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Economic Insecurity, Populism and Public Trust: an Experimental Approach

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Economic Insecurity, Populism and Public Trust: an Experimental Approach

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Abstract

This paper tries to experimentally analyses the role of perceived economic insecurity in shaping political attitudes. Specifically, we are interested in testing whether feeling of economic insecurity led to increased populist attitudes and distrust via racial anxiety. We develop a priming experiment designed to randomly allocate a treatment that triggers feelings of economic insecurity. Relative to our control group, we expect to find that exposed individuals had lower levels of institutional trust, and are more likely to score highly on an index capturing nativist sentiment. If our results will be confirmed by the experimental setting, this would suggest that policies promoting economic security may reduce populist and authoritarian attitudes.

Keywords: Populism, Trust, Economic Insecurity, Racial Anxiety.

JEL Classification Numbers: D63, D72, D90

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1 Introduction

Economic insecurity is a topic of increasing interest in the public and academic debate, especially in this time of economic uncertainty, political instability and global pandemic. Defined as "the anxiety produced by the possible exposure to adverse economic events and by the anticipation of the difficulty to recover from them" (Bossert & D'Ambrosio, 2013, p.1018), economic insecurity has been discussed not only for its implications of individual well-being (Rohde *et al.*, 2016; Watson, 2018, among others) but also for its effects on social and political attitudes (Hacker *et al.*, 2013).

The individual experience or the perception of economic insecurity has recently being discussed as one of the main driver of the recent rise right-wing populist support in the Western democracies and the reasons behind the resurgence of far-right movements around the globe (Bossert *et al.*, 2019; Guiso *et al.*, 2017; Rodrik, 2021, among others). The increased vulnerability, a sense of relative deprivation and status loss has also affected attitudes toward the government and support for redistributive policies (Hacker *et al.*, 2013; Shayo, 2009, 2020), with those more insecure individuals less supportive of welfare state (Ashok *et al.*, 2015; Charité *et al.*, 2015) and less trusting of public institutions and political establishment (Algan *et al.*, 2017; Dustmann *et al.*, 2017; Guiso *et al.*, 2020). It has also been argued that economic insecurity has contributed to sharpen intergroup conflicts (Inglehart & Norris, 2017) and made in-group membership more salient, boosting identity politics (Besley & Persson, 2021; Gennaioli & Tabellini, 2019; Grossman & Helpman, 2020). The recent COVID-19 pandemic have exacerbated this tendency with far right-wing movements leading anti-lock down protests, exploiting the opposition for the government restriction measures.

In this paper we adopt an experimental approach in order to test the causal link between economic insecurity, racial anxiety and social distrust. In particular, we run a survey on students and staff in one of the Australian Universities asking a series of questions on voting preferences and politics interest. We then expose the participants to two different future scenarios about the state of the Australian economy to study how they change their views about immigration, social trust and cohesion, and vaccine hesitancy.

This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and provides an overview of the distribution of the key variables across the sample. Section 3 explains our empirical strategy. In the Appendix A, we provide the main questions of the survey and some additional results.

2 Data and Randomization

We have designed the survey "Economic Insecurity and Political attitudes in Australia" using as participants students and staff from Griffith University. The survey required approximately 10 to 15 minutes to be completed. After receiving ethical approval from the Ethics committee of Griffith University, we have invited individuals to participate through the "Volunteer for important Research projects" page at Griffith University and publishing the link of the survey through the website of some undergraduate courses at the Griffith Business School. We have informed that the participation was anonymous and no incentive was provided in participating in the survey. The participants were randomly assigned in treatment and control group, with an equal number of individuals assigned to each condition. As in Di Tella and Rodrik (2020), we restricted our data to those who confirm to have devoted full attention to the survey. Incomplete surveys have also been discarded. We ask the participants to fill all the questions, adding a pop-up window when some questions were not completed.

