japan and Australia were widely acclaimed for having established joint initiatives in regional economic institutions in the 1980s. Compared to Japan's economic diplomacy in the 1970s, Asia Pacific regional cooperation was not just a Japanese foreign policy initiative, but a genuine joint effort by Japan and Australia.

To provide some background to this initiative, uncertainty remained as to the stability of the Asia Pacific as well as the advancement of economic integration in other parts of the world. Globally, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iran hostage crisis in 1979 blew away optimism for détente. In South East Asia, military confrontations and exchanges of fire were observed between Vietnam and Cambodia, and Vietnam and China in the late 1970s. The Carter administration declared its continuous presence in South East Asia by acknowledging the geographical, political and economic significance of the region for the US[125]. It also required its allies to beef up their defence capabilities in the early 1980s. Meanwhile, in Europe, the European Economic Community, which had already successfully eliminated tariffs on specific items among members, expanded its membership. There was also the embryonic idea of economic integration in North America and Latin America.

The Pacific Basin Cooperation initiative emerged in these global and regional security and economic contexts. Although the idea of regional economic cooperation initiatives was in line with post-war Japanese economic diplomacy to establish its leadership credentials commensurate to its growing weight and obligation to make an international contribution, because of these external circumstances, PM Masayoshi Ohira's Pacific Basin Co-operation Concept bore fruits as a multilateral regional forum. Ohira's concept included the Pacific Economic Co-operation Council (PECC), established in 1980 and, even after his death, the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) forum, established in 1989.

Terada argues that common self-awareness in the Asia-Pacific region and the fear of isolation drove the two governments to promote this

idea. He points out that 'bridging Asia and the West' was a common ingredient in Japan and Australia's foreign policy[126]. The decision to form the European Union and the establishment of a free trade agreement between the United States and Canada in the late 1980s also contributed partly to Australia's and Japan's sense of isolation and caused them to look towards the establishment of APEC[127]. Peter Drysdale has also noted that 'in their subsequent reactions to the changing international environment, both countries moved towards closer involvement with each other'[128]. This sense of closeness was exacerbated by the fact that Europe and America had adopted inward-looking policies like the Common Agricultural Policy within their regional institutions, intensifying the Australian and Japanese sense of isolation from the major powers[129].

Despite its primary focus on economic issues, Japan's motivation to initiate economic cooperation in the Asia Pacific was not limited to economics. As Terada argues, Japan launched the Pacific Basin Co-operation Concept partly to fulfil its comprehensive security notion, the essence of which was to 'stabilise the regional systems by strengthening cooperative ties with friendly states which share common or similar values and ideals'[130]. This is consistent with Ohira's conceptualisation of comprehensive national security. For example, a report published by the Comprehensive National Security Study Group established at the behest of Ohira argues that 'it was no longer enough for Japan to depend solely on the United States as it had done until now under the Yoshida Doctrine'[131]. It indicated the need to explore comprehensiveness in defining the national security, situation-awareness/threat perception and foreign policy means to be employed. APEC, though the primary focus was definitely economic issues, was seen as one of means to strengthen the liberal camp by promoting economic development of individual states in the Asia Pacific and thereby enhancing economic interdependence in the region.

There was some difference over the presence of the United States in the respective governments' approach to this regional conception. According to Funabashi, the Australian side preferred to exclude the

US from the outset because of the lingering anxiety of South East Asian states over the US On the other hand, the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry insisted on the importance of the US because they considered the bilateral sectoral negotiations with US to have become ineffective for liberalisation. The exclusion of the US could be seen as creating a trade block against the North American free trade area, and a new regional cooperation framework which could accommodate ASEAN's rise was necessary[132]. However, both states considered APEC as a means to solidify the US commitment to the region[133]. Ohira and Yasuhiro Nakasone made Japan–US security the focus of Japan's foreign policy during their premierships. Notably, despite their focus on relations with the US, both Ohira and Nakasone struggled to graduate from the Yoshida Doctrine which would see Japan pour its resources into economic development by relying on the US for its security. Japan's approach to this regional cooperation initiative, therefore, should be understood as not only economic diplomacy but political and strategic consideration of its greater responsibility in the region.

Conclusion

Japan cooperated with Australia in regional economic diplomacy in the 1970s and 80s. While Japan's economic diplomacy toward South East Asia and its initiatives for creating regional economic cooperation chiefly targeted economic development in the region, there were political and strategic consideration behind the policymaking in Japan. The receding US presence and lingering concerns over the continuity of the US commitment to the region prompted Tokyo to take on a level of responsibility commensurate to the worlds' second largest economy and an advanced industrial democracy. For Japan, Australia was one of best partners due to its common political values, shared regional aspirations, and seeking an unwavering US commitment to the Asia Pacific region. The leadership in Japan mattered as well. Fukuda, who had a clear-cut idea of the importance of an open economic order for the sake of preserving regional security, enabled the efforts of diplomats to enhance their engagement in ASEAN and contribute to cooperative relations between ASEAN and Indochina. Although

external situations pushed Japan to be more engaged in the region, Ohira's leadership and conceptualisation of comprehensive national security advanced Japan's approach to regional economic cooperation, and founded the Pacific Basin Cooperation initiative.

To sum up, it could be argued that Japan–Australia cooperation was aimed at three things: 1) promoting economic development in the region, especially South East Asia; 2) preserving the open liberal economic order, and 3) eliciting US presence in the Asia Pacific. The first two objectives stemmed from the perilous security situation where US influence was seen to be receding and regional confrontation lingered under the Cold War. Due to self-recognition of their own limited power and resources in the bipolar international structure, the two governments shared the objective to retain US presence in the region despite some disagreements over specific means.

So, are these political and strategic considerations still relevant for evolving Japan–Australia cooperation? Under the leadership of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, Tokyo has promoted its foreign policy under the banner of 'diplomacy that takes a panoramic perspective of the world map', a 'proactive contribution to peace' and most recently, the Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy. Emerging challenges to the post-WWII international order, such as the North Korean missile and nuclear development program, China's maritime expansion, and non-state security threats, have pressured Abe to push Japan's responsibilities in preserving the order. The Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy, for example, aspires to promote infrastructure development in the Indo-Pacific, especially in South East Asia, and to assist state-building in Africa. It also articulates the importance of cooperation among like-minded states, especially the US, Australia and India.

Thus, superficially, there would be similarities between Japan's economic diplomacy in the 1970s and the current foreign policy. However, it should be noted that the world is no longer in the clear-cut bipolar Cold War era. Compared with the Cold War era, questions, such as what the two countries jointly protect, from whom and how are getting more unclear. Economic interdependence has been

dramatically heightened by incorporating, or even centring on China which also challenges regional security and the rules-based order. Japan is more proactively engaging in military affairs beyond a policy of purely economic diplomacy by restructuring its domestic security legislation. Yet, Japan cannot be a rising sun in terms of economic growth. It is hardly imaginable that Japan could provide an alternative market or source of investment to China for the region. Therefore, political and strategic motivations may be more essential for the two countries to enhance their security cooperation than ever. The sustainability of their cooperation depends on their perception of threats and the convergence of their national interests to preserve the rules-based regional order.

Japan–Australia Security Cooperation After the Cold War

Tomohiko Satake

Introduction

While relations between Japan and Australia during the Cold War mostly involved economic cooperation, they also participated in some security exchanges, such as information sharing and military training, especially since the mid-1970s. Yet, such cooperation was limited in scope and mostly facilitated by the United States, rather than through direct cooperation between the two countries. Indeed, there was a strong feeling inside Japan that Tokyo should not pursue defence cooperation with countries other than the United States during the Cold War.[134] Majority of Australian also remained cautious about negative regional impacts caused by Australia's closer defence engagement with Japan.[135] It was not until the end of the Cold War that Japan and Australia began more substantial cooperation in terms of defence and security.

The 1990s: The Diversification of Security Partnerships

Unlike in Europe, the end of the Cold War in the Asia Pacific did not quickly translate into a more peaceful and stable environment. Despite the demise of the Soviet Union, many risks and uncertainties remained, including the situation on the Korean Peninsula, the future directions of Russia and China, and a potential reduction of US military presence in the region. Given these risks and uncertainties, Japanese and Australian

policymakers came to realise that simply maintaining bilateral alliances with the United States would not automatically guarantee their security in the post-Cold War era.

This is why both Tokyo and Canberra began to enhance their own regional engagement by diversifying their bilateral and multilateral security partnerships, even as they kept strong alliance relations with Washington. The 'diversification' in this context did not necessarily mean that two countries become independent or keep distance from the United States. On the contrary, Japan, and increasingly Australia too, saw diversifying their security cooperation could indirectly help to keep US strategic presence in the region, by increasing reginal allied roles for maintaining and strengthening a liberal international order in the region. It was in this context that Japan and Australia came to cooperate closely in various fields, including defence and security.

In March 1990, senior defence officials from Australia visited Japan for talks on regional security issues with their counterparts at the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This 'strategic dialogue' continued with regular exchanges until February 1996, when official political-to-military (PM) and military-to-military (MM) dialogues were institutionalised. Mutual visits by defence ministers and senior officials also began between 1990 and 1992. According to Paul Dibb, the head of the Australian delegate at that time, officials discussed US extended deterrence, Russia's strategic posture, the future of China, and the South East Asian security environment. Two countries' officials also discussed their mutual concerns about the possible demonstration effect of New Zealand's ban on US nuclear-armed warships in 1985, which ended up the suspension of the US's ANZUS treaty obligations to New Zealand.[136]

Both countries' active roles in regional security – such as the peace settlement in Cambodia beginning in the late 1980s and regional institution-building through the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) – contributed to the development of bilateral cooperation. By late 1991, Australia was already recognised by Japan as an 'indispensable partner for coping with regional and global issues, including environmental

problems, arms control and disarmament, and the Cambodian peace settlement.'[137] Australia also welcomed Japan's military commitment to Cambodia, acknowledging that it should 'be a model of the ways Australia and Japan can, where feasible, join forces diplomatically to help resolve regional disputes.'[138] In 1993, the SDF joined a PKO seminar led by the Australian Defence Forces (ADF)—the seminar continued and was held 9 more times until 2008. In May 1995, the leaders of both countries announced a Joint Declaration on the Australia–Japan Partnership. The Declaration pledged Japan and Australia to work jointly on security issues such as institution-building, peacekeeping operations (PKO), and disarmament.[139]

Tokyo's and Canberra's active security roles were partly linked to their growing concerns with US strategic presence in the region. At the first meeting between the Japanese Defence Chief and the Australian Defence Minister, both leaders stressed the importance of the US military presence to 'cope with various destabilizing factors in the Asia Pacific', and confirmed that Japan and Australia 'need to make their own effort in accordance with their national circumstances' in order to 'encourage the US further by making it easy to maintain the stationing of forces in this region'.[140] Canberra also began to encourage Tokyo to assume a greater regional and even global security role, as demonstrated by its support for Japan's contribution to the multilateral coalition forces during the first Gulf Crisis or its permanent membership of the UN security council. For Canberra, Tokyo's greater security roles are important not only to build regional peace and stability, but also to enhance the US–Japan alliance it saw as the linchpin of the US engagement in the region.[141]

In this context, it was not coincident that both Japan and Australia moved to 'reinforce' bilateral alliance relations with the United States almost in the same period. In April 1996, Japan and the United States announced the Joint Declaration for Security. There months later, Australia and the United States announced the 'Sydney Statement'. These two documents not only 'reconfirmed' the strong alliance relationships, but 'redefined' alliance roles from bilateral to regional and global contexts. In line with this alliance enforcement, Japan and

Australia also agreed to upgrade their bilateral dialogue (including PM/MM meetings) and cooperation in the political and security fields in the mid-1990s. The Japanese and Australian defence chiefs also agreed to expand reciprocal visits, high-level talks, and joint training between the Japan Maritime Self-Defence Force (JMSDF) and the Australian Defence Force (ADF). For the first time, Japan's 1997 defence white paper named Australia in its section on bilateral defence exchanges with foreign countries.

As such, the enhanced bilateral dialogue between these two allies was closely related to their respective security relations with the United States. It was recognised that joint cooperation between Japan and Australia would indirectly support the US military presence in the region, by increasing regional allies' responsibilities in terms of international order-building. Considering such a strategic interdependence between the US, Japan, and Australia, it was quite natural that their respective dyad relations evolved into 'trilateralism' afterwards. In fact, at least in Australia, the idea of a trilateral exchange between the US, Japan, and Australia had already 'obtained a foothold of sorts in Australia's strategic policy agenda' by the mid-1990s.[142] As their security interests converged in the post-Cold War era, the idea of trilateralism became increasingly realistic between these countries.