The survey has started the 1st of December and it is still ongoing. Here we report the answers recorded at the end of April. 140 participants, 55 staff members and 82 students and 3 other participants from outside Griffith University have completed the survey. The survey has 7 main sections. The first group of questions is intended to collect demographic characteristics of the participant. We report in Table 1 the main demographics (gender, age, residence, level of education, parental background, income, religiosity, family composition, employment status, main language spoken at home), distinguished between treatment and control group. The mean age for the entire sample is 37.82. The sample is mainly composed by individuals who are females, Australians, with a PhD, who live in Queensland in a main city and with a full-time occupation. The middle gross income, defined as the middle point of the 10 income classes is quite high, about 84000 dollars, although there is a large variability (more than 50000 dollars standard deviation)

In the second section, we asked participants about their interest in politics and party preference, using questions from the "Political Interest & Political Participation" section of the World Value Survey (henceforward WWS) (7th Wave, 2017-2020). When individuals where asked about political interest on 0-10 scale, the mean response was 6.863 for the control group and 7.862 for the treatment group. When asked about their political position on the left-right spectrum (0 left, 10 right), the average position was 3.164 for the control and 2.908 for the treatment. In the third section, participants have been asked to read an article about the future of the Australian economy: for those assigned to the treatment group, the article present a negative trend with particular emphasis on increasing unemployment; for those assigned to the control group, the article has a neutral/positive view on the economic prospects for Australia.

The article is followed by a series of manipulation checks as in Jetten *et al.* (2021)and Stewart and Willer (2021), in order to test the efficacy of the treatment. At question "according to the article, Australia's economic future looks bright" on a 0-10 scale with 0= "strongly disagree" and 10= "strongly agree", individuals assigned to the treatment and control group correctly identified the tone of the article, with the treatment group averaging 1.892 and the control group 7.301. The other manipulations checks are relative to perceived economic insecurity, both on a personal level and a country level. At the question of "How concerned are you about the state of the Australian economy?" on a 0-10 scale with 0= "not concerned at all" and 10= "extremely concerned", the treatment group reports a bigger mean value than the control group (6.446 vs 5.753). At the question "Overall, how concerned are you about your future economic security" the two groups report similar levels (5.753 for the control and 6.446 for the treatment). We also consider a measure for relative gratification/deprivation by Dambrun et al. (2006) in order to capture a broader sense of economic insecurity. At the question "would you say that your overall financial circumstances are better, same or worse relative to people like you" on a 0-10 scale, with 0= "much worse" and 10= "much better", the treatment group scores a mean value of 5.8 vs 6.082 for the control group.

In the remaining sections, we ask a series of questions about opposition to immigration, social trust, nationalism, racism and vaccine hesitancy that will be our main variables of interest. In section 3, we use 3 items from the multicultural policy scale by Leviston etal. (2020), where greater value of the index denotes increasing support for governmental programs for immigrants and the opposition to immigration scale by Jetten *et al.* (2021)where greater value of the index indicates stronger opposition to immigration. For the control group the average value of the first index is 8.242 and 1.870 for the second one, while for the treatment group is 8.123 and 1.803. In section 4, we focus on social trust and trust toward organizations as in Di Tella and Rodrik (2020), using two questions from "Social Capital, Trust & Organizational Membership" section of the WWS. At the question "generally speaking, would you say most people can be trusted, or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?" on a 0-10 scale with 0= "need to ve very careful" and 10="most people can be trusted", the control group score 5.342 average value and the treatment gruop 5.707. At the question "I am going to name a number of organizations. For reach one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them?" on a 0-10 scale with 0 = "none at all" and 10 = "a great deal", the control group reports an average value of 4.381 vs 4.097 of the treatment group.

In section 5, we focus our attention on measures of nationalism considering also the economic dimension, due to the particular relevance of trade protectionism in the rightwing populistic rhetoric (Grossman & Helpman, 2020; Rodrik, 2021). The index for nationalism/national identity and the economic nationalism index have been taken from the national identity questionnaire by the International Social Survey Pogram (Module III, 2013) and adapted for the Australian case. The nationalism index is composed by 8 items (some of them have been reverse coded), where greater value of the indices indicates a stronger national identity and economic nationalism. The average values of the two indices are around 4 for the control group (4.380 and 4.296), slightly lower for the treatment group (3.869 and 4.268).