By that time, the growing strength of China may have motivated Japan's outreach to Australia. In particular, the 1995–96 Taiwan Strait Crisis stimulated concern among the two countries' policymakers and the issue was discussed at the first PM/MM meetings. A 1997 bilateral summit between their leaders affirmed for the first time that they would 'make efforts to keep China engaged with the international community.'[143] Howard later recalled that '[t]he major challenge' in this period was 'to reassure the Japanese that we were not flirting too much with the new suitor, China.'[144] According to Asia specialist Michael Green, the strategy paper made by the Liberal Democratic Party in 1997 recommended that, in addition to the alliance with the United States, Japan should strengthen cooperation with regional

countries such as South Korea and Australia, 'which also have reason to be concerned about China's future course.'[145]

Yet Tokyo and Canberra were fully aware that rapid development of bilateral defence cooperation would unsettle their Asian neighbours, which could negatively impact regional security. In particular, Australia's Howard government attempted to enhance political and economic relations with China, which temporally deteriorated after Australia supported the deployment of US aircraft carriers near the Taiwan Strait. Australia aimed to avoid giving the impression that it was interested in the 'encirclement' of China.[146] Thus, while he acknowledged the benefits of expanding Japan–Australia security cooperation, Prime Minister Howard believed 'rapid expansion [was] not favourable.'[147] He instead recommended a gradual expansion of security dialogues. Prime Minister Hashimoto also supported such an incremental approach.[148] As a result, bilateral security cooperation in the 1990s was mostly limited to low-key exchanges, rather than more serious operational cooperation.

The 2000s: From Exchange to Cooperation

In the 2000s, the symbolically important Japan–Australia defence exchanges evolved into more practical cooperation. Direct engagement between the Japanese Self-Defence Forces (JSDF) and the ADF occurred in bilateral operations, and often trilateral operations involving the United States, at both regional and global levels. Regionally, Japan and Australia played central PKO roles in East Timor, providing large-scale military and engineering units and collaborating closely in areas like road and bridge construction. Tokyo and Canberra also collaborated in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) activities. After the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami, for instance, they were active in HA/DR operations in Indonesia as members of a 'core group' with the United States and India.

Globally, Japan and Australia contributed to the US-led 'war on terror' more than any other regional countries by providing military, economic, and diplomatic support. Such cooperation led to the Australia–Japan Joint Statement on Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism in July 2003. In February 2005, the Howard government decided to send 450 ADF personnel to protect a JSDF unit operating in the city of Samawah, Iraq to support reconstruction. Between 2004 and 2008, moreover, Japan Air Self-Defence Force (JASDF) units airlifted more than a thousand ADF personnel – the second largest number after US military personnel – operating as part of Multi-National Force – Iraq.

To some extent, this activity was stimulated by geostrategic concerns, including the rise of China. Throughout the 2000s Japan grew increasingly worried about China's growing maritime activities in its surrounding areas, as well as North Korea's nuclear and missile programs. While Australia saw little direct military threat from China, it predicted that 'US–China relations may be a significant source of tension in the region in coming years,' which could significantly affect Australia's security.[149] In order to hedge against growing strategic uncertainties caused by the changing regional balance of power, Japan and Australia began to enhance their trilateral defence relationship with the United States, as well as strengthen their traditional US alliance ties by assuming greater regional and global burden-sharing.

As a result, the two countries decided to establish a Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (TSD) with the United States. Originally started at the sub-cabinet level, TSD was upgraded to the foreign ministers' level in March 2006. The US–Japan–Australia Security and Defence Cooperation Forum (SDCF) – an annual meeting at the assistant secretary level – also kicked off in February 2007. While TSD was largely driven by geostrategic interests, many of the issues discussed centred on non-traditional security, such as counter-terrorism and HA/DR. Through these activities, TSD supplemented roles of regional multilateral security institutions, while shaping international security environment in favour of three countries' interests and values. Cooperation in such 'soft' security areas also made it possible for all

three countries to enhance their defence cooperation without much controversy at the initial stage of the TSD process.

In addition to these external functions, TSD has its internal functions. As explained, Japan and Australia saw TSD as a useful mechanism to keep US engagement with the region by institutionally binding its regional security commitment. It also served as a mechanism to encourage greater allied burden-sharing on regional and global security issues. In particular, the United States (and Australia) expected TSD to spur Japan's greater security roles in the region and beyond by making Tokyo 'think more about the world like Australia and the United States do'.[150] Thus both the US and Australia have used the TSD and the SDCF to engage Japan more deeply on bilateral defence cooperation in the region even beyond Japanese territory. Some Japanese also see the TSD as an important element of 'normalization' of Japan's security policy.[151]

Another 'hidden' agenda of the TSD process was to prevent Australia from inclining too much towards China. By 2005, China had already become Australia's second largest trading partner, overtaking Japan. Prime Minister Howard and Foreign Minister Downer made maximum efforts to enhance Australia's diplomatic and economic engagement with China, while maintaining a strong US alliance.[152] It is argued that both Japanese and American policymakers were worrying about a drift in Australia's policies to China, and such concern worked as a key catalyst for the development of TSD.[153] In short, TSD was developed not only to shape international security environment, but to shape each member's behaviour and policies. Put another way, three countries have developed trilateral security cooperation in order to 'keep the US in, let Japan do more, and tether Australia'.[154]

In line with this growing trilateralism, Japan and Australia also began to institutionalise their bilateral defence and security relationships—the weakest link in this triangle. In March 2007, just one year after the upgrade of TSD, both countries announced the Japan–Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation (JDSC). The first Japan–Australia

Foreign and Defence Ministerial Consultation (a 'two-plus-two meeting') was then held in June 2007. In December of the following year, the two nations' defence ministers signed a revised Memorandum on Japan–Australia Defence Exchanges, which provided a framework for expanding practical engagement between the JSDF and the ADF. Although JDSC, two-plus-two meeting, and revised defence memorandum did not reveal any new initiatives of bilateral security cooperation, these frameworks provided foundations for the further enhanced defence and security cooperation afterwards.

While Japan–Australia defence and security cooperation developed mostly in trilateral contexts with the United States, two countries had their own bilateral initiatives which were independent from the US strategic interests. A good example of this their cooperation for non-proliferation and disarmament through the International Commission for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (ICNND). After holding a number of meetings, the ICNND committee finalised a report at the fourth Commission meeting in Hiroshima in October 2009. The report called for the US and Russia not only rapidly to conclude the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, but to commence a new round of negotiations designed to produce further deep cuts in each side's arsenals. It further stressed that all the nuclear weapon states should agree a strong statement on disarmament at next year's NPT review, as well as adopting a nuclear doctrine, such as the 'no first use' commitment—that significantly reduces the role and salience of nuclear weapons in their defence posture.[155]

Japan and Australia also collaborated for the community-building in Asia Pacific. In his speech at Singapore in January 2002, Prime Minister Koizumi called for the establishment of a regional community (later known as the East Asian Community) that encouraged functional cooperation among regional countries, and invited Australia as a 'core member' of such a community. While such a vision did not materialise, it enhanced a momentum for the establishment of a summit-level meeting among regional key players, later materialised as the East Asian Summit of which both Japan and Australia were initial members.

In June 2008, moreover, Prime Minister Kevin Rudd announced that Australia would seek to encourage development of an 'Asia Pacific Community'. While the concept was understood as competitive to Japan's East Asian Community concept, which was reiterated by Japan's new prime minister Kunio Hatoyama in 2009, there were many common features in terms of membership, vision, and functions between these two concepts. In this sense, Japan and Australia shared similar views on a desirable regional security architecture, as well as sharing a view that US military commitment was indispensable for peace and stability of the region. Such shared views on a regional security order were foundations of close security cooperation between two countries in the post-Cold War era.

The 2010s: Cooperation Under the 'Power-Shift'

The power shift caused by the rise of China and the relative decline of the United States became more prominent in the late 2000s. With its rapid growth in economic and military power, China became increasingly assertive over maritime interests including resources and territorial claims in the region. In response, the administration of President Barack Obama began to enhance US military, economic, and diplomatic commitments to the Asia Pacific through the 'pivot' or 'rebalance' policy. At the same time, it encouraged regional allies and partners to take on more independent roles by addressing regional security challenges on their own.

In this context, close defence and security cooperation between Japan and Australia continued under the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) and Australia's Labor Party. The countries signed an Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) and an Information Security Agreement (ISA) in May 2010 and May 2012, respectively. After the Great East Japan Earthquake of March 2011, Australia dispatched three out of its four C-17s to help relief efforts. This was highly appreciated by the Japanese government. An ADF contingent also began to support JSDF engineering units dispatched for the United Nations (UN) mission in South Sudan starting in August 2012.

This DPJ–Labor period also saw a rapid development of bilateral and trilateral military training and exercises involving the United States, not only on PKO and HA/DR, but also on hard security issues. Since 2007, for instance, bilateral and trilateral military exercises have been conducted fairly regularly and included amphibious and anti-submarine warfare operations. Some of these exercises were conducted in areas near Okinawa, the South China Sea, and the Mariana Islands where the Chinese navy had been increasing its presence. There was also increased bilateral cooperation in defence technology, space, and cyberspace. Indeed, the Rudd government initially proposed the possibility of cooperation in submarine technology to the DPJ government. As discussed, institutions like TSD, SDCF and bilateral 2 plus 2 meetings provided frameworks to discuss and prepare for the enhancement of bilateral defence and security cooperation at the military to military level.

Close security links between Australia and Japan were further upgraded when conservative prime ministers took power in both countries. Under the banner of a 'special strategic partnership,' Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe and Australian prime minister Tony Abbott pushed for cooperation on Australia's future submarine project. They also facilitated joint operations and exercises between the JSDF and the ADF. Given these developments, some argue that the Japan–Australia security partnership has already become a 'quasi-alliance' or 'an alliance with a lowercase "a",' even though it is not a formal alliance grounded in a mutual defence treaty.

Yet, the failure of the submarine deal – the April 2016 decision by Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull's government not to choose Japan as its partner for Australia's next submarine – poured cold water on warming relations between the two countries. Some view Australia's close economic relations with China (verging on dependency) as the major reason for the setback. While there is no clear evidence to support such a view, it is at least true that the 'strategic interests' Japan emphasised in its submarine bid were not shared by the Australian side as much as some Japanese policymakers expected. The

outcome highlighted some subtle differences in terms of priorities as well as perceptions of China between the two countries.

Notwithstanding such differences, Japan and Australia have maintained momentum toward closer security cooperation even after the 'submarine shock.' In July 2016, Japan, Australia and the United States held a TSD for the first time in three years. Japanese and Australian defence ministers also met in August and confirmed that they would promote even stronger defence cooperation between two countries. At the Japan–Australia Summit Meeting in September 2016, moreover, the prime ministers agreed to promote further the strengthening of both bilateral security and defence cooperation and trilateral cooperation including the United States. In late 2016, the three signed a Trilateral Intelligence Sharing Agreement (TISA), enabling more data-sharing among the three countries in key areas of the region. In early 2017, Japan and Australia also signed a revised ACSA, which enabled the mutual supply of ammunition between the JSDF and the ADF.[156] They have also sought to conclude the Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA), which would improve and simplify reciprocal administrative, policy, and legal procedures for when JSDF and ADF units visit the other's home country, by the end of 2017.

This is not only because of their shared commitment to liberal international order, as often stressed by the two governments, but also because of shared concerns over future risks and uncertainties, including the rise of China and the potential decline of US power in the region. Tokyo and Canberra had initially different relations with the US Trump administration. Nonetheless, both parties clearly recognise that sustaining the US commitment to the region remained to be crucial for peace and security in the region. This is why not only Japan, but Australia have attempted to revitalise bilateral relations with the US under the Trump administration in order to project its influence over the White House's decision-making process.

Meanwhile, both Japan and Australia have accelerated diversification of their international security partnerships in response to greater uncertainty under the Trump presidency. Whether pro-alliance or

alliance sceptic, conservative or liberal, many in Australia support deeper engagement with the region through expanding strategic partnerships with like-minded countries, most notably Japan.[157] Japan has accelerated its regional engagement and the diversification of its strategic partnerships under the banner of a 'free and open Indo-Pacific.'[158] Australia is positioned as the centre of such a strategy. In this sense, close defence and security cooperation is likely to continue, or even strengthen, in the foreseeable future under the increasingly uncertain security environment in the Asia-Pacific region.

Australia–Japan Security Cooperation: The Lack of a Targeted Approach

Sheryn Lee

Introduction

The success of post-Cold War relations between the US, Japan and Australia is unique. Since 1957, the Commerce Agreement has enabled highly beneficial two-way trade between the two countries, with resource-poor Japan relying on Australia as an important source of raw materials and energy, and Australia receiving manufactured goods, components and foreign investment from Japan.[159] Encouraged by vibrant commercial ties, Tokyo and Canberra have also sought to upgrade its security cooperation and political dialogue. At the core of this arrangement is the TSD, which began in 2001 and was elevated to ministerial level in 2005. As previously argued by Thomas S. Wilkins, US, Japanese and Australian regional strategies are achieving a 'remarkable degree of coordination.'[160]

The US–Japan–Australia Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (TSD) has provided a framework for practical trilateral defence cooperation, and strengthened the bilateral alliances between the US and Japan, and the US and Australia. With regards to bilateral ties, in March 2007, then-leaders John Howard and Shinzo Abe concluded the Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation (JDSC), the first formal defence relationship for Japan outside of the US–Japan security treaty.[161] Its success has led to numerous characterisations: 'virtual alliance,' 'virtual JANZUS,' 'little NATO,' 'shadow alliance,' 'bilaterally networked multilateralism,' and 'informal trilateralism.'[162]

Understanding the strengths and limitations of such defence cooperation is essential for strengthening the relationship in a time of great change for the Asia-Pacific region. First, this paper will outline the '~isms and ~schisms' of regionalism, what are the objectives, and what are the prospects and limitations of such arrangements. Second, it will examine Japan–Australia relations, arguing that although it has a successful foundation it lacks a targeted approach from Canberra. Australia has more to benefit from deepening cooperation with Japan, however it needs to clarify its strategic objectives. That is, making clear its interpretation of its ANZUS commitments, and what it seeks to achieve from spoke-to-spoke and trilateral cooperation.

'~isms and ~schisms'

It is important to understand what is meant by 'trilateralism' and how it fits into broader patterns of bilateral, regional or minilateral, and multilateral arrangements. Such arrangements are 'one way of organizing [portions] of the international community for the conduct of public policy.'[163] Yet as Alan Winters has previously argued, 'since we value multilateralism we had better work out what it means and, if it means different things to different people, make sure to identify the sense in which we are using the term.'[164]

The notion of 'trilateralism' was popularised in 1972 when the Trilateral Commission was proposed between the United States, Western Europe and Japan, and its origins reflect a particular interpretation of relations between advanced capitalist powers.[165] Similarly to the current context in the Asia Pacific, in the 1970s the moves to instigate trilateral arrangements was accompanied by 'an intensive American effort to inculcate liberal democratic political institutions and values to serve as anchors against either a return to right-wing militarism or a move toward the Communist Left.'[166] Since the end of the Cold War, the US has sought to leverage its alliance with Japan to form collective security arrangements to 'keep the Pacific as an American lake.'[167]

Washington resisted the use of the NATO alliance as a model for the proposed (and then unsuccessful) South East Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO). It's preference was to maintain its set of bilateral alliances with Japan, South Korea, the Republic of China (ROC or Taiwan) and ANZUS (Australia and New Zealand)—known as the San Francisco Treaty system—with no unified command and no commitment to allocating unified and American forces to the region.[168] Since the 1969 Guam Doctrine, Washington has sought for its allies to take greater responsibility for their own self-defence,[169] and one form of engagement it has promoted in particular is 'spoke-to-spoke.' This created a relatively flexible 'hubs and spokes' system in which Washington could coordinate between different partners and in various numbers. These ad hoc groupings were considered more responsive to problems as they arose as it solved the problem of collective action.[170]

Trilateralism has thus become broadly defined as 'cooperative security behaviour between three states or strategic polities to promote specific values or orders.[171]' Michael Green has also observed that, 'trilateral forums were established to leverage common values and interests in order to shape the larger regional agenda for security cooperation … [and to pursue] a favourable balance of power.'[172] In doing so, 'trilateralism' strengthens 'spoke-to-spoke' cooperation—such as relations between Canberra and Tokyo—and theoretically lightens the burden of the 'hub,' Washington. Such cooperation can lead to practical defence technology sharing agreements, intelligence sharing agreements, military to military exchange, and joint operational training—all of which leads to the much-treasured notion of trust between two countries.

Trilateralism is also classified as a form of 'minilateralism,' as well as the broad phenomenon of 'regionalism.' 'Minilateralism' as defined by Moses Naim is 'a smarter, more targeted approach …bring[ing] to the table the smallest number of countries needed to have the largest possible impact on solving a particular problem … Think of this as minilateralism's magic number.'[173] William T. Tow clarifies that this 'magic number' is 'usually three, but sometimes four or five states

meeting and interacting informally (in the absence of a governing document) to discuss issues involving mutual threats to their security or, more often, to go over specific tasks related to building regional stability and order.'[174] That is, in comparison to multilateralism, minilateralism's smaller numbers of actors results in targeted objectives of engagement, less contracted negotiations, and the provision of practical solutions.

These '~isms' fall into the broader scheme of regionalism which Anthony Milner argues, 'suggests the intentional, top-down character of region building.'[175] Regional institutional arrangements are measured on successes—both material and cognitive. Material regionalism, such as that of the Six Party Talks, targets practical and functionally specific issues for which cooperative responses are considered more effective than that by individual nation-states.[176] On the other hand, cognitive regionalism emphasises 'region-building,' for instance, ASEAN is in effect a mechanism for producing and enforcing shared norms and beliefs by which regional identities can be built.[177] However the two should not be mutually exclusive but rather 'scaffolded'—regional institutions exist in a geostrategic and proposing regional arrangements entails setting and meeting objectives.[178] Material regionalism can lead to the regional integration of identities and norms, such as the European Union (EU) integration efforts.[179] Whereas, cognitive regionalism is a mechanism for socialisation, building trust and establishing mutual norms. Such environments are more conducive to discussion on difficult security and political topics, such as approaching an ASEAN–China Code of Conduct in the South China Sea.[180]

The Foundation of Australia–Japan Ties

US–Japan–Australia trilateralism is the most successful case of bolstering bilateral ties between US allies, meaning Australia–Japan relations are particularly unique. This paper argues that the strength of US–Japan–Australia ties is due to the relative lack of success of other trilateral initiatives, successful historical and grassroots reconciliation,

and the strong economic agreements implemented between Japan and Australia.

First, in the case of the US–Japan–Australia arrangement, the level of 'spoke to spoke' interaction is considerable when compared to the US–Japan–India and US–Japan–ROK initiatives. The US and Japan have sought similar trilateral arrangements with both India and South Korea, and the lack of success has fuelled the perception of the success of US–Japan–Australia relations. On the one hand, the US, Japan and India share a similar threat perception over China, with Japan becoming a permanent member of the Malabar naval exercises in 2015.[181] However, defence cooperation and economic linkage remain modest. Consequently, despite strategic convergence this has not been enough to sustain a consistent and formal security partnership.

On the other hand, the US–Japan–ROK relationship is more complex and is more apt for comparison to US–Japan–Australia ties. The formalisation of a trilateral security partnership US, Japan and South Korea—conducted through the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG)—has long been a geostrategic objective for Washington. Combined with the shared values and interests between Washington, Seoul and Tokyo leads to the assumption that the TCOG should have advanced beyond that of the TSD.[182] When considering the changing balance of power which necessitates material regionalism efforts in combination with the cognitive notions of Asian democracies allied to the US—one would assume US–Japan–ROK trilateralism to be the most advanced mechanism. However, this relationship is the most fragile with gaps in strategic understanding and continued disagreement over history.

In comparison to Australia–Japan relations, throughout WWII the Japanese flew 64 raids on Darwin and 33 raids on other targets in Northern Australia. The 1942 bombing of Darwin remains the largest attack ever mounted on Australia by a foreign power, and it was a popular Australian fear that Japan was planning an invasion. As well, over 22,000 Australian servicemen and approximately 40 nurses were

held as prisoners-of-war by the Japanese in South East Asia, and by the end of the war more than a third of these prisoners had died.[183]

Despite this, Australia and Japan have had success in reconciling its historical grievances from the Second World War, which has led to a second strength. The post-war reconciliation process has formed a bedrock for intercultural exchange and cooperation, and added to both countries' public diplomacy and soft power efforts.[184] Japanese remains the most studied foreign language in Australian schools and universities, and Australia is the top sister school partner for Japan with approximately 650 school to school arrangements.[185] Current grassroots reconciliation efforts continue to be viewed as genuine efforts by both the Australian and Japanese communities.[186] On the 60th anniversary of the Japan–Australia Commerce Agreement, former Prime Minister John Howard remarked that 'Australia's decision to overcome post-World War II animosity and sign a trade deal with Japan 'immeasurably strengthened' Australia's economy.'[187]

Lastly, on the back of the success of the long-standing Commerce Treaty, the free trade agreement—the 2015 Japan–Australia Economic Partnership Agreement (JAEPA)—is the most liberalising bilateral trade agreement signed by Tokyo. Australia is the only major agricultural exporter to have an FTA with Japan, and once it is fully implemented by 2034, 98 percent of Australian merchandise exports to Japan will receive preferential access or enter duty free.[188] Japan is also the second largest source of foreign direct investment behind the US. Even though China is now Australia's biggest export destination, Japan still remains Australia's second largest export market and is the largest source of foreign investment from the Asia-Pacific.[189] In particular, Australia and Japan share a largely complementary relationship in the energy and resources with Australia providing approximately two-thirds of Japan's coal, one-fifth of Japan's LNG imports, and over 60 percent of Japan's iron ore imports. Conversely, Japan continues to be a leading investor in the development of Australia's coal and iron export industries.[190] According to Austrade, 'Japanese companies reinvest a greater proportion of their earnings back into Australia than companies from most other major economies'

including the US, the UK and Germany.'[191] Such agreements such have been regarded in Canberra as acts of reconciliation, and a sign of shared values, providing a stepping stone into substantive political and security dialogue.[192]

Constraints to Formalising Defence Cooperation

The US is a key ally for both Japan and Australia, and its security interests in the region have been best served by its existing framework of 'hubs and spokes' bilateral alliances.[193] Until the end of the Cold War, security cooperation between Tokyo and Canberra remained indirect, via the US–Japan Security Treaty and the ANZUS alliance.[194] A key component of the burgeoning 'bilateral strategic relationship [between Japan and Australia] is its triangulation with Washington.'[195] In 2007, the Japan–Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation was signed to affirm strategic cooperation and coordination between the two countries.[196] Practical defence dialogue continues to develop between Canberra and Tokyo, with broader trilateral initiatives seen as an important force multiplier. In essence,

> *China's increasing economic, diplomatic, and military strength is compelling countries to rethink existing security arrangements and take initial steps that may lead to the formation of regional groupings of nations with common interests and values. At the same time [the US] has pursued stronger defence relations with Australia, Japan, and India.*[197]

To this end, in 2012 the Australia–Japan Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement (ACSA) for the reciprocal provision of supplies and services between the Australian Defence Force (ADF) and the SDF was signed into force. In the same year the Information Security Agreement (ISA) to enhance information sharing and information cooperation for both the bilateral and trilateral settings was also enacted.[198] In 2014, the bilateral relationship was elevated to a 'Special Strategic Partnership,' and both sides also signed an agreement to establish the framework for joint research, development, production and of defence equipment and technology.[199] Currently, a Visiting

Forces Agreement is being negotiated to enhance military cooperation—it would allow Australian forces to undertake training at Japanese bases, and also enable both countries to transport military equipment. This would make it easier to conduct joint training exercises and drills. This would be the first agreement of its kind for Japan (besides its agreement with the US), however, no conclusion date has been set.[200]

Both Australia and Japan have much to gain from strengthening cooperation in a time of great unease, however it is Canberra that has created more limitations for than Tokyo. The constitutional restraints on Japan's military involvement, self-defence capabilities and arms exports, had previously limited Tokyo's scope for cooperation. However, Prime Minister Abe has committed to normalising Japan's Self Defence Forces (JSDF), and for it to take a more equal role in its US alliance. For instance, in 2014, Japan lifted a self-imposed arms export ban to expand Japan's security role in the region and offset China's growing military might.[201] Although such measures face domestic backlash due to Japan's 'active pacifism,' with many Japanese citizens reluctant for Japan to take on increased military activities, Abe's cabinet has continued with its reinterpretation of Article 9, and has increased cooperation with India, Indonesia, the Philippines and Vietnam to name a few. As Aurelia George Mulgan has argued, Tokyo has shifted from 'exclusive bilateralism to modest minilateralism.'[202]

Moreover, Japan is the closest ally of the US, and Australia could benefit greatly from its experience in developing military capabilities that are interoperable with US forces. (It is of symbolic significance that Abe was the first foreign leader to meet with President Donald J. Trump, and Prime Minister Turnbull received President Trump's phone number via Greg Norman). Japan's geostrategic proximity to the Korean Peninsula, the Taiwan Strait and mainland China makes it a pivotal location in the Western Pacific, and is considered the 'America's unsinkable aircraft carrier in the Western Pacific.'[203]

In comparison, Australia still harbors reluctance to fully engage in any forum that might alienate Beijing and potentially damage important

two-way trade links. Overall, 'increasing capabilities among like-minded nations could enhance stability and provide a platform … to potential aggression by other countries, but it also risks threatening China, potentially spurring dangerous countermeasures.[204] Consequently, Australia–Japan relations has a strong foundation but it lacks a targeted approach due to Canberra's concern that strengthening security relations with the US and its partners could weaken its beneficial trade relationship with China.