In section 6, we consider a measure of racial attitudes, using the RACES scale proposed by Grigg and Manderson (2015) for Australia. The original index includes 25 items, we restrict our analysis only on those items measuring racist attitudes, as main aspect of the right-wing populist attitudes. Higher value of the index denotes higher level of acceptance, with the control group scoring an average value of 6.437 and the treatment group a slight higher value of 6.792. In the last section, we focus on vaccine hesitancy due to the link with right-wing populism (Kennedy, 2019; Larson *et al.*, 2016) and the government distrust (Burke *et al.*, 2021; de Figueiredo *et al.*, 2020). We consider two questions, the first one relative to vaccine confidence from the Vaccine Confidence Project questionnaire and second one about source of medical trust from the WIN/Gallup International Association survey (Larson *et al.*, 2016). The items of the first index have been reversed coded in order to measure vaccine hesitancy. The control group has a very low average score of vaccine hesitancy (1.032) and a score of 6.256 in the source of medical trust index. The treatment group has scored similar values for both indices: 1.103 for vaccine hesitancy and 6.323 for trust in medical advisors.

In Table 2, we report the distribution of the political interest variables and the main outcomes after the treatment. We also provide a graphical representation of the main variables distribution in Figure 2 - Figure 6 for the treatment and control group.

3 Experimental Strategy

We study the effect of economic insecurity on populist attitudes via racial anxiety. In Figure 1, we show our causal framework based on Rodrik (2021). Due to the limitation of a secondary data analysis in estimating a causal effect, we adopt an experimental strategy to test the indirect effect of economic insecurity on populist support. In particular, we study the effect of a treatment on a series of indicators about opposition to immigration, racism, nativism and trust. In both case, for the treatment and control group, the article read by the participants has an introduction paragraph that describe the state of the Australian economy and a second paragraph with a fictional character's history to make it more personal.



Figure 1: Economic insecurity causal framework

Note: The graph represents the direct (A) and indirect effect (B) of economic insecurity on populist attitudes. The graph is based on Rodrik (2021).

Empirically, we estimate the following model to link economic insecurity with the all the survey quantities of interest (social trust, nationalism, opposition to immigration, racism and trust in the health system):

$$y = \alpha + \delta_i T + \mathbf{x}'_i \boldsymbol{\beta} + \boldsymbol{\epsilon} \tag{1}$$

Where y is the outcome of interest for social trust index and T is a dummy variable indicating if the individual belongs to the treatment and the control group. α is a constant, δ_i represents the coefficient of the treatment variable and \mathbf{x}'_i is vector of exogenous controls including sociodemographic variables such as gender, age, race and personal income, $\boldsymbol{\beta}$ a vector of parameters and $\boldsymbol{\epsilon}$ the error term.

We use ordinal techniques that do not impose a fixed gradation between outcomes. These include ordered probit/logit models, and distributional difference metrics, such as Chi-Squared distances.