Moreover, Australia is not proximate to the Northeast Asia maritime theatre. Despite being a US ally and hosting the US–Australian joint facilities at Pine Gap and Nurrungar (which play critical roles in signals intelligence and early warning), the Australian debate demonstrates a great reluctance to contribute more.[205] It has been highlighted by many observers that Australia finds it difficult to 'remain strategically engaged with the US and Japan while trying to keep China on side' due to the assumption that the Chinese government will 'punish Australia for unwanted strategic behaviour.'[206] For instance, if there were to be a Taiwan Straits crisis, Canberra enjoys the geographical luxury of discussing whether ANZUS entails a contribution, whereas for Tokyo it is broadly recognised that the unilateral reunification of Taiwan to mainland China would 'gravely weaken the US–Japan strategic position.'[207]

Therefore, if one examines the geostrategic environment of the Asia Pacific against the current status of security cooperation between Canberra and Tokyo, the mechanism is simply not adequate. Broadly, the changing balance of power in the Asia Pacific can be characterised by three dynamics:

1. The rejuvenation of the Chinese nation—Xi Jinping's 'Chinese dream'—has further provided a compelling and unifying ideology for the rapid transformation of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), the structural reorganisation of its command to consolidate President Xi's control, and its increased assertiveness in its territorial disputes.[208]

2. This has been exacerbated by the perception of the relative decline of the US in the Western Pacific. The election rhetoric of President Trump of a 'reduced strategic rule for the United States … triggered unease in many Asia-Pacific capitals.' As well, 'mixed messaging and the doctrine of 'America First' are generating scepticism and anxiety among America's allies and partners.'[209]

3. As well, the developing nuclear weapons program of North Korea, and its recent nuclear tests have highlighted the increasing vulnerability of the continental United States and the limitations of its extended deterrence in the Western Pacific.[210] Two of its ballistic missile tests were fired over Japan's northern Hokkaido region, and Pyongyang states it has successfully tested a hydrogen bomb to be mounted on an ICBM.[211]

Current Australia–Japan relations and the broader trilateral arrangement of US–Australia–Japan lacks the targeted approach to contribute or deliver practical solutions—a condition for material regionalism. Although it is discussed at various ministerial dialogues that such dynamics are concerning, the infrastructure, organisation and doctrine are not in place. The ACSA and ISA agreements are foundations which have not been capitalised on, and partnering activities remain confined to non-traditional security areas such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, peacekeeping operations and nuclear disarmament.[212]

As well, the argument for Australia and Japan's 'shared values'—concreting ideational regionalism—is weak. The current desire to maintain the democratic principles and ideologies of the American-led 'rules-based order' is not unique to the Australia–Japan relationship. These discussions are held in South Korea, the Philippines, Indonesia, Vietnam, India, the EU, Germany and France to name a few. This argument is not an expression of 'shared values' but rather a mechanism to voice mounting frustrations at the rapid change in regional balances of power.

Moreover, the argument of 'shared values' between Australia and Japan is not enough of a 'bandaid' to cover the divergent public opinions regarding foreign policy. According to 2017 polls by The Asian Research Network: 48 percent of Australians believe that ANZUS makes no difference to the major threats that Australia faces; 6 percent believe that the alliance reduces the likelihood of threats to Australia; and only 27 percent believe that ANZUS is an asset to Australian engagement in the Asia Pacific. In comparison, 75 percent of Japan's respondents believed in the credibility of the US alliance, and a 56 percent majority viewed Chinese investment as bad.[213]

Conclusion

Australia–Japan security relations have been viewed as a success in comparison to other minilateral initiatives in the region. However, despite a strong foundation it lacks a targeted approach to current geostrategic dynamics and a uniquely binding shared narrative for cooperation. Divergence has occurred due to Canberra's reluctance to articulate under what conditions it has to commit to its ANZUS obligations, and the political and public opinion that closer relations to the US and its allies endangers economic ties with China. This lack of focus of what contingencies ANZUS targets, and thus what spoke-to-spoke and trilateral cooperation could coordinate and achieve means that despite its achievements, Australia–Japan relations will remain constrained to a basic form of security cooperation.

This has implications for other minilateral arrangements, in particular, the hopes for the formalisation of a quadrilateral security agreement between the US, Japan, Australia and India. In November 2017, senior officials from the US, Australia, Japan and India met in the Philippines ahead of the East Asian Summit.[214] This prompted renewed discussion about the possibilities for formalising quadrilateral dialogue for substantive security and diplomatic issues. The motivations for such arrangements contain both values-based arguments and strategic rationales. The notion of 'The Quad' in particular has been motivated by the idea of a 'concert' or 'alliance' of democracies,' and a 'security

diamond' or 'axis' to 'contain China.'[215] However, since its origin in the coordination of the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, similar reincarnations of quadrilateral engagement—whether it be Malabar Ocean exercises or sideline meetings—have always faded away. Consequently, understanding the anomalous success that is US–Japan–Australia trilateralism could shed light into the failure of assumingly effective groupings such as US–Japan–ROK and US–Japan–Australia–India.

Further research in this area could examine the implications of using minilateral arrangements as a strategy. It should be remembered that the 'hubs and spokes' arrangement set up during the post-Cold War was designed to be ad hoc, and that this desire for flexibility and to avoid collective action problems means that minilateral initiatives should not be overhyped. Rather, emphasis should be placed on its functional form to respond as needed. Here it could also be fruitful to examine the risks cited by the experience of economists studying the coercive use of trilateral agreements to bring others to the negotiation table should not be overlooked.[216] This might increase our understanding of countries'—such as Australia—reluctance to upgrade security cooperation to the level of alliances (or even 'quasi-alliances'[217]).

Yet this poses a quandary—if the ad hoc system was not designed to be used for containment or coercion to achieve political objectives, can minilateral arrangements be an effective form of material regionalism? That is, can they meet strategic objectives? As well, there are implications for understanding 'shared values' as a binding element between the parties. The parties in the discussed minilateral arrangements are democracies, however, they have not increased the expression of 'shared' values and identity. Rather, minilateralism has often become a victim to election cycles and electoral systems. This is particularly true with regards to Japan and South Korea relations,[218] and even Japan–Australia relations when the submarine deal was scuttled.

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What is 'Special' About Japan's Strategic Partnership with Australia?

Thomas S Wilkins

Japan's 'New Bilateralism': Building Strategic Partnerships

As the first instance of Japan undertaking bilateral security cooperation outside of the US, the Australian case emblematises a paradigm-shift in Japanese policy, with Kersten positing that 'Japan recalibrated its relationship with Australia as part of its new regional and global strategy.'[219] The Japan–Australia bilateral has set the benchmark for other subsequent and future strategic partnerships, and perhaps most significantly, served as an experimental 'proving ground' not only for policies of 'external' mobilisation, but also for many 'internal' strategic objectives, such as security 'normalisation' and others, considered below.[220]

Experts consider Australia as Japan's second most important security partner, after the US.[221] It was the first such strategic partnership to be institutionalised, has progressed the most rapidly, and appears the most successful/effective of Tokyo's desired partnerships to date. For all these reasons Sahashi concludes that '*The relationship with Australia is the best example to demonstrate the Japanese strategy in security partnerships.*'[222] As such it has set the template for subsequent strategic partnerships that have followed in its wake, such as India, and various South East Asian states. This paper highlights the specific

benefits yielded by the Australian connection for Japan (many of which are of course reciprocal). In other words, what makes it 'special' in Japanese eyes?

What Makes the Japan–Australia Partnership 'Special'?

Unlike some of Japan's other aspiring strategic partnerships, this one is *multidimensional*, with a degree of 'breath' in its scope of activities unmatched by other partnerships. Former Foreign Minister Gareth Evans sets the tone for the 'special' nature of the relationship, claiming:

> *'With Japan, we have an extraordinarily fully rounded relationship, no longer just one dimensionally economic, but very mature, very close, and very cooperative politically: for example, we're the only country with whom Japan continues to actively and regularly engage in a formal multi-member Ministerial council dialogue.'*[223]

This section now explores several facets of the partnership through which Japan derives substantive benefits from its new security relationship with Australia.

Diplomatic/Security Cooperation

The Japanese authorities have repeatedly remarked that Japan faces an increasingly hostile international environment, especially in its immediate neighbourhood of East Asia, where relations with neighbouring powers such as China, Russia, and the two Koreas are far from satisfactory. As a consequence, perhaps inspired by Meiji reformer Yukichi Fukuzawa's well-known exhortation to 'leave Asia and join the West' (*Datsu-A nyū-Ō*), Tokyo has sought to create diplomatic space *elsewhere* in the Pacific region (and 'over the horizon' in Europe) to shore up its international position. In addition to the US, Australia as a regional 'middle power' (and co-ally of the US) has been a valuable interlocutor diplomatically across a range of issues at the heart of Japanese security concerns. Not least, Australia has been a long-time supporter of a permanent seat on the UN for Japan, and the two consulted closely during Canberra's tenure as a non-P5 member in

2013–14, and have continued to do so during Tokyo's tenure in 2016–17.[224]

Wilton attests that 'The strength of the Australia–Japan relationship is reflected in the ability of both countries to work together to achieve regional and global objectives.'[225] Many of these fall under the broad umbrella of regional security order, which can be identified as the organizing 'system principle' of the partnership.[226] To elaborate: Japan as a status quo power seeks to maintain a stable and rules-based regional order and is highly adverse to disruptions to such an order. In particular, these have taken the form of Chinese challenges to international law in the East China Sea (where Japan is directly affected) and the South China Sea (where it is not). In the annual leadership summit of 2015, PM Malcolm Turnbull issued a joint statement with Abe registering their 'Strong opposition to any coercive or unilateral actions that could alter the status quo in the South China Sea'.[227] Australia had previously outlined its opposition to Chinese attempts to unilaterally extend an Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) over disputed territory, and again affirmed its opposition to the construction of artificial islands (and their militarization) in the SCS in 2016, notably during a meeting with the Japanese PM; an act that drew predictable censure from Beijing.[228]

There is however a limit to the support Canberra is willing to give on these contentious territorial issues. Though Japan has not received direct recognition of its claim over the disputed Senkaku Islands from Canberra, de facto such support (arguably) implicitly exists.[229] Though Australia would be unlikely to render assistance to Japan unilaterally, when its ANZUS obligations are considered, action alongside the US to support Japan is much more probable. Japan is additionally working with Australia to assist other regional states facing coercive activities in the maritime sphere in 'capacity-building' efforts, including the transfer of ODA and military hardware (an arrangement also extended to the Pacific Island Countries (PICs), where Japan shares Australia's wariness of expanding Chinese influence).

All of this fits into a broader Japanese strategic objective of managing the rise of China by reducing its diplomatic isolation and concerting efforts to restrain Beijing's growing geopolitical influence. Thus, O'Neil posits that 'China's rise is enhancing the importance of Australia in Japanese policy thinking.'[230] This mutual support regarding the above issues is a form of 'soft balancing' of the PRC. Satake adds that 'both countries have developed their cooperation in order to construct a liberal international order based on institutions, rules, norms and values, rather than simply coping with an external threat'.[231] One of the most salient aspects of this cooperation can be seen in their mutual championship and continued support for multilateral security institutions such as APEC, ARF and EAS. While the two have collaborated closely on these former initiatives, they failed to coordinate in simultaneous and competing efforts to build a regional security community around 2008–9 when Kevin Rudd's 'Asia pacific community' and Yukio Hatoyama's 'East Asian Community' initiatives collided with one another.[232] These soft-balancing and community-building efforts notwithstanding, Canberra is not oblivious to the potential military dangers posed by the rise of China or of North Korea, and has condemned DPRK missile tests (and along with Japan, applied sanctions), much to Tokyo's satisfaction.

In addition, the partners are jointly extending their strategic purview toward a new arena for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region. Medcalf notes that 'Japan, like the United States, India, [and] Australia….is experimenting with the idea of an Indo-Pacific strategy'.[233] While it is unclear at this stage exactly what form such assistance would take – most likely naval/coast guard cooperation – the potential is there. As Sahashi notes 'the rise in Australian geopolitical importance, crucial for US power projection in the Indian Ocean and South East Asia, is well appreciated in Tokyo'.[234]

Values-Based Diplomacy

Under PM Abe in particular, Japan, as part of its efforts towards a international resurgence, has emphasised so-called 'values-based diplomacy'. This brand of diplomacy plays up adherence to international law, good international citizenship and the practice of liberal

democratic norms more generally. Once again, Australia is a perfect fit for cooperation on this score. *The Defence of Japan* 2016 states that 'Australia shares universal values with Japan, such as respect for freedom and human rights, and democracy.'[235] Wilton concurs that 'Australia has a history of incorporating the consideration of values into foreign policy making as a means of contributing to issues that go beyond responsibilities within borders, and towards responsibilities to people and institutions outside Australia's borders'.[236] Indeed, as one might anticipate, the strategic partnership serves as a vehicle for showcasing and operationalising such values, with official statements declaring: the 'special strategic partnership between Australia and Japan, a partnership based on common values and strategic interests including democracy, human rights, the rule of law, open markets and free trade.'[237] Interestingly, a similar approach has been taken with other 'like-minded' partners such as India, where again the jointly-held values are seen to catalyse (facilitating contact and mutual interests) and underpin (ease cooperation even in sensitive areas based upon the ready establishment of trust) cooperation. Behind this lies Japan's desire to use normative means and international law to defend against challenges to the status quo. As US hegemony in the Asia Pacific declines Japan has found common ground with other like-minded (especially 'middle') powers that seek to uphold a rules-based international order, as American ability to uphold the status quo purely through military supremacy wanes. This has spurred joint cooperation across on diplomatic issues such as Freedom of Navigation/Overflight – and disruption thereof – supplemented by an enthusiasm for regional 'public goods' such as maritime cooperation, HADR, and so forth that form the heart of their practical security cooperation (below). Such collaboration leads Manuel Panagiotopoulos to conclude that 'The Australia–Japan relationship is an example of 'values-based alignment' which has been supplementing realpolitik calculations.'[238]

Normalisation:

Australia's desire to have Tokyo play a greater role in regional security has resulted in strong political endorsement of both Japan's domestic and international policy agendas. Bisley argues that 'The Australian government' has made 'a very public strategic commitment to a Japan

that is in a period of significant transformation.'[239] In particular, former PM Tony Abbott provided ringing endorsement of Abenomics and Japan's 'proactive contribution to international peace'. And supporting Abenomics, the PM declared 'Japan's economic resurgence under Prime Minister Abe will be good for Japan, good for Australia and good for the world'.[240] This transnational political support provides a fillip to the Japanese PM's domestic and international standing, with the resultant political capital assisting in achieving objectives in both spheres. To this degree Canberra has welcomed new legislation and reinterpretations of the Japanese constitution to facilitate easier JSDF deployment overseas – for example in Peace Keeping Operations – including the principle of 'collective self-defence'.[241] This permits Japan to engage in a wider scope of allied operations with Australia in the future. Indeed, Australian forces already count several instances of PKO co-deployment including southern Iraq and South Sudan. Japan has also received political support from Australia for the loosening of its rules for arms exports (and Japan hopes that Australia will be a major customer for indigenous defence technology: see below). Lindley attests that 'Australia's engagement with Japan explicitly supports Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's agenda of revising Japan's defence posture and increasing involvement in regional security issues, even at some risk of upsetting China.'[242]

History

In the background to such security 'normalization' the issue of 'history' looms large. This relates to Japan's historical culpability for atrocities inflicted by imperial forces during the Great East Asia/Pacific War.[243] Whilst PM Abe's mixed messages about Japan's role in those wars, including objectionable private views, have alienated China and South Korea, Australia has registered no such indignation. Rather, According to Wilton, 'Australia, as a country with strong ties to Japan, has found a way to reconcile its relationship with Japan, despite its own historical grievances from the Second World War.'[244] Instead, particularly under PM Abbott, Canberra stressed a forward-looking relationship, and he even went as far to praise the 'courage' of Japanese submariners in their daring raid on Sydney Harbour in 1942.[245] And while this was not accepted uncritically among the Australian public, it is clear that

historical enmities on Australia's part are largely consigned to the past and serve as no inhibitor to contemporary relations. This is a refreshing change for Japanese officials accustomed to ritualistic censure from their Chinese and Korean counterparts. It also acts as a 'demonstration effect', perhaps pointing the way toward longer term reconciliation with countries in East Asia that may be encouraged to follow the Australian example. Medcalf surmises that that 'One way Australia may quietly help is over history. Australia and Japan should make more of their exceptional record of reconciliation.'[246] Moreover, Wilton puts forward policy recommendations for the Australian government to serve as a 'mediator' in Japan's historical disputes with Korea and China, as a form of middle power diplomacy. He argues that 'Australia could and should take the opportunity to develop an effective and credible policy to promote reconciliation'.[247] This may or may not be a welcome initiative from Tokyo's perspective (and Wilton's paper does not source Japanese opinion as to their receptiveness).

Practical Security/Defence Cooperation

The special strategic partnership however, goes beyond the political/diplomatic area to encompass working-level security/defence cooperation. As Ishihara has pointed out, the strategic partnership with Australia is not simply a 'talk shop', but an 'action shop', where tangible security cooperation occurs on a range of issues.[248] Its current remit includes: 'enhancing training and exercises, increased personnel exchanges, deepening cooperation on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, maritime security, peacekeeping, capacity building and enhanced trilateral defence cooperation with the United States'.[249] Indeed, as part of the strategic partnership's modus operandi, Japan seeks to '*learn*' through cooperation with Australia in fields ranging from intelligence, logistics, and operations.

Appearing elsewhere are joint efforts in counter-terrorism and non-proliferation (where Japan has worked with Australia in the UN). Japanese forces have undergone regular joint training exercises and staff exchanges with the ADF and have gained 'in-field' experience during co-deployment in southern Iraq, East Timor and South Sudan, building up military-to-military interoperability, (which some have

argued requires additional investment to realise its potential).[250] Mechanisms such as the ISA and ACSA (recently upgraded in 2016) have also proved their worth, with the latter facilitating Australia's major contribution to disaster relief efforts in the aftermath of the Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011 (Operation Pacific Assist) and later cooperation on relief efforts after Philippines Typhoon and search for the missing passenger airliner MH370.[251] While much of the discourse has been framed in non-traditional security (NTS) terms highlighting HA/DR and PKOs, Ishihara has identified what he calls a 'second evolution' in security cooperation, which indicates an increasing focus on more traditional 'hard security' issues.[252] Indeed, it could be argued that NTS forms a means toward CBMs/trust-building which will later develop into military cooperation (or arguably acts as a 'cover' for such actual intent). Furthermore, Australia and Japan have held discussions regarding a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) that would 'enable the two nations to conduct joint security exercises and disaster relief operations. Under such an accord, they will be allowed to bring troops, equipment and ammunition into each other's country.'[253] This had not eventuated at the time of writing, however. Instead, A Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA) is currently being negotiated that would simply joint training and procedures when JSDF personnel visit Australia and vice-versa.[254]

This expanding security collaboration is undergirded the emergence of defence technology cooperation where Tokyo views Australia as a potential major collaborator, even setting up a dedicated Japan–Australia Defence Cooperation Office in 2014 to manage such enterprises. Japan's partial retraction of the 'three principles on arms export' allowing for this is embodied in the Standards for Overseas Transfer of Defence Equipment (2011) and Three Principles on the Transfer of Defence technology (2014) legislation.[255] The Japanese government and defence industry is exploring projects related to hydrodynamics and others, but this field of cooperation suffered a serious blow when its prolific bid for Australia's SEA 1000 Future Submarine Program, was beaten by its French Rival, DCNS, leaving Japanese representatives rather aggrieved.[256] The loss of the contract was a serious setback in the overall strategic partnership depriving it

of a centrepiece defence collaboration, and the potential benefits of technology/expertise transfer, and improved interoperability/joint warfighting capability. Analysts have scrambled to offer a plethora of ex post facto explanations for the controversial decision not to back the Mitsubishi/Kawasaki bid, ranging from Japan's inexperience in major overseas arms sales, to a lack of enthusiasm on the part of the tenderers themselves.[257] As a consequence, Medcalf, among others, has suggested that 'We need to take the initiative now to assure the Japanese that a close strategic partnership is about more than submarines.'[258] Other areas of technical cooperation such as space and cyber security are also on the table at the time of writing.[259]

Other areas of cooperation

If joint diplomatic and security cooperation is seen as the primary impetus for the Strategic Partnership, other aspects of deep cooperation that reflect the maturity and 'specialness' of the relationship should not be ignored. As in all alliances/strategic partnerships these reinforce ties at the top level. First, due to the Japan–Australia EPA of 2014, Japan has made major efforts to revitalise its historically strong economic relationship with Australia. Abe expended significant political capital to drive through the early conclusion of this FTA with Australia. Though — as is the case will all Asia Pacific states — trade with China by volume overshadows their own bilateral exchange, Japan remains Australian second largest trading partner, with approximately $70bn in total bilateral exchange (based upon the slightly out-of-date official figures).[260] Moreover, a more recent study conducted by Panagiotopoulos for DFAT argues that the Japan–Australia relationship amounts to a 'new economic paradigm', when FDI figures, developed-to-developed country benefits and political risk factors are calculated, which greatly benefits both countries.[261] Emblematic of this are major infrastructure investment projects such as the INPEX Ichthys Liquid Natural Gas facility in northern Australia, which will make a significant contribution to meeting Japan's energy needs.[262] In addition, the precipitous withdrawal of the US under Donald Trump from the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP, has resulted in Australia and Japan leading the charge to salvage the trade pact without Washington's participation (TPP-

11).[263] Finally, it is worth mentioning that people-to-people ties also reinforce the relationship at the grass-roots level with Australians recording 80 per cent 'favourable' views toward Japan (in contrast to South Korea's 25 per cent and China's 12 per cent), according to the latest Pew polling figures.[264] This provides a durable base of public support in Australia for the strategic partnership.