	Entire	Sample	Treatment		Control	
Demographics	Mean	St. dev	Mean	St. dev	Mean	St. dev
Age	37.819	16.224	38.092	16.017	37.575	16.513
Female	0.565	0.498	0.492	0.504	0.630	0.486
Australia birth country	0.696	0.462	0.785	0.414	0.616	0.490
English-speaking birth country	0.123	0.330	0.077	0.269	0.164	0.373
Non-English birth country	0.181	0.387	0.138	0.348	0.219	0.417
Father Australia birth country	0.565	0.498	0.615	0.490	0.521	0.503
Father English birth country	0.174	0.380	0.154	0.364	0.192	0.396
Father non-English birth country	0.261	0.441	0.231	0.425	0.288	0.456
Mother Australia birth country	0.558	0.498	0.646	0.482	0.479	0.503
Mother English birth country	0.196	0.398	0.138	0.348	0.247	0.434
Mother non-English birth country	0.246	0.432	0.215	0.414	0.274	0.449
Having children	0.399	0.491	0.446	0.501	0.356	0.482
Australian citizen	0.906	0.293	0.923	0.269	0.890	0.315
Permanent resident	0.022	0.146	0.000	0.000	0.041	0.200
Temporary resident	0.072	0.260	0.077	0.269	0.068	0.254
No High school	0.043	0.205	0.046	0.211	0.041	0.200
High school	0.275	0.448	0.338	0.477	0.219	0.417
Bachelor's degree	0.283	0.452	0.185	0.391	0.370	0.486
Master's degree	0.188	0.392	0.246	0.434	0.137	0.346
Phd	0.210	0.409	0.185	0.391	0.233	0.426
Father no High school	0.333	0.473	0.385	0.490	0.288	0.456
Father High school	0.341	0.476	0.323	0.471	0.356	0.482
Father bachelor's degree	0.196	0.398	0.138	0.348	0.247	0.434
Father master's degree	0.072	0.260	0.108	0.312	0.041	0.200
Father Phd	0.058	0.235	0.046	0.211	0.068	0.254
Mother no high school	0.225	0.419	0.246	0.434	0.205	0.407
Mother High school	0.457	0.500	0.492	0.504	0.425	0.498
Mother bachelor's degree	0.203	0.404	0.169	0.378	0.233	0.420
Mother master's degree	0.094	0.293	0.062	0.242	0.123	0.331
Mother phd	0.022	0.146	0.031	0.174	0.014	0.117
Queenslander	0.022	0.147	0.015	0.124	0.028	0.107
Victorian	0.897	0.305	0.938	0.242	0.859	0.350
Nu Cuth Wala	0.001	0.222	0.015	0.124	0.085	0.280
New South Weish	0.029	0.170	0.031	0.174	0.028	0.107
English speaking	0.884	0.321	0.908	0.292	0.863	0.340
Australian - New Zealander	0.002	0.478	0.738	0.443 0.174	0.575	0.498 0.117
Agian	0.022	0.140	0.031	0.174	0.014	0.117
Asian Other ethnic background	0.109 0.217	0.312	0.125	0.331	0.090	0.290
Poligiogity	0.217	0.414 0.424	0.100	0.312 0.414	0.313 0.247	0.408
Divorcod	0.252	0.424 0.235	0.213 0.077	0.414	0.247	0.434
Married	0.000	0.235	0.077	0.209	0.041	0.200
Separated	0.022	0.301	0.080	0.457	0.400	0.002
Single	0.031	0.220	0.031	0.174	0.008	0.234
Having siblings	0.070	0.484	0.308	0.400	0.425	0.498
Oldest sibling	0.300 0.471	0.295	0.308	0.292	0.304 0.452	0.250 0.501
City	0.411	0.501	0.452	0.304	0.452	0.001
Bural	0.400	0.283	0.015 0.077	0.450	0.010	0.400
Suburban	0.007	0.289	0.011	0.205	0.050	0.250
Urban	0.130	0.338	0.210	0.999	0.164	0.373
Full-time employee	0.100 0.404	0.493	0.052 0.422	0.292 0.498	0.389	0 491
Not in labour force	0.051	0.200	0.031	0.175	0.069	0.256
Part-time employee	0.001	0.222 0.426	0.001 0.234	0.110 0.497	0.005	0.200 0.428
Student	0.066	0.250	0.063	0.244	0.069	0.256
Self-employed	0.243	0.430	0.250	0.436	0.236	0.428
Middle income	84274.97	51826.37	101384.3	48946.05	69040.64	49816.73
Observations	1	38	6	5	7:	3

 Table 1: Descriptive Statistics

Notes: The table presents means, standard deviations, min and max for all variables used in the paper for the entire sample and for the treatment and control group.

		Treatment		Control	
Political Interest Variables	Mean	St. Dev.	Mean	St. Dev.	
Greens	0.338	0.477	0.342	0.478	
I don't know	0.046	0.211	0.110	0.315	
Labour Party	0.415	0.497	0.356	0.482	
Liberal Party	0.077	0.269	0.123	0.331	
National Party	0.031	0.174	0.041	0.200	
Other (please specify)	0.092	0.292	0.027	0.164	
Political Interest (0 Not interested at all -10 Extremely interested)	7.862	2.200	6.863	2.594	
Political Spectrum (0 Left — 10 Right)	2.908	2.241	3.164	2.410	
Manipulation Check					
Manipulation check (Australia future looks bright : 0 Strongly Disagree — 10 Strongly Agree)	1.892	1.863	7.301	2.308	
Personal economic security (0 Not concerned at all -10 Extremely concerned)	5.292	2.930	4.712	2.870	
Australian economy concerns (0 Not concerned at all -10 Extremely concerned)	6.446	2.339	5.753	2.259	
Relative Deprivation/Gratification (0 Much worse — 10 Much better)	5.800	2.101	6.082	2.133	
Outcome variables after treatment (for control group)					
Government intervention index	8.123	1.625	8.242	1.961	
Opposition to immigration index	1.803	1.864	1.870	2.250	
Social trust index	5.707	2.363	5.342	2.468	
Trust organization index	4.097	1.523	4.381	1.352	
Nationalism index	3.869	1.416	4.380	1.658	
Economic Nationalism index	4.268	1.262	4.296	1.803	
Races scale index	6.792	2.053	6.437	2.261	
Vaccine hesitancy index	1.103	1.696	1.032	1.687	
Trust health advise index	6.323	1.242	6.256	1.417	
Observations	65			73	

Table 2: Distribution of the Main Variables

Notes: The table presents means, standard deviations for the main variables used for the analysis, considering their distribution between the treatment and the control group.