Conclusion

Testament to the exemplary success of Japan's first serious attempt to build a bilateral strategic partnership beyond the US-security alliance (if not outside its orbit) is not hard to find. Former PM Abbott effused that 'Australia's friendship with Japan has been one of the most mutually beneficial bilateral relationships in global history'.[265] Even more sober analysis from an expert panel concluded that 'the potential for further development of the Australia–Japan strategic relationship is strong— given the natural fit between both nations as security allies.'[266]

Given the admirable progress made and commitment demonstrated through practical action as well as powerful rhetorical support, there is certainly something 'special' about this strategic partnership when compared to other less-developed Japanese security-dyads. Lyon points out that term 'Special Relationship' 'suggests a much deeper form of strategic connection between Japan and Australia than some might have imagined.'[267] Indeed, such language is usually reserved for US–UK or US–Israel security relations. Yet he reflects that 'The unfolding Australia–Japan relationship looks likely to be atypical of what emerges. It's likely to set a benchmark in strategic cooperation that few other such relationships could achieve.'[268]

These positive assessments notwithstanding, Envall observes – especially in light of Japan's failed submarine bid – that a de jure military *alliance* pact remains a distant prospect. He notes that:

> *'Continued growth in the Australia–Japan strategic partnership is, of course, not inevitable. Importantly, neither*

> *side officially proposes a deeper strategic partnership [alliance?] of this kind, even though some in Japanese policy circles and politics already view the relationship as moving towards a virtual or quasi-alliance.'*[269]

However, the evidence above certainly lends credence to the argument that the Australian strategic partnership represents a 'decentring' away from the US to provide ballast to, or otherwise lessen its over-dependence upon Washington. Lindley concludes that 'the bilateral partnership has exceeded the limits that would be seen if it were merely cooperation between two spokes in the US alliance mechanism. The burgeoning areas of bilateral cooperation indicate that the Australia–Japan relationship provides value in its own right, [on the other hand]...complementing each nation's formal alliance with the US.'[270]

Operationalising the Special Strategic Partnership Between Japan and Australia in Security Terms

Hideshi Tokuchi

Introduction

In 1951, the American attempt to establish a multilateral alliance of Australia, Indonesia, Japan, New Zealand, the Philippines and the US aborted partly because of the opposition of Australia for the absence of any treaty limitations of the rearmament of Japan and instead the ANZUS treaty was established partly to quiet fears inspired by a reviving Japan.[271] This story is all history now. In Japan today, enhancement of security cooperation with Australia sounds natural to the ears of the general public and seems widely accepted. Though further and in-depth analysis is needed, the reason can be summarised as follows:

1. Both countries are allies of the US and integral parts of the US-centred alliance network.
2. Both countries are mature democracies and share the basic values buttressing democracy.
3. Both countries are maritime nations in the vast Asia-Pacific seascape.

When Kurt Campbell emphasises Australia's important role in expanding US presence within Asia, he refers to Australia's features including its favourable geographic position, long coastline and deep waters.[272] He also argues, 'Australia is America's gateway to the Indo-Pacific, a maritime region home to the world's most important economic and energy waterways.'[273] Similar arguments would be made for Japan, despite geographical difference, particularly the difference of the distance to the Indian Ocean. Fourth, both countries' public sentiment toward each other has become friendly. According to the public opinion poll conducted by Japan's Cabinet Office in 2013[274], 63.9 per cent of the Japanese respondents feel familiar with the Oceanian countries.[275] The number is lower than that of the US (83.1), but higher than that of the South East Asian countries (60.4); and much higher than that of India (46.3) and that of the Republic of Korea (40.7). According to the public opinion poll about Japan conducted in Australia by Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2015,[276] 81 per cent of the Australians acknowledged friendly relations with Japan and only 6 per cent did not. In the same poll, Japan marked the best in Asia to the question of which of the G20 countries is the most reliable friend to Australia.

Nick Bisley points out that Australian former Prime Minister Tony Abbott's famous comment in September 2013 that Japan was Australia's best friend in Asia was seen as a diplomatic gaffe.[277] Mr Abbott's comment, however, is not a sea change of the bilateral relationship. It can be seen rather as a simple expression of the result of the evolution of the bilateral partnership. The bilateral security cooperation began in the 1980s with the peace settlement in Cambodia and regional institution-building through ARF, and then gradually evolved to include cooperation in UN-sponsored peacekeeping missions not only in Cambodia but also in East Timor, HA/DR efforts in the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami, the US-led war on terror and Iraqi reconstruction. These experiences had led to Australia–Japan Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation (JDSC) of 2007 before the advent of Prime Minister Abbott.[278]

The JDSC is nearly eleven years old. The bilateral security cooperation kept promoted not only during the years of the Japanese administration led by LDP but also during the time of the DPJ-led administration in the past ten years. The two countries signed two important security-related bilateral treaties, i.e. an Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement and an Information Security Agreement during the three years when Japan was ruled by DPJ. The momentum toward closer bilateral security cooperation was not lost during that period, which serves as clear evidence that the security cooperation with Australia has won a wide range of political and public support in Japan.

This paper tries to discuss opportunities and challenges of the security cooperation between the two countries under the banner of a 'special strategic partnership' in the present regional security environment. Although Japan was not successful in winning the deal for Australia's next submarine in 2016, it should not be regarded as a major setback. Equipment cooperation is rather new in the history of the security cooperation between the two countries. Though it may be a growing area of the bilateral cooperation, both countries have a lot more issues to cooperate on before promoting equipment cooperation.[279]

Regional Security Environment surrounding Japan and Australia

Geopolitical Situation in the Great Power Rivalry

Just in the aftermath of WWII, fears that Japanese militarism would return was equalled by fears of communism in Australia and it was the spectre of a Japan once again on its doorstep that was central to Australia's cultivation of an alliance with the US.[280]

Today's situation is completely different. The 2016 Defence White Paper of Australia states that there is no more than a remote prospect of a military attack by another country on Australian territory in the foreseeable future.[281] The 2016 White Paper's illustration of the events since the release of its 2013 version suggests a lot about the security concerns of Australia. It cites the relationship between the US

and China as 'fundamental to our strategic circumstance;' territorial disputes between claimants in the East and South China Seas as 'created uncertainty and tension in our region;' North Korea as 'a source of instability;' and state fragility as 'helped to enable the rise of Daesh terrorists in the Middle East.' It also mentions a violation of international law which 'led to the deaths of Australians in the skies over Ukraine.'[282] In his keynote address at IISS Shangri-La Dialogue 2017, Australia's Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull called North Korea's action 'unlawful, reckless and dangerous.'[283] Discussing China, he said, 'Some fear that China will seek to impose a latter day Monroe Doctrine on this hemisphere in order to dominate the region, marginalizing the role and contribution of other nations, in particular the United States.'[284]

Though Australia's strong commitment to the maintenance of the rules-based international order and to the deepening of its alliance with the US is crystal clear, the Australian view on China is nuanced. First, the 2016 Defence White Paper states, 'The growth in the capacity of China's military forces is the most significant example of regional military modernization, but other countries are also undertaking extensive modernization programs.'[285] It seems that careful consideration of balance is shown here so that China's military modernization is not too much highlighted. Second, when the 2016 White Paper discusses Australia's international partnerships, it treats Japan, the Republic of Korea and China in the same category.[286] (Regarding this point, I would argue that just as the White Paper correctly expresses the character of the US–China relationship[287], relationships of both Australia and Japan respectively with China are also 'a mix of cooperation and competition,' and thus the importance of cooperative aspect of the relationship with China should not be underrated, but that the limit of such cooperation should be also recognised, particularly in light of the Chinese 'aberrant behaviour,'[288]) Third, Australian Prime Minister Turnbull said also in his Shangri-La Dialogue address, 'Some commentators argue that Australia has to choose between Beijing and Washington. It is an utterly false choice – we have a good friend and partner in Beijing and a strategic friend and

ally in Washington. Neither constrains us in our dealings with the other.'[289] Here, I see another example of Australia's trying to take balance between the two powers. (On this point, I would agree with Thomas Wilkins, when he points out that strategy is stronger than politics and stronger than trade since Australia depends upon the US and its alliance system for its national security, not on China.[290])

Japan's position is different from that of Australia. Though power of balance is important in the actual maintenance of the balance of power as Campbell points out,[291] the importance of the US-centred alliance network as the indispensable tool of balance of power will continue to be at the top of the emphasis from a Japanese view-point.

Mixture of Traditional and Untraditional Challenges

The Asia-Pacific region is a part more of an 'international society' of sovereign nation states rather than of a 'world society' without national borders. We see more confrontation of sovereign states and more confrontation between liberal democracy and authoritarianism than dark side of globalization. Confrontation between democracy and 'irresponsible militarism' has not ended yet in the region. A difference from the Cold War days is that now such a confrontation is accelerating proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and disrupting free and unimpeded access to the global commons, particularly maritime sphere. In addition, some countries of this region are being occupied with social disorder and the threats of international terrorism. This region is full of traditional security agenda intertwined intricately with untraditional security agenda. It is more complicated than a simple return of geopolitics.

The 2016 Defence White Paper of Australia points out non-traditional challenges to Australia's security such as terrorism, cyber-attacks, space threats, and weapons of mass destruction.[292]The Japanese Government expresses similar assessments in its annual Defence White Paper.[293] Of immediate serious concern for Japan right now is North Korean nuclear and ballistic missile ambition. It is a global challenge. It is a blatant challenge to the non-proliferation regime. In

addition, North Korea will not hesitate to proliferate WMDs and related materials to terrorists to earn money. North Korean provocations also affect the world economy by easily influencing stock markets. There will be no quick fix on the North Korean issue. It will require unflagging efforts of long-term containment, as already proposed by some experts.[294] The strong condemnations of North Korea by the words of the international community, including Japan and Australia, should be accompanied by well-coordinated action showing strong determination of the world community.

No matter how serious and urgent this issue may be, however, we should not divert our attention from maritime security. It is not only about the territorial disputes in the middle of the South China Sea, but also about free and unimpeded access to the big artery of the world economy. It is about a strategic domain which should be free from state sovereignty. It covers a variety of issues such as maritime disaster, piracy, IUU fishing and damping, and human and drug trafficking. As the South China Sea connects the two oceans, it has a special significance. As Australia neighbours Indonesia, there may be a false image among the general public that Australia is closer to the South China Sea than Japan is, but in fact, Tokyo is closer to the South China Sea than Darwin is. Japan's interest in this strategic seascape is as large as Australia's.

The Asia-Pacific Regional Order

Survival in the said intricate environment mandates a dual approach. While traditional agenda must be addressed in a traditional way, i.e. balancing of power, untraditional agenda must be addressed in an untraditional way, i.e. international cooperation.[295]

The US-centred alliance network in this region was born as an American tool to contain the former Soviet Union. Though the Cold War ended a long time ago, it continues to serve as an indispensable instrument of balance of power of the democracies against the authoritarians in the Asia Pacific. While it was a hub-and-spokes type system centring on the US as the hub, it has now evolved into a web

of security cooperation connecting the countries at the tips of the spokes such as Japan and Australia. Moreover, the network now provides versatile infrastructure for multilateral security cooperation, such as All Partners Access Network (APAN) for sharing information, increasing situational awareness and decreasing response time for governments, militaries, international and non-governmental organizations particularly in humanitarian assistance or disaster response (HA/DR) efforts[296], and Rim of the Pacific Exercise (RIMPAC), which began as a multilateral exercise of Western navies in the early 1970s in the Cold-War context, but now serves also as an instrument of multinational military cooperation covering HA/DR, and involving China and sometimes even Russia.

In this sense, this network, which has guaranteed the stability of this region for many years, will continue to be the primary basis of the regional order. In fact, the regional allies of the US, particularly Japan and Australia, have obtained great benefits from the stability this system has generated, and thus, they do not have interests in undermining the network. In this interconnected world, security without alignment is not realistic for these countries. Alliance with rising China would be a non-starter, as China is authoritarian and acting against the rules-based international order. Alliance of medium and small size countries would not work, as the fundamental ingredient of international order is power. The alliance with the US will continue to be the best and only option for the incumbent US allies.

The power of the US is declining, but it is only relative to the rise of other powers. The US is still at the pinnacle of the international hierarchy in almost every dimension of power and is likely to remain there.[297] The relative decline of the US happened because the US post-war project for the recovery of the war-devastated world was successful. In addition, the US-centred alliance network is not a unilateral project of the US. It has been always adjusted by the burden sharing of US partners[298], including Japan and Australia. Although the adjustment is becoming more challenging particularly because of the advent of the Trump Administration, the US is not all about Mr Trump. In theory, it may be true that those individuals who range themselves

against existing authority are no less products and reflections of the society than those uphold it, as EH Carr described.[299] In this sense, Donald Trump reflects the American society, but at the same time the American society is more diverse. Incidentally, President Donald Trump's security policy orientation began to follow the traditional line of the Republicans. While his administration's National Security Strategy is full of his own political rhetoric such as 'America first,' "fair and reciprocal economic relationships to address trade imbalances,' and 'a fair share of the burden of responsibility,'[300] the substance of the Strategy emphasises the US strong commitment to the alliance relationships as expressed by the previous administrations. In addition, the US president cannot conduct his policy without cooperating with the Congress, which strongly supports the alliances on the bipartisan basis. It is the American public that chose Mr Trump as the US president, but it is also the same public that up until now strongly supports the American alliances abroad.

Shared Strategic Interests of the Two Countries

The JDSC of 2007 begins with the two prime ministers' affirmation that 'the strategic partnership between Japan and Australia is based on democratic values, a commitment to human rights, freedom and the rule of law, as well as shared security interests, mutual respect, trust and deep friendship'. Then, what are the shared security interests of the two countries?

Satake argues, 'While Australia saw little direct military threat from China, it predicted that 'US–China relations may be a significant source of tension in the region in coming years,' which could significantly affect Australia's security. In order to hedge against growing strategic uncertainties caused by the changing regional balance of power, Japan and Australia began to enhance their bilateral and trilateral defence relationship with the United States, as well as strengthen their traditional US alliance ties by assuming greater regional and global burden-sharing.'[301] I have two comments on his point as follows:

First, these attempts should not be regarded as 'hedge.' As I discussed earlier, all these attempts are part of their efforts to make alliance network more robust and more adjusted to the current environment.

Second, he seems to suggest that the main consideration of the two countries is about China. Rise of China may have been behind their efforts to enhance their security relationship, but it is global security challenges such as terrorism, proliferation of WMDs, and human security concerns including natural disasters and pandemics that the JDSC emphasised. In fact, the JDSC does not explicitly take up the most serious aspect of the rise of China, i.e. China's maritime expansion. Although the Australia–Japan '2+2' Joint Statement of 2012 has a paragraph on the promotion of regional adherence to norms of maritime security and safety, including freedom of navigation, this document in fact states, 'Continuing to build positive, comprehensive relationships with China, in support of China's responsible and constructive participation in the international rules-based order and role in promoting regional prosperity and stability while encouraging improved openness and transparency with respect to China's military modernization and activities.' In this document, the two countries seemed to take a low-key position toward China, compared with the '2+2' Joint Communique of 2015 and the '2+2' Joint Statement of 2017, both of which place more emphasis on the negative aspects of China's maritime expansion. Even now, Australia's view on China, shown in the 2016 Defence White Paper, is nuanced, as I discussed earlier. It seems still a little early to suggest that rise of China was the main consideration.

If the two countries had shared their concern on the rise of China at the time of the establishment of the JDSC, it would have focused much more on maritime security cooperation. In 2007, international terrorism by al-Qaeda was still casting a long shadow over the international community and it was just one year after North Korea's first nuclear test and only three years after the Sumatra earthquake and tsunami. Counter-terrorism, non-proliferation of WMDs and HA/DR were very hot issues then, and the roles of the alliances with the US were critical in these agenda. Therefore, it was natural for Japan

and Australia as allies of the US to promote security cooperation to address these challenges.

Incidentally, these issues are even more relevant today. Proliferation of terrorists to this region in the aftermath of the collapse of IS in the Middle East and the possibility that Rohingya issue will instigate foreign fighters to conduct terrorism in this region are serious regional concerns now. Already North Korea conducted six nuclear tests in the past eleven years, and its missile capabilities are improving rapidly. In addition, this region is prone to huge natural disasters, not to mention Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami in 2011 and Typhoon Haiyan in 2013.

Rise of China is more conspicuous than before. The Chinese are more assertive in their words and deeds. China defies the ruling of the Permanent Court of Arbitration of July 2016 on the South China Sea disputes. It does not stop land reclamation and militarization in the South China Sea, contrary to its assertion. In his report to the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China on October 18, 2017, President Xi Jinping referred to the land reclamation as one of the major achievements in the Chinese economic development in the past five years.[302] He also said, 'We will make it our mission to see that by 2035, the modernization of our national defence and our forces is basically completed; and that by the mid-21st century our people's armed forces have been fully transformed into world class forces,'[303] but it is unknown what the 'world-class' military forces mean. As Japan is the only maritime power in Northeast Asia that is exposed directly to China's maritime expansion, and Australia is the only maritime power facing both the Pacific and the Indian Oceans, it is natural for both countries to be concerned about the maritime expansion of China, particularly its naval expansion.

As the basis of the regional security, in addressing China, North Korea, international terrorism or whatever, both countries will continue to have shared interests in strengthening the US-centred alliance network of this region. Former US President Barak Obama said in his speech to the Australian Parliament in November 2011, 'the United

States has been, and always will be, a Pacific nation.'[304] It is not a political rhetoric unique to him. It is a geographical fact no one can deny, but without continuous efforts on the part of the regional allies to work on the US, the US might be forgetful of the important fact. It is increasingly important for both nations to remind the US of it in order to make the regional order robust.

Opportunities and Challenges Expected to Come from the Scope of the Partnership

Rikki Kersten argues with regard to Japan's security policy reform, particularly on the issue of collective self-defence, 'It is … essential that collective self-defence can be realised outside of an alliance relationship replete with fears of entrapment, while still delivering relative security autonomy. It is here that the deeper, broader security relationship with Australia comes into its own from a Japanese perspective, as this relationship delivers more strategic autonomy for Japan while remaining within the US alliance system.'[305] However, Japan is not obliged to defend any foreign countries, even the US, and therefore fears of entrapment should not be viewed as relevant in the discussion of collective self-defence. If Japan pursued security autonomy, Japan would not be interested in exercising the right of collective self-defence because it is the right to fight for others. Meanwhile, she is right in arguing, 'It is the partnership with Australia that … enhances the quality and coherence of the alliance with the USA,'[306] in the sense that the partnership with Australia will strengthen the US-centred alliance network as the basis of the regional order. Tensions will not emerge between trilateral expectations involving the US, Japan and Australia on the one hand, and Japan's own ambitions for bilateral security relations with Australia on the other for the same reason, contrary to her concern.[307] In this regard, Satake's policy recommendation, 'Japan and Australia should encourage a continued US commitment to liberal international order, especially in the Asia-Pacific region. … They should … support the US military presence in the region as well as encourage the United States to commit to free trade and regional institutions.'[308] should be well

taken. The security partnership of the two countries should be rightly placed in the international efforts to establish regional order based on the US-centred alliance network.

Then, what are key areas of practical security cooperation between the two countries? Satake lists five areas: first, military training, exercises, and interoperability; second, information and intelligence sharing; third, missile defence; fourth, cyber security; and fifty and finally, regional defence engagement.[309] This list provides a well-thought forward-looking set of ideas. As Australia, Japan and the US are advanced maritime democracies, I would add maritime security and promotion of democracy to this list.

First, maritime security. The Asia Pacific is a huge seascape, where the regional stability is challenged by the continental power's maritime advancement, which narrows the security buffer with the maritime powers. That is why both countries should promote maritime security cooperation. Meanwhile, maritime security is not just about China's expansion. It includes a wide variety of issues of common concern for mankind, including maritime disaster, and piracy, as I discussed earlier. Even apart from the issue of expansion of China, both nations must cooperate for maritime security.

Second, promotion of democracy. It is important, but not necessarily because of the theory of democratic peace. Disruption is built into the fabric of democracy as democracy's stability is born of its openness to upheaval through elections, legislation and social actions, as Condoleezza Rice points out.[310] This domestic situation may sometimes cause conflicts and confrontations to the international relations among democracies. Nonetheless, democracy promotion is important, because of democracy's inherent affinity to the rule of law, freedom, transparency and accountability to the public. These concepts are critically important to uphold the rules-based international order particularly in the face of the resurgence of authoritarianism with aggressive foreign policies. Democracy promotion means helping developing countries establish a democratic institution from within by peaceful means. In the conduct of capacity

building assistance to South East Asian countries, particularly to Vietnam, not only maritime security but also democracy promotion should be included in the agenda in an appropriate way in which it is acceptable to those countries.

Related to the promotion of the bilateral security cooperation, Wilkins argues, 'In short, while the economic relationship [with China] is obviously extremely important to Australia, the far more balanced and extremely important strategic relationship with Japan should not be allowed to unduly suffer as a result. After all, PM Abbott declares 'you do not win new friends by losing old ones."[311] Wilkins is right, but China consideration will continue to linger in the minds of both countries.

A related issue is how to involve India in the security cooperation. In the face of China's disturbance of the regional order and the balance of power, it is important for Japan to complicate China's security calculations. Geographically, Japan is located in a position to check China from its eastern flank, and India is from its southern flank. That is a reason closer cooperation with India has a great importance. India has a large economic and military potential, and its maritime capability is increasing, but it is psychologically far away from Japan in the minds of common Japanese. It is sometimes difficult for them to realise that India is part of Asia. Here is the importance of Japan's partnership with Australia since Australia is faced with the Indian Ocean. Australia is more accustomed to the concept of 'Indo-Pacific region' to express our region.[312] Japan's use of the term is now unfolding, but a strategy toward the Indo-Pacific does not seem to be fully established yet. The most important issue is how to embrace India as an integral part of the security cooperation and architecture of this entire region. It has not been articulated yet, either. Security cooperation with Australia will help facilitate Japan's cultivation of its strategic thinking about India.

Management of the Expectations in the Acute Regional Security Environment

Bisley points out, 'Since European settlement in 1788, the only time that Australia has felt itself to be fundamentally threatened was by Japan's attacks on Darwin and Sydney Harbor during the Second World War. … In 1945, the country was a thinly populated wealthy white country with a racially exclusionary immigration policy which found itself in a region that was densely populated, poor as well as, from Canberra's perspective, dangerous and volatile.'[313] It is surprising to see the shift of the landscape during the past 70 years. The relationship between Australia and Japan is much more robust now even beyond the personal tie between Tony Abbott and Shinzo Abe.

Both the bilateral relationship of Australia and Japan and the trilateral relationship of Japan, Australia and the US must be more robust to address the acute security environment. The 2016 Defence White Paper of Australia defines the importance of the security relationship with Japan and shows the guidance on the ways ahead, based on the JDSC.[314] The Japanese side should also echo the Australian aspiration in the next National Defence Program Guidelines, hopefully to be completed and released in 2018. The shift or expansion of security focus of the two sides, even including cyber space and outer space, necessitates a new framework replacing the 2007 JDSC. If the JDSC is renewed, such collaboration for renewal will generate a new momentum for further promotion of the bilateral security cooperation.

Notes

1 Meaney, Neville, 1992 'Australia, the Great Powers and the Coming of the Cold War', *Australian Journal of Political Science* vol.38, no. 3, p.324.

2 De Matos, Christine, 2008, *Imposing Peace & Prosperity: Australia, Social Justice and Labour Reform in Occupied Japan,* Australian Scholarly Publishing, Melbourne, pp.40, 307.

3 Lee, David, 1995, *Search for Security: The Political Economy of Australia's Postwar Foreign and Defence Policy,* Allen & Unwin, Sydney, p. 102. By early 1948, reports from the US were arguing that the changing world situation 'arising from the steady deterioration of China, deterioration of [the] Korean situation, and Russian expansionism has already outdated initial United States' post-surrender policy'; see Australian Embassy Washington to Department of External Affairs (DEA) Canberra, 23 March 1948, National Archives of Australia (NAA) A1838/515/2 Part 1

4 Australian Consul-General New York to DEA Canberra, 19 Nov. 1947, NAA A1838/TS382/8/2/1 Part 3.

5 'Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr Marshall Green of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs', 28 May 1948, *Foreign Relations of the United States* (*FRUS*), 1948, Vol. VI, The Far East and Australasia, doc. 552. For example, in an article published in *The New York Times* on 4 April 1948, Evatt continued to emphasis the same post-war themes while failing to address the emerging Cold War situation. He wrote of 'Australia and New Zealand', as 'young democracies rapidly growing in power and influence', proving 'to be valiant and indispensable allies' in 'redressing the world balance in favour of liberty against international fascism'. Communism was not mentioned at all in the article, which is almost entirely focused on Japan; see 'There is the Pacific also', Text of article published in *The New York Times*, 4 April 1948, NAA A1838/383/1/2/1 Part 3.

6 See, for example, 'Statement by the Minister for External Affairs, The Right Hon. H. V. Evatt', 11 Nov. 1949, NAA A1838/381/3/1/2 Part 1.

7 For example, on 3 January 1950 Spender said, 'Australia, which with New Zealand, has the greatest direct interest in Asia of all Western peoples, must develop a dynamic policy towards neighbouring Asian countries. We should give leadership to developments in that area'; Quoted in 'Australia's Role in S.E. Asia', *The Age*, 3 Jan. 1950, NAA A1838/381/3/1/1, Part 1.

8 'Statement by the Minister for External Affairs in the House of Representatives', 28 Nov. 1950, NAA A1838/383/4/1A Part 1.