Figure 2: Attitudes to Immigration

Note: The graphs report the distribution of the two indices for attitudes to immigration—government support to immigration and opposition to immigration—by treatment and control group.

Figure 3: Social Trust



Note: The graphs report the distribution of the two indices on social trust—towards other people and towards organizations, by treatment and control group.



Figure 4: Nationalism

Note: The graphs report the distribution of the two indices on nationalism—economic and national identity—by treatment and control group.

Figure 5: Racism



Note: The graphs report the distribution of the RACES scale index by treatment and control group.



Figure 6: Trust in Health System

Note: The graphs report the distribution of the two indices of trust in the health system—vaccine hesitancy and trust in health advisors—by treatment and control group.

4 Conclusion

In this paper we try to experimentally analyses the role of perceived economic insecurity in shaping political attitudes. In particular, we test if feeling of economic insecurity led to increased populist attitudes and distrust via racial anxiety. We expect to find that individuals more exposed to economic insecurity are more likely to express lower level of institutional trust and higher nativist sentiment. These results would have huge policy implications. If evidence emerges that economic insecurity is responsible for the cultural backlash, then more inclusive economic policies will mitigate the risk and enhance certainty and trust.

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A Appendix

In the Appendix we report some of the survey questions as well as the two blurbs used for the experiment.

A.1 Main survey questionnaire

The reader is referred to this web link for the online version of the survey: https://prodsurvey.rcs.griffith.edu.au/EconomicInsecurity

A.1.1 Political interest

- 1. How interested would you say are you in politics? Are you:
 - Not interested at all (0)
 - Extremely interested (10)
- 2. If there were a national election tomorrow, for which party on this list would you vote? If you don't know or you are not allowed to vote: Which party appeals to you most?
 - Labour Party
 - Liberal Party
 - National Party
 - Greens
 - One Nation
 - I don't know
 - Other (please specify)
- 3. In political matters, people talk of "the left" and "the right." How would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking?
 - Left (0)
 - Right (10)

A.1.2 Treatment

Survey goes on to one of these 2 categories.

• Control group: Australia's Economic Prospects. According to recent reports, the Australian economy is looking increasingly strong. Despite the impacts of the Covid-19 pandemic and the ongoing restrictions in place, the country has

avoided the worst of the global economic contraction. In terms of growth, inflation and unemployment, Australia has easily outperformed most other advanced nations, as recently reported by the IMF.

"My business has been surging since the start of the year," says Sally Evans, 43. We have had to take on new staff, and we simply can't keep up with demand. With consumers increasingly spending their money on domestic goods and services, the opportunities for Australians are there in abundance."

• Treatment group: Most Australians Face an Insecure Economic Future. Despite the domestic economy largely weathering the storm created by the Covid-19 pandemic, researchers are warning that millions of Australians are finding themselves in increasingly precarious economic positions. Rising inflation, combined with high unemployment and unprecedented rates of bankruptcy and foreclosure have left Australian households with little sense of safety or security.

"Since my husband lost his job, our family has been really struggling," says Sally Evans, 43. "We relied upon our savings to get through the first part of the pandemic, but these are now almost exhausted. When we run out of money, I just don't know what we will do." With the pandemic unlikely to be over any time soon and domestic and international borders remaining closed, the future for Australians like Sally remains very uncertain.