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10 Jervis, Robert, 1980, 'The Impact of the Korean War on the Cold War', *Journal of Conflict Resolution,* vol. 24, no. 4, pp. 563-92.

11 Halvorson, Dan, 2017, 'From Commonwealth Responsibility to the National Interest: Australia and Post-war Decolonisation in South-East Asia', *The International History Review*, pp.1-23, DOI: 10.1080/07075332.2017.1357135

12 The ANZAM concept originated in 1946 and referred to the British Commonwealth zone of security in South East Asia, for which Australia assumed planning responsibility in 1950. Australia's forward defence deployments to Malaya in 1955 during the 'Emergency', and to Borneo in 1965 to oppose Indonesia's 'Confrontation' of Malaysia, were taken under ANZAM auspices as part of the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve (CSR).

13 Australia's initial opposition and then sponsorship of Japan's entry to the Colombo Plan has received some attention within larger works on Australia–Japan relations, and Australia and the Colombo Plan. See, respectively, Rix, Alan, 1999, *The Australia–Japan Political Alignment: 1952 to the Present,* Routledge, London and New York, pp. 119-20; and Oakman, Daniel, 2010, *Facing Asia: A History of the Colombo Plan,* ANU E-Press, Canberra, pp. 99-111. There is only one standalone study of this episode: Kobayashi, Ai 2014 'Australia and Japan's Admission to the Colombo Plan', *Australian Journal of Politics and History,* vol. 60, no. 4, pp. 518-33.

14 Watt, Sir Alan, 1975 'Australia's Reaction to Growing Japanese Influence in the Far East: An Uncertain Future', in David Pettit (ed) *Selected Readings in Australian Foreign Policy*, 2nd edition, Sorrett Publishing, Malvern, Vic, p. 287.
15 Halvorson, Dan, 2016, 'From Cold War Solidarity to Transactional Engagement: Reinterpreting Australia's Engagement with Asia, 1949–74', *Journal of Cold War Studies,* vol. 18, no. 2, pp. 130–59.
16 Oakman, Daniel, 2010, *Facing Asia: A History of the Colombo Plan,* ANU E-Press, Canberra, p. 33.
17 Lowe, David and Oakman, Daniel, 2004, 'Introduction' in David Lowe and Daniel Oakman (eds) *Documents on Australian Foreign Policy: Australia and the Colombo Plan 1949–1957*, Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Canberra, p. xxv; Tomlinson, BR, 2015, '"The Weapons of the Weakened": British Power, Sterling Balances, and the Origins of the Colombo Plan' in Shigeru Akita, Gerold Krozewski and Shoichi Watanabe (eds) *The Transformation of the International Order of Asia: Decolonization, the Cold War, and the Colombo Plan*, Routledge, London and New York, pp. 34–5.
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19 House of Representatives, *Official Hansard*, No. 23, 1952, Wednesday, 4 June 1952, 20th Parl., 1st Sess., 4th Period, 1370.
20 'Political Objectives of the Colombo Plan', 19 March 1952, NAA A1838/3004/11, Part 1
21 Oakman, *Facing Asia*, pp. 36–42.
22 Lowe, 'Percy Spender and the Colombo Plan'.
23 'Japanese Participation in the Colombo Plan', Annex to Cabinet Submission, 28 July 1954, in *Documents on Australian Foreign Policy*, 589.

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25 *Ibid.*, p. 483.
26 *Ibid.*
27 'A General Appraisal of the Colombo Plan', Memorandum by DEA, Aug. 1952, in *Documents on Australian Foreign Policy*, 500.
28 Kobayashi, 'Australia and Japan's Admission to the Colombo Plan', 529. The election result was very close. The ALP won the popular and two-party preferred vote, but not enough seats to form government.
29 'A General Appraisal of the Colombo Plan', p. 501.
30 *Ibid.*, p. 502.
31 Kobayashi, 'Australia and Japan's Admission to the Colombo Plan', p. 520.
32 'Japanese Participation in the Colombo Plan', pp. 589–90.
33 The Australian Embassy in Washington wrote to Casey that the 'Americans thought Japanese association "in some feasible manner" should now be considered'. The exclusion of Japan constituted a '"logical inconsistency" against [the] background of generous policies pursued towards her by [the] United States and Commonwealth and also prevented practical co-operation between Japan and South East Asia'; 'Japan and the Colombo Plan', DEA Canberra to Australian Embassy Washington, 12 Aug. 1954, Australian Embassy Washington to DEA, in *Documents on Australian Foreign Policy*, 593.
34 Kobayashi, 'Australia and Japan's Admission to the Colombo Plan', p. 526.
35 Minute from Casey to Tange, 16 Aug. 1954, in *Documents on Australian Foreign Policy*, p. 594.
36 *Ibid.*
37 Letter from Casey to Menzies, 18 Aug. 1954, in *Documents on Australian Foreign Policy*, 595. On a broader note, Alan Rix points out that it was only in the mid-1950s when residual wartime matters had been 'cleared away', that Australia, from a domestic political point of view, could pursue 'more constructive dealings with Japan'; Rix, *The Australia–Japan Political Alignment*, 3.

38 'Japan's Association with the Colombo Plan', DEA Canberra to all Posts, 28 Aug. 1954, in *Documents on Australian Foreign Policy*, 598. In a letter to Lester Pearson, Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, on 1 September 1954, Casey explained Australia's change of policy: 'As you know there has been some discrete inquiry on the part of the Japanese over a year ago and again lately, as to whether they might not be allowed to join the Colombo Plan. A year ago was, from our point of view, too early as public opinion would not have been ready for that sort of thing at that time. However time has marched on and we are now of a different mind on the subject. I suggested to our Cabinet lately that we might show more tolerance towards Japan – and that … we should cease to drag our feet with regard to their joining the Colombo Plan – which was agreed'; Letter from Casey to Lester Pearson (Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs), 1 Sept. 1954, in *Documents on Australian Foreign Policy*, p. 599.

39 Record of Conversation between Patrick Shaw (Assistant Secretary, UN Division, DEA) and Haruhiko Nishi (Japanese Ambassador to Australia), 16 Sept. 1954, in *Documents on Australian Foreign Policy*, p. 603.

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43 'Review of Australian Policies in Asia and the Assumptions on which these are Based', Heads of Mission Conference – Bangkok, August 1959, NAA A1838/1270/15/8. Much the same conclusions were reached at the 1962 Conference of Australian representatives; see Heads of Mission Conference – Bangkok, 19-22 June 1962, NAA A1838/3004/11/28 Part 3.

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45 The 'Asianist' element of the Japanese political elite maintained that close co-operation with China and integration with Asia should remain important strategic priorities. Generally, Japan perceived the Soviet Union as a greater threat than China during the Cold War; J.B. Welfield, 'Australia and Japan in the Cold War', in *Japan and Australia: Two Societies and their Interaction*, eds. Peter Drysdale and Hironobu Kitaoji (Canberra: ANU Press, 1981), 397-99.

46 In the only stand-alone piece written on the subject and published in 2006, it is treated as a failed 'co-operative security' organisation, which is factually incorrect. See C.W. Braddick, 'Japan, Australia and ASPAC: The Rise and Fall of an Asia-Pacific Co-Operative Security Framework', in *Japan, Australia and Asia-Pacific Security*, eds. Brad Williams and Andrew Newman (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), pp. 30-46.

47 Braddick, 'Japan, Australia and ASPAC', p.32.

48 'Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC)', Brief for Prime Minister's Visit to USA, March/April 1969, NAA A1838/541/1/1 Part 2; Braddick, 'Japan, Australia and ASPAC', p. 34.

49 'US/Japan Consultations', 2 Oct. 1968, Australian Embassy Tokyo to DEA Canberra, NAA A1838/3004/13/21 Part 8.

50 For example, External Affairs Minister, Paul Hasluck's (1964-69) report from the Second Ministerial Meeting on 7 July 1967 emphasised the crucial importance of the organisation to Australia: 'ASPAC is an Asian organisation which includes Australia (and New Zealand) as full members but not the major Western powers so that our membership associates Australia with Asian countries on a basis of equality and associates us with the region in a unique way; eee 'Asian and Pacific Council – Second Ministerial Meeting: Report by the Minister for External Affairs, The Rt. Hon. Paul Hasluck, M.P.', July 1967, NAA A1838/541/1/1 Part 2; also 'Briefing on ASPAC and ASEAN', Prepared by L.R. McIntyre, DEA, for Lord Casey, Governor-General, 15 Nov. 1968, A1838/3004/13/21 Part 8. In addition, One of Australia's most longstanding and influential diplomats and public servants, Sir Arthur Tange, then High Commissioner to India, considered ASPAC as particularly significant, in 'that none

of the major Western or Communist powers are members – these are the beginnings of true regional collaboration'; see 'Australia and South-East Asia', Address by the High Commissioner in India, Sir Arthur Tange, Defence Services Staff College, Wellington, Madras State, 9 Oct. 1967, NAA A1838/3004/11 Part 8. Tange served as Secretary of the Department of External Affairs from 1954 to 1965 and Secretary of the Defence Department from 1970 to 1979.

51 'Regional Cooperation in Asia', New Zealand (NZ) Foreign Ministry, 25 May 1972, NAA A1838/3004/13/21 Part 15.

52 'Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC)'.

53 'Report on A.S.P.A.C. Activities in Bangkok by the Australian Ambassador in Bangkok', 15 June 1967, NAA A1838/541/3/1 Part 2.

54 'Japan Australian Ministerial Talks', Australian Embassy Tokyo to DEA Canberra, 30 March 1967, NAA A1838/541/1/1 Part 2.

55 'Asian and Pacific Council – Third Ministerial Meeting, 30 July – 1 August 1968', Report by the Minister for External Affairs, The Rt. Hon. Paul Hasluck, M.P., Cabinet Submission No. 266, NAA A5882/CO310; DEA Canberra to Australian Embassy Washington, 2 Aug. 1968, NAA A1838/3004/13/21 Part 7.

56 'Japanese Paper on ASPAC', Attachment to 'Attitudes to ASPAC of Individual Member Governments', July 1967, NAA A1838/541/6.

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58 Miki explained 'this primarily in terms of the difficulties the Japanese Government has with its domestic public opinion but no doubt the Japanese also wish to maintain the maximum flexibility for the future in relation to the communist countries'; see DEA Canberra to Australian Embassy Washington, 2 Aug. 1968, NAA A1838/3004/13/21 Part 7

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60 'Regional Cooperation in Asia'.
61 DFA Submission to Minister on China Policy, 4 Nov. 1971, NAA A1838/541/1/3.
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279 There is a view that Australia's close economic relation with China is the major reason for the setback. Though there is no clear evidence to support such a view (Satake, "Japan-Australia Security Cooperation," 5.), it reflects the tendency to look at the security cooperation between the two countries as a tool to address China alone and to view the security situation in this region from the view-point of China's expansion or the competition between China and the American bloc alone. If Australia had abandoned its submarine modernization program or chosen China as its partner, such a view would have been the case, but in fact, Australia is going to modernise its submarines, and thus the above-said view seems misguided.

280 Bisley, 'Australia's Changing Perception', p. 113.
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292 See Australian Government *2016 Defence White Paper,* 'The threat of terrorism and terrorist groups to Australia's security and our interests in a stable international order is growing', p. 46.
'Cyber attacks are a direct threat to the ADF's warfighting ability given its reliance on information networks. … Cyber threats also have impacts well beyond Defence, with the potential to attack other Australian government agencies, all sectors of Australia's economy and critical infrastructure', p. 52.
'Some countries are developing capabilities to target satellites to destroy these systems [space-based satellite systems on which the ADF and our partners are reliant] or degrade their capabilities, threatening our networks. Space-based capabilities also offer potential state adversaries advanced information gathering opportunities, including imagery gathering', p. 52.
'North Korea's threatening behaviour includes its nuclear weapons program, its ballistic missile tests, and its proliferation

of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems', p. 60.

'Weak or fragile countries may resort to using weapons of mass destruction [...] Terrorists will also continue to seek the means to conduct a mass casualty chemical, biological, radioactive or nuclear attack', p. 64.

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GRIFFITH ASIA INSTITUTE

Griffith University Nathan campus
Nathan Queensland 4111, Australia

Phone: +61 7 3735 3730
Email: gai@griffith.edu.au

griffith.edu.au/asiainstitute

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