A.1.3 Manipulation checks

- 1. According to the article, Australia's economic future looks bright.
 - Strongly Disagree (0)
 - Strongly Agree (10)
- 2. We would like to ask you about the economy in general. How concerned are you about the state of the Australian economy?
 - Not concerned at all (0)
 - Extremely concerned (10)
- 3. We would like to ask you about your family and personal economic security. By economic security we mean your ability to keep your job, maintain your income, retire comfortably, manage medical emergencies and so on. Overall, how concerned are you about your future economic security?
 - Not concerned at all(0)
 - Extremely concerned (10)

A.1.4 Relative Deprivation/Gratification

- 1. Would you say that your overall financial circumstances are (better/same/worse) relative to people like you?
 - Much worse (0)
 - Much better (10)

A.1.5 Immigration and Multiculturalism

- 1. Using the scale below, to what extent do you agree with the government investing in a series of initiatives? (0-10 scale: 0 = Strongly Disagree, 10= Strongly Agree)
 - An adult migrant English program to support immigrants to learn English language skills.
 - A Government multicultural access and equity policy that provides additional social services for people from different cultural backgrounds.
 - An adult migrant English program to increase education and employment opportunities for new immigrants.
- Using the scale below, to what extent do you agree with each of the following statements? (0-10 scale: 0 = Strongly Disagree, 10= Strongly Agree)
 - Immigrants take resources and employment opportunities away from Australia.
 - In school where there are too many children of immigrants, the quality of education will suffer.
 - Immigrants abuse the system of social benefits.
 - Australian norms and values are being threatened by the presence of immigrants.
 - The cultural practices of immigrants threaten the Australian way of life.
 - Immigrants are a threat to Australian identity.

A.1.6 Social Trust

- 1. Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?
 - Need to be very careful (0)
 - Most people can be trusted (10)

- 2. I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all? (0-10 scale: 0 = None at all, 10 = A great deal)
 - The press
 - Television
 - Federal government
 - State government
 - Political parties
 - Politicians
 - Major companies
 - Scientific community
 - Social media
 - Public health officials

A.1.7 Nationalism

- 1. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements? (0-10 scale: 0 = Strongly Disagree, 10= Strongly Agree)
 - I would rather be a citizen of Australia than of any other country in the world.
 - There are some things about Australia today that make me feel ashamed of Australia.
 - The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like the Australians.
 - Generally speaking, Australia is a better country than most other countries.
 - People should support their country even if the country is in the wrong.
 - When my country does well in international sports, it makes me proud to be Australian.
 - I am often less proud of Australia than I would like to be.
 - The world would be a better place if Australians acknowledge Australia's shortcomings.
- How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?(0-10 scale: 0 = Strongly Disagree, 10= Strongly Agree)

- Australia should limit the import of foreign products in order to protect its national economy.
- For certain problems, like environment pollution, international bodies should have the right to enforce solutions.
- Australia should follow its own interests, even if this leads to conflicts with other nations.
- Foreigners should not be allowed to buy land in Australia.
- Australia's television should give preference to Australia films and programs.

A.1.8 Races scale

- The following section asks about your thoughts and feelings towards people from the many different racial, ethnic, cultural, and religious backgrounds in Australia. If a question says 'background', this means any racial, ethnic, cultural, or religious background. (0-10 scale: 0 = Strongly Disagree, 10= Strongly Agree)
 - I don't understand people from some backgrounds.
 - People from some backgrounds are more violent than others.—
 - I don't trust people from some backgrounds.
 - People from some backgrounds are not friendly.
 - If people aren't happy in Australia they should go back to their own country.
 - If people don't fit into Australian society they should change.
 - People from some backgrounds are more likely to get into trouble than others.
 - People from some backgrounds get more than they deserve.

A.1.9 Vaccines and Trust

- How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements? (0-10 scale: 0 = Strongly Disagree, 10= Strongly Agree)
 - Vaccines are important for children to have.
 - Overall, I think vaccines are effective.
 - Overall, I think vaccines are safe.
- 2. How much do you trust each of the following? Do you trust them a lot, some, not much, or not at all? (0-10 scale: 0 = None at all, 10 = A great deal)
 - Medical and health advice from the government,
 - Medical and health advice from medical workers, such as doctors and nurses.
 - Traditional healers.

A.1.10 Attention check

- 1. The final question is a request for feedback about the responses you provided so far. It is vital to our study that we only include responses from people who devoted their full attention to this study. In your honest opinion, should we use your responses, or should we discard your responses since you did not devote your full attention to the questions so far?
 - No, I have not devoted full attention to the questions so far and I think you should not use my responses for your study.
 - Yes, I have devoted full attention to the questions so far and I think you should use my responses for your study.